Martin v. Warden, State Prison

Carlton Martin v. Warden, State Prison

No. TSRCV134005658

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Tolland, Somers, Geographic Area 19

April 13, 2016

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Samuel J. Sferrazza, S.J.

The petitioner, Carlton Martin, seeks habeas corpus relief from a total, effective sentence of ninety years imprisonment imposed, after a jury trial, for committing the crimes of felony murder; robbery, first degree; and five counts of witness tampering. This judgment of conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, State v. Martin, 77 Conn.App. 778 825 A.2d 835 (2003); cert. denied, 266 Conn. 906, 832 A.2d 73 (2003).

The petitioner filed a petition for a new trial, which petition was denied, and that denial was also affirmed on appeal Martin v. Flanagan, 107 Conn.App. 544, 945 A.2d 1024 (2008). In addition, he filed a habeas corpus action which ended unfavorably, Martin v. Warden, Superior Court Tolland J.D., d.n. CV 06-4001122, (November 16, 2011) T Santos, J. affirmed, per curiam, 141 Conn.App. 903, 60 A.3d 412 (2013).

The amended petition in the present habeas corpus action asserts two grounds for relief. First, the petitioner claims that he was denied due process because now-discredited, lead bullet composition comparison evidence, produced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was presented at his criminal trial. Second, he contends that his earlier habeas counsel, Attorney Sebastian DeSantis, afforded him ineffective, legal assistance in that postconviction proceeding.

Due Process Claim

In the fall of 2000, the prosecution introduced comparative bullet lead analysis evidence (CBLA) at the petitioner's criminal trial through the testimony of FBI Agent Kathleen Lundy. That testimony purportedly demonstrated that .25 caliber slugs retrieved from the victim's body and the crime scene came from the same box of ammunition seized at the petitioner's residence.

On September 1, 2005, the FBI discontinued CBLA, which it had utilized since 1996, to deduce whether a lead bullet came from a particular cartridge box. The decision to discontinue use of CBLA resulted from the conclusions of an independent research committee, composed of forensic chemists, that, in general, the chemical comparison of trace elements in lead bullets through CBLA failed to produce sufficiently distinct outcomes from which to permit a valid identification of a common source for the ammunition so analyzed.

The petition argues that the admission of this flawed, scientific evidence at his criminal trial violated his right to due process of law. The court rejects this argument both on the basis that no due process violation occurred and because no specific prejudice derived from the CBLA results in the petitioner's particular criminal case.

There is a split of authority as to whether the unknowing use of false testimony by law enforcement or prosecutorial officers is a denial of due process warranting the reversal of a conviction so obtained via habeas corpus. Gould v Commissioner, 301 Conn. 544, 570, fn 18, 22 A.3d 1196 (2011). While the majority of federal courts have rejected this proposition, the United States Supreme Court has never squarely answered the question, Id.

Our Appellate Court, however, has affirmed a trial court decision in which the " habeas court concluded that because the petitioner had not alleged that the perjured testimony came through any intentional action by the state or through deficient performance of his trial counsel, his perjury claim was an unadorned, newly discovered evidence count that might support a petition for a new trial, but that is not an independent claim on which relief can be granted in a habeas proceeding, " Lewis v. Commissioner, 116 Conn.App. 400, 410, 975 A.2d 740 (2009). The Appellate Court added, " We conclude that the court's conclusion is logically and legally correct, " Id., 411.

In the Lewis decision, the Appellate Court also noted that the pro se petitioner had failed to allege a due process violation before the habeas court, nor did he explain how the alleged perjury affected his criminal trial, Id. 411-12. The Court remarked that it was " unaware of any precedent where [that] court or our Supreme Court has held that an allegation of perjury, unaccompanied by an antecedent constitutional violation or an explanation of how that perjury affected the result of a trial, is a proper ground for seeking habeas relief, " Id., 411-12. It is, therefore, somewhat murky whether the Appellate Court rejected the claim because the habeas court's decision was " logically and legally correct" in ruling that an " unadorned" due process claim of unintentional use of false testimony fails to make out a cognizable habeas claim or because the petitioner in that case failed to assert and prove such a claim adequately.

