Martinetti v. Mangan

LORI MARTINETTI,as representative of her minor daughter, Jane Doe Martinetti, Plaintiff, v. KELLY MULVOY MANGAN,in her representative capacity as President of Harrison Central School District Board;KIMBERLY BEUKEMA,in her representative capacity as Principal of Harrison High School;ROES AND DOES 1-X, Defendants.

No. 17-CV-5484 (KMK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 19, 2019

OPINION & ORDER

Appearances:

Warren Ross Markowitz, Esq.

The Markowitz Law Firm

Las Vegas, NV

Counsel for Plaintiff

Lewis R. Silverman, Esq.

Stephen Paul Illions, Esq.

Caroline Beth Lineen, Esq.

Silverman and Associates

White Plains, NY

Counsel for Defendants

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:

Lori Martinetti, as representative of her minor daughter, Jane Doe Martinetti ("Plaintiff"), brings this Action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV, against Kelly Mulvoy Mangan ("Mangan"), in her representative capacity as President of Harrison Central School District Board (the "School Board"), and Kimberly Beukema ("Beukema"), in her representative capacity as Principal of Harrison High School (collectively, "Defendants"). (See generally Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 19).)¹ Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her rights when they failed to "investigate and take corrective and protective action" after learning that Plaintiff was sexually assaulted. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) Before the Court is Defendants' Motion To Dismiss (the "Motion"). (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 33).) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, (Am. Compl.), and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving the instant Motion.

Until relocating to Las Vegas, Nevada in August 2016, Plaintiff resided in the Harrison Central School District (the "School District") and attended Harrison High School ("HHS"). (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff "notified members of the HHS administration that she had been the victim of a sexual assault" by "a person known to her, her school classmates[,] and the school community in general." (Id. ¶ 27.) Upon learning of the sexual assault, "the members of HHS, under the direction of the School Board, and therefore [Defendants] . . . , did ignore their responsibilities, failed to conduct an investigation, create or develop a plan to address the assault, [or] provide a protective environment to the victim, and passed their non-delegable duty under the law[] to the School Resource Officer, a member of the [Harrison Police Department]." (Id. ¶ 28.) Defendants allegedly "shuffl[ed] [Plaintiff] from service provider to service provider" in order to "prevent any perceivable impediment to the standing of the School, the District, and the Community." (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) The School ResourceOfficer ("SRO"), who was tasked with addressing the incident, "appeared to lack any kn[ow]ledge of how to deal with sexual altercations involving minors"; he "subject[ed] the Plaintiff to Miranda Warning prior to taking a statement, which resulted [in] the exer[c]ise of undue influence over [Plaintiff] and squelched her ability to gain the protections of state and Federal Law within an educational setting." (Id. ¶ 7.) Under the "direct oversight and control of the Chief of Police," Defendants allegedly "conspire[d] to 'play down' or otherwise 'sweep under the rug' any matters that would negate the value of the local community," thereby "establish[ing] a general understanding and policy of 'it doesn't happen here.'" (Id. ¶ 8.)

As a result of these events, Plaintiff "found it necessary to visit with . . . a variety of mental health professionals," including school therapists and private mental health service providers. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that she was "denied the protections of the law, the safety of the law, and was subject to ridicule and persecution by her classmates because of the outcry and disclosure of the assault." (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages "and any other relief that this [C]ourt determines to be just and proper." (Id. at 11, ¶ 47.)

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed her original complaint in state court on June 9, 2017, bringing claims against Mangan and Beukema, as well as against Michael Olsey ("Olsey"), Chief of Police of Harrison, New York, and Defendants removed the Action to this Court on July 19, 2017. (Not. of Removal (Dkt. No. 1).) On July 21, 2017, Olsey filed a letter requesting a pre-motion conference in anticipation of filing a motion to dismiss, and Beukema and Mangan filed a pre-motion letter similarly seeking to move to dismiss on July 28, 2017. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 10.) The Court held a pre-motion conference on October 10, 2017, during which the Court directedPlaintiff to file an amended complaint within 30 days curing the defects raised by Defendants' letters. (See Dkt. (minute entry for Oct. 10, 2017).)

On November 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed the operative Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl.) On November 13, 2017, Olsey filed a letter seeking a pre-motion conference in anticipation of moving to dismiss the Amended Complaint, and on November 22, 2017, Beukema and Mangan also filed a letter seeking to file a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. Nos. 20, 22.) On November 30, 2017, Olsey was voluntarily dismissed from the Action without prejudice. (See Not. of Voluntary Dismissal (Dkt. No. 25).) The Court then held a pre-motion conference, and set a briefing schedule for Beukema's and Mangan's contemplated motion to dismiss. (See Dkt. (minute entry for Feb. 5, 2018).)

Defendants filed the instant Motion To Dismiss and accompanying papers on March 12, 2018. (See Not. of Mot.; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss ("Defs.' Mem.") (Dkt. No. 35).) On April 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed a response. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Mot. To Dismiss ("Pl.'s Mem.") (Dkt. No. 37).) On May 21, 2018, Defendants filed a reply. (See Defs.' Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Mot. ("Defs.' Reply") (Dkt. No. 38).)

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Rather, a complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint," id. at 563, and a plaintiff need allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not "nudged [his or her] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed," id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ("Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" (citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79 ("Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.").

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) ("In addressing the sufficiency of a complaint we accept as true all factual allegations . . . ." (quotation marks omitted)). Further, "[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] motion to dismiss, the Court . . . draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.2012)). "In adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. Analysis

Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint on grounds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. (See Defs.' Mem 4-13.)

1. Title IX²

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title IX because (1) the named Defendants are not recipients of federal funds as is necessary to be liable for violations of Title IX; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants had actual notice of the sexual assault; (3) Plaintiff fails to plead deliberate indifference; (4) Plaintiff fails to plead gender-based discrimination; and (5) Plaintiff fails to plead the deprivation of educational opportunities. (Defs.' Mem. 4-9.) Defendants...