Martin v. United States

1

DALE MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. 5:21-CT-03051-M

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division

March 6, 2023

ORDER

RICHARD E. MYERS II CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This cause is before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. Mot. [D.E 24], For the reasons discussed below, the court grants the motion.

Relevant Procedural History:

On February 16, 2021, Dale Martin (“plaintiff'), an inmate at F.C.I. Butner (“Butner”) proceeding pro se and without prepayment of fees, filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80. [D.E 1, 2, 7]. Plaintiffs unverified complaint alleges, circa March 6, 2020: Butner staffs failure to secure wheelchair restraints in a transport bus caused him to trip, fall, hit his head, and lose consciousness; a “collision” between transport buses caused him to “slam into another part of the bus, hurting [his] head and neck” “prior to [his] fall and the collision[,] there was the smell of alcohol on the staffs breath”; and, although Butner health staff treated him for a small lip cut, they ignored his severe headache and neck pain complaints, “did no kind of concussion protocol [sic],” did not provide pain medication, and failed to properly treat or document his injuries. Compl. [D.E. 1] at 5-8. For relief, plaintiff seeks $24,000.00. Id. at 9.

On December 16, 2021, the court conducted its initial review and allowed plaintiffs FTCA claim to proceed against the United States of America (“defendant”). Order [D.E. 9].

On May 13, 2022, defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, or, alternatively, for summary judgment, Mot. [D.E. 24], and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 25], a statement of facts [D.E. 26], and an appendix [D.E. 27]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), the court notified plaintiff about this pending motion, the response deadline, and the consequences of failing to respond. [D.E. 28].

On November 9, 2022, the court noted plaintiff's failure to respond to defendant's motion and directed him to inform the court whether he intended to prosecute this case. Order [D.E. 29], On December 9, 2022, plaintiff responded to the order to show cause. [D.E. 30], On December 15, 2022, the court found plaintiffs response complied with the November 9,2022, order to show cause, liberally construed this response as a motion for an extension of time to respond to defendant's pending motion, and allowed plaintiff until January 13, 2023, to file any response. Order [D.E. 31]. Plaintiff, however, failed to respond and the time to do so has passed.

Facts:

On February 24, 2020, Lieutenant Franklin Troublefield, a Butner Complex Transportation Officer (“CTO”), was conducting a bus movement at the Butner Federal Medical Center to escort plaintiff and other inmates between Complex institutions. Def's Stmt. Mat. Facts. [D.E. 26] at ¶1, see Def's App., Troublefield Decl. [D.E. 27-1] at ¶3 (declaring plaintiff “was not transported to, from, or within the Butner Complex on March 6,2020”). Plaintiff was handcuffed, had a martin chain around the waist, and had leg restraints with chains. Troublefield Decl.[D.E. 27-1] at ¶6.

Circa 12:30 p.m., while walking to a CTO bus seat, plaintiff tripped and fell on the floor when his leg restraints got caught on a floor hook that typically is used to secure wheelchairs. Id. at ¶4 (declaring, after tripping and falling, plaintiff stayed on the floor until Health Services staff responded to assess his potential injuries, but Troublefield did not witness him lose consciousness).

Circa 12:35 p.m., a second CTO bus made impact with the stationary CTO bus where plaintiff had fallen. Id. at ¶5 (declaring, while “awaiting Health Services staff to assist Plaintiff, I heard and felt an impact coming from the rear of the CTO bus we occupied. . . . Based on my observations, the second CTO bus was in motion backing up and scraped the side of the CTO bus I occupied with Plaintiff. To my knowledge neither I nor any of the other inmates on the bus at the time sustained any injuries. The only inmate that complained of an injury was Plaintiff”).

Plaintiff was seen by Butner Health Services for his injuries on both the date of this incident and on the following day. See Def's App., Declaration of Dr. Patrick Craft (“Dr. Craft Decl.”) [D.E. 27-5] at ¶¶2-6; ift, Attach. 1 [D.E. 27-6] at 1-3 (Feb. 24, 2020, Health Services Clinical Encounter Injury Assessment); id.. Attach. 2 [D.E. 27-7] at 1-2 (Feb. 25, 2020, Health Services Clinical Encounter for sick call).

Arguments:

Plaintiff argues that: Butner transport staff was negligent by not properly securing wheelchair restraints which caused his fall and loss of consciousness and in causing the motor vehicle accident; Health Services staff was negligent by “ignoring his complaints and purposefully failing to enter symptoms and complaints into [his] medical record”; and “as a result of the negligent action(s) and/or inaction(s), I suffered an unnecessary fall that resulted in injuries, and other injuries as a result of a collision between transport buses [sic].” Compl. [D.E. 1] at 5-7.

Defendant argues, inter alia: the discretionary function exception applies to plaintiffs injuries due to the trip and fall; as to the remaining claims, plaintiff fails to establish that any BOP officer breached their duty or that “action taken by actors of the United States were the proximate cause of his alleged injuries”; plaintiff received timely medical care on February 24, 2020; and his medical negligence claims are without merit. See Def's Mem. [D.E. 25] at 2, 9-28.

Legal Standards:

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-63 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012). To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008).

When considering a motion to dismiss, the court need neither accept a complaint's legal conclusions drawn from the facts, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments,” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302 (quotation omitted). The court, nevertheless, presumes as true the factual allegations in the complaint and construes these allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,268 (1994); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd, v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250,255 (4th Cir. 2009). Further, although the court liberally construes pro se filings, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), all complaints must contain “more than labels and conclusions,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Summary judgment is appropriate when, after reviewing the record as a whole, the court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment must initially demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleading, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, but “must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis and quotation omitted). A court reviewing a motion for summary judgment should determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In making this determination, the court must view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

Discussion:

“As a general rule, the United States is immune from claims for money damages in civil suits.” Blanco Ayala v. United States, 982 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 686-90 (1949)). Pursuant to the FTCA, however, the United States waives its sovereign immunity for “the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50, 52 (2013); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150,150 (1963) (finding a prisoner “can sue under the [FTCA] to recover damages from the United States Government for personal injuries sustained during confinement in a federal prison, by reason of the negligence of a government employee.” (footnote omitted)).

“An action under the FTCA may only be maintained if the Government would be liable as an individual under the law of the state where the negligent act occurred.” Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). Further, an FTCA plaintiff must “show that an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity exists[.]” Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 651 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “If the plaintiff fails to meet this...