Martinez v. Costco Wholesale Corp.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Hon. William V. Gallo, United States Magistrate Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Marisa Martinez's Motion for Attorney Fees (“Motion” or “Fee Motion”). (Doc. No. 135.) Plaintiff filed her Fee Motion on September 6, 2022. (Id.) On October 4, 2022, Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Defendant,” “Costco,” or “Company”) filed its Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion. (Doc. No. 140.) On October 20, 2022, the Court convened a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion.^[1] Having fully considered the

Parties' moving and opposing papers, and all underlying declarations, exhibits, and oral arguments, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Fee Motion and explains below.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff seeks compensation from Defendant for attorney fees, expert fees, and costs she reportedly incurred since this litigation began in May 2019. Specifically, Plaintiff moves the Court for (1) an attorney fee award of $2,675,130, which is comprised of a $1,337,565 lodestar enhanced by a multiplier of 2.0; (2) an award of expert fees in the amount of $20,139.50; and (3) and an award of costs in the amount of $6,284.32. Defendant disputes Plaintiff's Fee Motion as unreasonable as to Plaintiff's counsel's hourly rates and time billed and unwarranted as to expert fees, costs, and any upward multiplier sought.

Plaintiff initiated this action on May 13, 2019, and alleged eight causes of action. (Doc. No. 1-2.) Specifically, Plaintiff brought Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) claims for (1) disability discrimination; (2) failure to accommodate; (3) failure to engage in the interactive process; (4) retaliation; and (5) failure to prevent discrimination, as well as claims for (6) retaliation under California Labor Code section 1102.5; (7) negligent supervision; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.) Plaintiff and Defendant litigated the case through all phases at the trial court level, including fact discovery, expert discovery, summary judgment, pre-trial proceedings, including in limine hearings, and trial.

On June 5, 2020, Defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on all causes of action except Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim (“reasonable accommodation claim”). (Doc. No. 21.) On August 21, 2020, then-presiding District Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion. (Doc. No. 30.) In doing so, Judge Curiel dismissed only Plaintiff's negligent supervision claim. On April 27, 2022, the Parties consented to this Court's jurisdiction for all purposes, including trial. (Doc. No. 73.) The case proceeded to trial, which was bifurcated. The first phase of trial began on May 23, 2022, and ended on June 2, 2022. (Doc. Nos. 75, 113.) On June 3, 2022,

the jury returned its verdict, finding for Defendant on all but one of Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. No. 114.) The jury awarded Plaintiff $1.7 million in compensatory damages, specifically $850,000 for past non-economic damages and $850,000 for future non-economic damages, on her failure to engage in the interactive process claim (“interactive process claim”). (Id.; Doc. No. 117.)

The second phase of trial began and ended on June 6, 2022, and resolved the matter of punitive damages. (Doc. No. 120.) The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $150,000 in punitive damages. (Doc. No. 129.) On June 9, 2022, judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1,700,000 in non-economic damages and $150,000 in punitive damages. (Doc. No. 130.) On July 7, 2022, Defendant filed its Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, for New Trial or Remittitur. (Doc. No. 131.) On February, 10, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion, affirming the jury's verdict in its entirety on compensatory damages and vacating the jury's verdict on punitive damages. (Doc. No. 144.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under the FEHA, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees. Cal. Gov't Code § 12965. The Court analyzes Plaintiff's Fee Motion consistent with the Ninth Circuit and California's lodestar method for assessing such requests. Moriarty v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 2022 WL 3907152, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2022); Newton v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC, 411 F.Supp.3d 856, 881 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2019) (citing Perdue v. Kenny A. ex ref. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 546 (2010).). Under the lodestar method, the number of hours reasonably expended is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, which is determined by the “prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Nichols v. City of Taft, 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1242-43 (Ct. App. 2007). With this this two-prong framework in mind, the Court first examines Plaintiff's counsel's reported time billed and then turns to counsel's hourly rates.