In a footnote, the Appellate Court did remark that its " conclusion that a freestanding perjury allegation is not a proper habeas claim is supported by the Ortega court's statement that 'a claim based on newly discovered evidence has never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding . . . We have held that a showing of perjury at trial does not in itself establish a violation of due process warranting habeas relief .' " Id. 412, fn 9 (emphasis in original). The Appellate Court was quoting the Second Circuit case of Ortega v. Duncan, 333 F.3d 102, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2003).

This court construes the Lewis decision as indicating that a habeas petitioner may allege and prove the fact of false testimony when asserting some other legal ground for habeas relief, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, or a Brady violation, or as the foundation for motion or petition for a new trial or an actual innocence claim, but not as an independent due process deprivation claim. In other words, a habeas petitioner cannot obtain any remedy in a habeas trial merely by asserting and demonstrating that the jury at his criminal trial arrived at the wrong conclusion because the jury believed false or flawed evidence. The writ of habeas corpus affords aid for legal wrongs not factual mistakes nor is it simply a vehicle for successive bites at the apple. See Fernandez v. Commissioner, 291 Conn. 830, 837, 970 A.2d 721 (2009). To permit such a freestanding due process claim to upend a criminal conviction without the need to prove some governmental wrongdoing in the use of what is later alleged to be discredited evidence would eviscerate the concept of finality, expose every criminal conviction to collateral attack, and invite the habeas court to substitute its credibility assessments for those made by the original fact-finder.

Also, such an independent claim, based on unknowing use of tainted evidence, would encourage the defendant in a criminal trial to keep some credibility evidence, available at that trial, in reserve for later employment at a collateral proceeding in the event of an unfavorable outcome at the criminal trial. For example, a defendant could decline to testify at the criminal trial, and then take the stand at a habeas hearing to prove that the fact-finder at the criminal trial relied on erroneous evidence.

The phrase " due process" refers to the obligation of the government to treat individuals fairly. A criminal trial may have been conducted in the most scrupulously fair manner and yet yield a wrongful conviction. The continued imprisonment of an actually innocent person is a miscarriage of justice, Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 641 A.2d 1356 (1994). But that miscarriage of justice need not result from a denial of due process. The wrongful conviction may be the product of an honestly mistaken witness who the factfinder found credible. As long as the trial process was legally correct, in the sense that the duties of the police, the prosecutor, the judge and/or jury, and defense counsel were faithfully executed, no due process violation occurred. The remedy for an innocent person who has been incarcerated in such circumstances, under habeas corpus, is to establish a claim of actual innocence under the Miller standard. That standard is far different than that presented by an " unadorned" due process deprivation based on an unknowing use of evidence which is later held suspect.

Indeed, there is no due process right which mandates availability of direct appeal, State v. Bacon Construction Co., 300 Conn. 477, 480, 15 A.3d 147 (2011); or allowance of state habeas proceedings, Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 839, fn 8, 613 A.2d 818 (1992). That is, there is no due process right to a procedure to question a jury's decision despite legal errors which may have happened. How then, can due process demand that there exist a procedural mechanism by which factual errors may be adjudged post-trial? In reviewing habeas attacks on criminal judgments, the court looks not only at the petitioners' claims " but also with regard to the effect of the issuance of the writ on the strong interest in the finality of judgments and the other interests embodied in the statute of limitations, " State v. Alegrand, 130 Conn.App. 652, 664, 23 A.3d 1250 (2011).

The first Connecticut case which recognized the viability of an actual innocence claim through habeas corpus was Summerville v. Warden, supra . A review of the reasoning in that case is illuminating with respect to a freestanding due process claim for unknowing use of later discredited scientific opinion. Our Supreme Court stated that in order to " mount a successful collateral attack on his conviction, a prisoner must demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or other prejudice and not merely an error which...