Martinez-Rivera v. Sanchez Ramos, Civil No. 05-2146 (JAG).

430 F.Supp.2d 47

Cruz MARTINEZ-RIVERA, et al., Plaintiff(s) v. Roberto SANCHEZ RAMOS, et al., Defendant(s).

Civil No. 05-2146 (JAG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

May 4, 2006.

Edwin Prado-Galarza, Prado, Nunez & Associates, PSC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Francisco A. Ojeda-Diez, Maria Judith Surillo, Federal Litigation, P.R. Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA-GREGORY, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants on March 7th, 2006. (Docket No. 19). For the reasons discussed below, the Courts GRANTS the Motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND¹

On October 28th, 2004, Luis Cepeda Martinez ("Cepeda Martinez") was on the seventh floor of the Torre Sabana Housing Project when, between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m., the Puerto Rico Police conducted a raid on the premises. Plaintiffs allege that, as Cepeda Martinez walked towards his mother's apartment, the cops instructed him to stop and, without provocation or reason, shot him to death. The Puerto Rico Police Department reported that Cepeda Martinez had been shooting at the agents; nevertheless, no weapon was ever recovered. Plaintiffs contend that defendants Antonio Martinez and Enrique Bencebi—sergeant and police officer, respectively—along with other unidentified police officers, were among those who participated in the raid in question. Plaintiffs, however, fail to identify the agent(s) who shot Cepeda Martinez.

On October 28th, 2005, Cepeda Martinez's parents, siblings and children (a son and a daughter, represented by their respective mothers) filed the present complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants' actions violated their rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eight and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and several state laws. (Docket No. 1). On January 18th, 2006, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, on the same grounds, against the following defendants: 1) Roberto Sanchez-Ramos, in his personal and official capacity as Secretary of the Puerto Rico Department of Justice; 2)Pedro Toledo, in his personal and official capacity as Superintendent of the Puerto Rico Police; 3) Sergeant Antonio Martinez, in his personal and official capacity as an agent of the Carolina Drug Unit of the Puerto Rico Police; 4) Enrique Bencebi, in his personal and official capacities as an agent of the Carolina Drug Unit of the Puerto Rico Police; and 5)John Doe and Jane Doe, as "potential defendants and officers who may have contributed to the wrongful death and violation of the rights of Luis Cepeda Martinez." (Docket No. 15 at 2-3).

On March 7th, 2006, defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint arguing that: 1) the Eleventh Amendment bars the official capacity claims, 2) plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action, as they fail to show a causal connection between their federal rights deprivation and defendants' actions, and 3) plaintiffs lack standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 19). On March 27th, 2006, defendants requested that the Motion to Dismiss be adjudicated as unopposed, due to plaintiffs' failure to respond to it within the ten day period prescribed by the Local Rules of this District.² On that same date, plaintiffs requested an extension of time to file an opposition to defendants' motion. (Docket No. 21). The Court, nevertheless, denied plaintiffs' request, as the reasons set forth for their non-compliance were not satisfactory.

A Second Amended Complaint was filed on April 3rd, 2006, (Docket No. 27), through which plaintiffs replaced defendant Pedro Toledo with Agustin Cartagena, dismissed all claims against the Secretary of Justice Roberto Sanchez Ramos, and dismissed all claims brought pursuant to the Fifth, Eight and Ninth Amendments. Plaintiffs also dropped all claims brought against the Puerto Rico Police Superintendent in his official capacity.

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(b),³ the Court GRANTS the defendants' request to adjudicate the motion as unopposed, and proceeds to examine the sufficiency of plaintiffs' Complaint. See Pomerleau v. West Springfield Public Schools, 362 F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir.2004)(holding that "the mere fact that a motion to dismiss is unopposed does not relieve the district court of the obligation to examine the complaint itself to see whether it is formally sufficient to state a claim"); Vega-Encarnacion v. Babilonia, 344 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir.2003).⁴ In doing so, the Court will employ a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir.1995). The Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990). The Court need not credit, however, "bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like" when evaluating the Complaint's allegations. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). When opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a plaintiff cannot expect a trial court to do his homework for him." McCoy v. Massachusetts Institute of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.1991). Plaintiffs are responsible for putting their best foot forward in an effort to present a legal theory that will support their claim. Id. at 23 (citing Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52). Plaintiffs must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988).

DISCUSSION

A perusal of the Amended Complaint reveals that plaintiffs' allegations are twofold. First, there is a wrongful death claim in which plaintiffs seek to recover for the damages they allegedly suffered as a result of defendants' actions against Cepeda Martinez. On this claim, plaintiffs must prove that they, not Cepeda Martinez, have a section 1983 cause of action. In addition, there is a claim brought on behalf of the decedent to recover for the damages inflicted upon him by the defendants. The Court will evaluate each claim separately.

1. Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claim

It is well known that section 1983 does not confer substantive rights, but provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In order to establish liability under section 1983, a plaintiff must first show that "the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Destek Group, Inc. v. State of New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission, 318 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir.2003); DiMarco-Zappa v. Cabanillas, 238 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir.2001). Secondly, a plaintiff must show the defendant's conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir.1989). There are two aspects to the second inquiry: 1) there must have been a deprivation of federally protected rights, privileges and immunities, and 2) the conduct complained of must have been causally connected to the deprivation. Id. Hence, to succeed in a section 1983 action, plaintiffs must prove that defendants' actions were a cause in fact or a proximate cause of their injury. See Collins v. City Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992); Vives v. Fajardo, 399 F.Supp.2d 50, 55 (D.P.R. 2005).

In the case at bar, it is beyond debate that the actions complained of were committed by people acting under color of state law. Plaintiffs, however, fail to clearly state which federally protected rights they were deprived of by defendants' actions. The Amended Complaint states that "[a] s a direct and proximate result of the acts described herein, the plaintiffs lost the company and affection of their brother, son and father and their liberty to enjoy such companionship," which has caused them "extreme emotional anguish, as well as physical and mental sufferings." (Docket No. 27 at ¶ 26). The Amended Complaint further states that plaintiffs have suffered economic hardship due to their dependence on the decedent's income. Id. Plaintiffs argue that all this amounts to a violation of their due process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Docket No. 27 at ¶ 29). The Court disagrees.

It is well settled that not every state tort constitutes a violation of a protected federal right simply because it is committed by the state. Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir.1991). In Valdivieso v. Robles, 807 F.2d 6, 9(1st Cir.1986), the First Circuit established that the stepfather and siblings of an adult inmate who was beaten to death by state guards, did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in companionship of their adult son and brother, such as would permit them to recover under section 1983. The Court explained that "[t]he Supreme Court has protected the parent only when the government directly acts to sever or otherwise affect his or her legal relationship with a child," and that a "governmental action that affects the parental relationship only incidentally—as in this case—is not susceptible to challenge for a violation of due process." Valdivieso, 807 F.2d at 8. Moreover, the First Circuit declared that "the problem of giving definition and limits to a liberty interest in this vast area seems not only exceedingly difficult but to a considerable extent duplicative of the widespread existence of state causes of action," that provide for compensation to grieving relatives. Id., at 9. Hence, under First Circuit standards, in order to establish a violation of...