Martin v. White

1

PATRICIA MARTIN, Plaintiff v. CLIFTON WHITE, Defendant

No. 1:22-cv-01482

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

February 28, 2023

MEMORANDUM

Kane Judge

Before the Court is Defendant Clifton White (“Defendant”)'s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Patricia Martin's (“Plaintiff”)'s complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6).^[1] (Doc. Nos. 1, 7.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND^[2]

Plaintiff and her late husband, Donald Martin (“Mr Martin”), sought to purchase firearms from Defendant. Initially, Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Mr. Martin purchased twenty-five (25) collectible firearms from Defendant, who held “himself out in the field as an expert.” (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 5, 9-10, 13-14.) Later, she states that both she and her husband purchased the firearms. See (id. ¶¶ 24, 30, 43). These firearms were purportedly purchased with the Martins' marital funds so that they “could be used as retirement funds and could be sold in the event they needed extra support.” (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.)

Plaintiff claims that each firearm purchase amounted to a separate contract. (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff avers that before she and her husband would agree to purchase a given firearm, Defendant “would represent the firearm to be of a specific brand, style, authenticity, condition, and/or value, and request a certain sum of money.” (Id. ¶ 24.) “When purchasing the firearms,” Plaintiff and her husband “made clear that they were purchasing the product based on it being authentic and not a replica and were purchasing it for the purpose of a collection item that could be resold for the same or higher price later.” (Id. ¶ 43.) In fact, Plaintiff maintains that her husband “kept detailed notes regarding what White represented to him as the authenticity and condition of the firearms sold” by Defendant. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also alleges that “[t]he representations as [to] the authenticity and value of the guns purchased by the Martins from White were material to the transaction, as the Martins would not have purchased them, either for the same amount of money or at all, knowing they were fake or not of the valued represented.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Despite these alleged representations, Plaintiff purportedly discovered that the firearms were either fake “and/or misrepresented as to the[ir] value” while later attempting to sell the firearms purchased from Defendant. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19.) Plaintiff claims that these misrepresentations led to a loss of over five-hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00). (Id. ¶ 20.)

On November 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed a six-count complaint alleging: breach of oral contract (Count I); fraudulent misrepresentation (Count II); violations of the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), see 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201 et seq. (Count III); breach of an implied warranty of fitness (Count IV); breach of an implied warranty of merchantability (Count V); and negligent misrepresentation (Count VI). See (Doc. No. 1).

On November 11, 2022, Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6). His motion also requests that if “any claims survive dismissal, . . . the Court transfer the case to the Northern District of Georgia, Gainesville Division.” (Doc. No. 7.) Defendant filed his motion with a brief in support and an affidavit containing declarations to challenge this Court's authority to assert personal jurisdiction over him.^[3] (Doc. Nos. 7, 8, 8-1.) On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition, and on December 12, 2022, Defendant filed a reply brief in further support of his motion. (Doc. Nos. 9-10.) Having been fully briefed, the motion is ripe for disposition.

11. LEGAL STANDARD

For the reasons discussed infra, the Court is ultimately persuaded by Defendant's argument that dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Accordingly, only the legal standards for the threshold question of standing^[4] (Rule 12(b)(1)) and for determining the existence of personal jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(2)) are provided below.

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss a case for lack of standing is properly brought under Rule 12(b)(1) because standing is a jurisdictional matter. See Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007). When evaluating a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(1), a court must first determine whether the movant presents a facial or factual attack. See In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). A facial challenge contests the sufficiency of the pleadings, meaning a court must consider the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Gould Elec., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). By contrast, when reviewing a factual attack, a court may consider evidence outside the pleadings. See id.

Defendant “makes a facial attack on Plaintiff's standing.” (Doc. No. 8 at 11.) Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must accept as true all material allegations set forth in the complaint and must construe those facts in favor of the non-moving party. See Ballentine, 486 F.3d at 810.

To establish standing, a plaintiff must first allege “an ‘injury in fact,' or an ‘invasion of a legally protected interest' that is ‘concrete and particularized.'” See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Second, the plaintiff must establish a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.” See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Finally, the plaintiff must allege the likelihood “that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” See id. at 561.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). Once “the defendant raises the question of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.” See Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992). If the moving party submits “competent evidence refuting jurisdiction,”^[5]the “plaintiff may not rely on bare pleadings but must support those pleadings with ‘actual proofs'” to carry its burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. See Carbonite Filter Corp. v. C. Overaa & Co., 353 F.Supp.3d 332, 336 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F.Supp.2d 538, 557 (M.D. Pa. 2009)); see also Time Share Vacation Club v. Atl. Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 66 n. 9 (3d Cir.1984) (explaining “at no point may a plaintiff rely on the bare pleadings alone in order to withstand a defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction” (citing International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 700 (3d Cir.1982)).

“A federal court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the extent authorized by the law of the state.” Carteret Sav. Bank, 954 F.2d at 144-45 (quoting Provident Nat'l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 1987)). Pennsylvania's long-arm statute permits the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction “to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States.” See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5322(b). Therefore, in its exercise of personal jurisdiction, this Court is constrained only by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, which requires that a defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” See O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Requiring “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state gives “fair warning” to a defendant that he or she may be called to defend a lawsuit in that state. See Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).

Two types of personal jurisdiction comport with these notions of due process: general and specific jurisdiction. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014). “General jurisdiction exists when a defendant has maintained systematic and continuous contacts with the forum state,” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 & n. 8 (1984)), as well as when a defendant consents to jurisdiction or is present or domiciled in the jurisdiction when process is served, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5301(a)(1)(i)-(iii). Specific jurisdiction encompasses cases “in which the suit ‘aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum.'” See Daimler AG, 134 S.Ct. at 754 (citations omitted). Specific jurisdiction is usually evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis. See Marten, 499 F.3d at 296 (citing Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2001)).

Typically a court's determination as to whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper entails a three-part inquiry: (1) the defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts that are “‘purposefully directed . . .' at the forum”; (2) “the litigation must ‘arise out of or relate to' at least one of those activities”; and (3) “if the...