Martinez v. Comm'r of Corr.

221 Conn.App. 852

303 A.3d 1196

Johnny MARTINEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

AC 45795

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 7, 2023

Officially Released October 17, 2023

Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state's attorney, and Marc G. Ramia, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Moll, Seeley and Keller, Js.

SEELEY, J.

Following the granting of his petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner, Johnny Martinez, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the petitioner claims that his trial counsel, Attorney TaShun Bowden-Lewis, performed deficiently by failing to offer her opinion as to whether the petitioner should have taken a pretrial plea offer from the state and that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. Shortly after 4 a.m. on November 2, 2010, the petitioner, Michael Mark, and Anthony Garcia were passengers in an automobile being driven by Manuel Vasquez. The four men were on their way to a "bootleg house" to purchase liquor that was sold when bars and package stores were not open for business. Around that time, the victim, Arnaldo Gonzalez, was walking to an election polling station where he was scheduled to work as a bilingual interpreter. Mark saw the victim and said that he intended to rob him. After Vasquez parked the automobile, both the petitioner and Mark exited the vehicle and followed the victim. Mark struck the victim in the back of the head with a hard object he had picked up from the ground. The victim immediately fell to the ground, and Mark struck him repeatedly. Thereafter, the petitioner stomped on the victim's head, causing blood to transfer onto one of the petitioner's sneakers. Mark took a backpack belonging to the victim, and he and the petitioner left the scene. The victim sustained multiple skull fractures and brain hemorrhaging and died as a result of blunt force trauma to his head.

In the following weeks, the petitioner received word that the Waterbury police wanted to speak with him regarding the incident. The petitioner subsequently went to the Waterbury Police Department and made a formal statement to the police about his involvement in the incident. In this statement, the petitioner admitted to the police that he had participated in the robbery of the victim and stomped on the victim's head after the victim had been struck in the head by Mark.

The petitioner was arrested on November 28, 2010, and charged with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, ¹ robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (1), robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (3), conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134, and tampering with physical evidence in violation of General Statutes § 53a-155. ² On December 15, 2010, trial counsel was appointed to represent the petitioner. On July 14, 2011, the petitioner was offered a plea deal that called for the petitioner to plead guilty to the charge of felony murder, and, in exchange, his sentence would be capped at thirty-five years to serve, with a right to argue for no less than thirty-two years.

On September 14, 2011, the petitioner rejected the plea offer in court. The court, Damiani, J. , stated the terms of the plea and told the petitioner that "the state's going to be trying the case on the theory of felony murder. So, if there's a robbery completed or attempted ... someone dies, you and the other person are equally culpable. That's the theory they're going to be going on; you understand that, right?" The petitioner answered in the affirmative. The court further asked the petitioner whether his trial counsel had "explained all this to [him]" and whether he knew "what the facts are, [and the] weaknesses and strengths of the state's case." The petitioner again answered in the affirmative. Finally, the court asked the petitioner whether he understood that the offer could not be renewed: "So, you come back to trial, you can't say you want to take this offer. It's got to be something more; do you understand, sir?" The petitioner indicated that he understood. A trial was held, and the petitioner was found guilty of felony murder, two counts of robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, and tampering with evidence. ³ The petitioner was sentenced to a term of incarceration of fifty years, twenty-five years of which was a statutory mandatory minimum. The petitioner's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Martinez , 171 Conn. App. 702, 758, 158 A.3d 373, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 925, 160 A.3d 1067 (2017).

On April 8, 2021, the petitioner filed the operative amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged in a single count that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise the petitioner adequately regarding the state's plea offer. Specifically, he alleged that trial counsel had failed to explain the elements of each of the crimes charged against him and to inform or advise him as to the strength of the state's case. A trial was held before the habeas court, M. Murphy, J ., on April 6, 2022, during which the petitioner was represented by counsel. The petitioner's trial counsel, the petitioner, and Attorney Frank Riccio, an expert witness who testified as to the best practices for advising a client as to a plea deal, each testified at the habeas trial.

The habeas court summarized the testimony of the petitioner's trial counsel as follows: "[Trial counsel] testified at the habeas trial that, at the time she represented the petitioner, she had been employed as a public defender for over a decade and had prior experience representing defendants facing murder charges. [Trial counsel] testified that she discussed the plea offer with the petitioner several times, in writing and verbally, at both the courthouse and the correctional facility at which the petitioner was housed. [Trial counsel] also testified that she had numerous discussions with the petitioner, both in writing and verbally, regarding what the state needed to prove for each offense he was charged with and the total exposure the petitioner faced as a result of the charges. [Trial counsel] further testified that she discussed the state's evidence and the strength of the state's case with the petitioner, including the incriminating statement the petitioner made to the police wherein he admitted to stomping the victim [on] the head. [Trial counsel] also testified that the decision to accept the plea or to go to trial was ultimately the petitioner's decision, but that she informed the petitioner of the strengths and weaknesses of his options given the fact that he was a young man with small children. [Trial counsel] testified that the petitioner ultimately rejected the plea offer approximately two months after it was conveyed to him."

The petitioner testified that his trial counsel had discussed with him what the state would need to prove for felony murder but that he did not understand it. The petitioner further testified that he had difficulty reading and understanding what his trial counsel had told him but could not remember whether he had told her that he had difficulty reading. The petitioner also testified that trial counsel had told him that, if he was found guilty at trial, his sentence could be up to double the state's plea offer of thirty-five years. He testified that, although he had difficulty remembering, he believed that his trial counsel had talked to him about the strength of the state's case.

In a memorandum of decision dated July 22, 2022, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the operative habeas petition. In doing so, the court concluded that the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel performed deficiently "in advising the petitioner about the plea offer." The court found that the petitioner's trial counsel "is an experienced public defender who testified credibly that she discussed the elements of the charged offenses that the state would have to prove to convict the petitioner, the potential sentences resulting from convictions of the charged offenses, the strength of the state's case, and the plea offer with the petitioner on numerous occasions, both verbally and in writing. [Trial counsel] also advised the petitioner concerning his options with the plea offer given the facts of his case and his personal circumstances. [Trial counsel] further indicated that there was no evidence that the petitioner did not understand their discussions. As a result, the court finds that [trial counsel's] advisement did not constitute deficient performance ... [and] that the petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proving that the petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's performance." Thereafter, the court granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court.

Before we begin our analysis of the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we must first address the argument of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, that the petitioner's claim on appeal is not reviewable. In the petitioner's operative amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he alleged that his trial counsel failed to properly advise him regarding the state's plea offer, including failing to explain to him adequately the elements of the charges he was facing and to...