IV. DISCUSSION

a. Lodestar Assessment

i. Gruenberg Law's Time Billed

Plaintiff reports her counsel and paralegal's time billed and experience levels as follows:

Individual	Experience	Time Billed
Joshua Gruenberg (“Gruenberg”)	Attorney as of December 1992	397.2 hours
Benjamin Silver (“Silver”)	Attorney as of November 2012	957.4 hours
Joshua Pang (“Pang”)	Attorney as of May 2014	94.4 hours
Pamela Vallero (“Vallero”)	Attorney as of December 2015	312.5 hours
Jesse Collmann (“Collmann”)	Attorney as of August 2016	215.8 hours
Catharine McGlynn (“McGlynn”)	Attorney as of December 2021	52.2 hours
Johanna Schiavoni (“Schiavoni”)	Attorney for “more than 20 years” (See Doc. No. 135-9, ¶ 2.)	56.7 hours
Lana Lee (“Lee”)	Paralegal studies completed in 2016	90.9 hours
Bianca Villegas (“Villegas”)	Paralegal certified as of December 2018	6.0 hours

Defendant disputes Plaintiff's reported time billed on various grounds. First, Defendant argues Pamela Vallero's effort in this litigation was largely duplicative of Jesse Collmann's. Defendant surmises Collmann worked up the case until his departure from Gruenberg Law on April 15, 2022, and Vallero retraced Collman's footsteps to prepare for trial. For this reason, Defendant moves the Court to cut all of Collmann's time from the lodestar. Second, Defendant argues Plaintiff's counsel regularly engaged in duplicative billing by (1) staffing multiple attorneys on depositions and court hearings; and (2) holding interoffice conferences that translate to “generic and vague billing records.” (Doc. No. 140, 16:24-25.) Third, Defendant argues Plaintiff's proffered time entries are incomprehensibly vague and obscured by “cryptic shorthand” such as Silver's July 22, 2019, billing entry for “Em to MM and JC.” (Id., 17:4-6.) Fourth, Defendant argues Plaintiff's counsel impermissibly billed for clerical tasks. Fifth, Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot recover attorney fees for travel time and specifies that Silver's 58.7 hours and Vallero's 56.7 hours spent traveling to and from the courthouse should be cut. Sixth, and finally, Defendant argues all of Schiavoni's time should be struck for its failure to be itemized in the form of billing entries. The Court addresses each of Defendant's arguments in turn.

1. Collmann and Vallero's Overlapping Work

“A district court may reduce the hours claimed where the documentation is inadequate or the time was not reasonably expended,' such as where the record reflects duplicative efforts or excessive staffing.” Villasenor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2011 WL 13213903, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011) (citing Sorensen, 239 F.3d at 1146.). As noted, Defendant posits the lodestar should exclude all of Collmann's time billed because Vallero replaced him and purportedly duplicated all of his labor. Having reviewed the entirety of Collmann and Vallero's time entries, respectively submitted as Exhibits C and D in support of Plaintiff's Fee Motion, the Court disagrees with Defendant's sweeping characterization of the two attorneys' work on the case.

The Court finds Vallero's duplication of Collmann's efforts was limited to reviewing 12 videotaped depositions and related transcripts and summarizing their contents (“deposition review”) and reviewing and annotating two expert reports (“expert report review”). (Doc. No. 135-3, 6-7.) Vallero's deposition review amounted to 56.1 hours, and her expert report review amount to 4.5 hours. Vallero's collective review work thus amounts to 60.6 hours that was duplicative of Collmann's earlier efforts during fact and expert discovery. Apart from this 60.6-hour overlap, the Court considers Collmann and Vallero's time distinguishable. Collmann's billing entries demonstrate Collmann was staffed on this action since the initial complaint was prepared on or around May 1, 2019, through the Parties' consent to this Court's jurisdiction on April 27, 2022. (See generally Doc. No. 135-4; see also Doc. No. 73.) Vallero's time reflects she began working on the case on April 15, 2022, approximately two weeks prior to the Parties' consent to magistrate jurisdiction. During those two weeks, specifically between April 15, 2022, and through April 24, 2022, Vallero made duplicative efforts by conducting deposition and expert report review to presumably study the action. (See Doc. No. 135-3, 6-7.) Beyond such time, Vallero conducted trial preparation and trial work that coincided with Collmann's departure from Gruenberg Law. Accordingly, the Court finds...