Martin v. Town of Simsbury

505 F.Supp.3d 116

Timothy G. MARTIN, Plaintiff,

v.TOWN OF SIMSBURY, et al., Defendants.

3:16-CV-00933 (KAD)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed December 7, 2020

Timothy G. Martin, Lakeville, CT, pro se.

Jonathan Zellner, Michael T. Ryan, Ryan Ryan DeLuca, LLP, Stamford, CT, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 147)

Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge

This action arises out of pro se Plaintiff Timothy Martin's unsuccessful effort to build a single-family residence on a parcel of land in Simsbury, Connecticut. The Defendants include the Town of Simsbury (the "Town"), Town employees and certain members of both the Zoning Board and the Conservation Commission. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, through a series of administrative or regulatory actions, thwarted his development of the land in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and state law. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Procedural Background

Plaintiff commenced this action on June 15, 2016 against the Town and other Town officials alleging various federal constitutional claims under sections 1983, 1985, and 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code, as well as various state law claims. By motion dated September 15, 2016, each Defendant sought dismissal of the case on a variety of bases, to include questions of subject matter jurisdiction, as well as claims that the Plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. (ECF No. 25). The omnibus motion was granted by the Court (Hall, J.) on May 2, 2017 on the limited issue of ripeness. (ECF No. 58). The other issues raised in the motion to dismiss were not addressed in the Court's decision.

The Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which vacated the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on May 29, 2018. (ECF No. 67). On remand, the Defendants again moved to dismiss the complaint raising the issues that were not previously decided. (ECF No. 83). At the conclusion of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the Court granted the motion, in part, dismissing the Equal Protection¹ and Due Process claims in Count One² ; dismissing the Supervisory Liability claims in Count Two, to the extent those claims were premised upon the Equal Protection or Due Process claims dismissed from Count One; dismissing the conspiracy claims contained in Count Three; dismissing the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim in Count Four; dismissing the Negligence and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claims in Counts Five and Six. The Court reserved decision on the motion with respect to the Inverse Condemnation claim in Count Seven, the Fifth Amendment Regulatory Taking claim in Count One, and the Supervisory Liability claim in Count Two, to the extent the claim was premised upon the Fifth Amendment Regulatory Taking claim in Count One.

Separately, the Court also took up the issue of whether the claims against Defendant Howard Beach should be dismissed for failure to effect service, and whether the Plaintiff should be given more time to do so. By Order dated June 19, 2019, all remaining claims against Defendant Beach were dismissed. (ECF No. 136). On August 28, 2019, the Court rendered its decision on the motion to dismiss denying the motion as to the Takings claims in Counts One and Two and denying the motion as to the Inverse Condemnation claim brought under Article First, Section 11 of the Connecticut Constitution in Count Seven. (ECF No. 139).

Thereafter, on September 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed the operative amended complaint in which he, among other things, identified a comparator to revive his Equal Protection claim and the Supervisory Liability claim to the extent it is premised upon the Equal Protection claim. On December 30, 2019, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment seeking judgment, on various grounds, as to all remaining claims. Plaintiff filed his opposition on February 18, 2020 and Defendants filed their reply on March 9, 2020.

Standard of Review

The standard under which the Court reviews motions for summary judgment is well-established. "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," while a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Significantly, the inquiry conducted by the Court when reviewing a motion for summary judgment focuses on "whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they m ay reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. As a result, the moving party satisfies his burden under Rule 56 "by showing ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case" at trial. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. , 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the movant meets its burden, "[t]he nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial[.]"

Irizarry v. Catsimatidis , 722 F.3d 99, 103 n.2 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Rubens v. Mason , 527 F.3d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 2008) ). "[T]he party opposing summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations or denials of his pleading" to establish the existence of a disputed fact. Wright v. Goord , 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) ; accord Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n , 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). "[M]ere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts" will not suffice. Hicks v. Baines , 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Nor will wholly implausible claims or bald assertions that are unsupported by evidence. See Carey v. Crescenzi , 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991) ; Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 801 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986). "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted).

In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the Court is "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Johnson v. Killian , 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft , 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) ). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the district court's function is not to weigh the evidence or resolve issues of fact; it is confined to deciding whether a rational juror could find in favor of the non-moving party." Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp. , 310 F.3d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 2002).

Facts

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses Plaintiff's non-compliance with Local Rule 56(a). Local Rule 56 governs the requirements for summary judgment motions in this district. It provides in pertinent part:

1. A party moving for summary judgment shall file and serve with the motion and supporting memorandum a document entitled "Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts," which sets forth, in separately numbered paragraphs meeting the requirements of Local Rule 56(a)3, a concise statement of each material fact as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.... Each material fact set forth in the Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement and supported by the evidence will be deemed admitted (solely for purposes of the motion) unless such fact is controverted by the Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement required to be filed and served by the opposing party in accordance with this Local Rule[.]

2. (i) A party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall file and serve with the opposition papers a document entitled "Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement of Facts in Opposition to Summary Judgment," which shall include a reproduction of each numbered paragraph in the moving party's Local Rule 56 (a)1 Statement followed by a response to each paragraph admitting or denying the fact and/or objecting to the fact as permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) .... All admissions and denials shall be binding solely for purposes of the motion unless otherwise specified. All denials must meet the requirements of Local Rule 56(a)3.....

(ii) The Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement must also include a separate section entitled "Additional Material Facts" setting forth in separately numbered paragraphs meeting the requirements of Local Rule 56(a)3 any additional facts, not previously set forth in responding to the movant's Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement, that the party opposing summary judgment contends establish genuine issues of material fact precluding judgment in favor of the moving party.....

3. Each statement of material fact by a movant in a Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement or by an opponent in a Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement, and each denial in an opponent's Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement, must be followed by a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial, or (2) other evidence that would be admissible at trial. The affidavits, deposition testimony, responses to discovery requests, or other documents containing such evidence shall be filed

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