Martinez v. Dixon

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MICHAEL DAVID MARTINEZ, Petitioner, v. RICKY DIXON, Respondent.

No. 22-61894-CIV-ALTMAN

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

July 10, 2023

ORDER

ROY K ALTMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Our Petitioner, Michael David Martinez, was found guilty in state court of attempted first-degree murder and discharging a firearm from a vehicle. See Judgment [ECF No. 9-1] at 34-39. For these crimes, he was sentenced to thirty years in prison. Martinez has now filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence. After careful review, we DENY Martinez's Petition on the merits.

The Facts

The State of Florida charged Martinez by information with one count of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm (Count 1) and one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle (Count 2). See Information [ECF No. 9-1] at 13-14. The State alleged that Martinez “got into the right rear passenger seat of a vehicle,” drove alongside another vehicle-in which three people were riding-and then fired “numerous gunshots” into that other vehicle. Arrest Warrant Aff. [ECF No. 9-1] at 8. One of the victims, Jonathan Lopez, was shot twice in the leg “shattering his femur bone.” Ibid. Law enforcement recovered five “.380 caliber shell casings” from the crime scene, id. at 7, and later found a “.380 caliber Desert Eagle” in Martinez's possession, id. at 10.

Martinez's first trial began on October 5, 2015. See First Trial Tr. [ECF No. 10-1] at 1 (showing that jury selection began on October 5, 2015). At that trial, the following exchange took place between the State and one of its witnesses, Edwin Rodriguez:

Q: Do you know a person by the name of Michael Martinez?

A: Yes, I do.

Q: How did you meet Michael Martinez?

A: Through [Gregorio Candalario].

[....]

Q: When you say you met Mr. Martinez through Gregorio Candalario, what do you mean by that?

A: I mean basically Gregorio used to go to Michael to buy [w]eed.

Id. at 498-99. Hearing this answer, Martinez's defense lawyer immediately moved for a mistrial- which because of the nature of the testimony, the trial court indicated it would grant. See id. at 499 (“[Defense Counsel]: [The witness] described [Martinez] just clear as a marijuana dealer. The Court: Sounded like it. He used to go to your client to buy [w]eed. If you want [the mistrial], I will give it to you, but, candidly, I think you better check with your client first to see if that is what he really wants.”). After a brief pause in the proceedings, defense counsel confirmed that, after speaking to Martinez and his father, he “want[ed] a mistrial.” Id. at 500. The state trial court promptly granted the mistrial and reset the case for a new trial. See id. at 502 (“I'm declaring a mistrial in this case, and I'm putting it back on the docket[.]”).

On December 28, 2015, Martinez's lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the information on double-jeopardy grounds. See Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 9-1] at 21-24. In that motion to dismiss, defense counsel advanced an interesting theory: The State (counsel argued) had purposely “asked [Rodriguez] how Candelario [sic] knew the Defendant” with the explicit goal of “goading and baiting the defense into requesting a mistrial,” so that, at a later trial, the State would be permitted to introduce some uncharged firearm conduct it hadn't been allowed to use at the first trial. Id. at 23-24. And it's true that, before the first trial, the state judge had “warned that [certain] evidence may not be admitted during the Defendant's trial because the State had not filed the appropriate Motion or Notice of their intent to use the material obtained from a Dade County arrest of the Defendant for which criminal charges were never filed.” Id. at 22. After holding a hearing, the state court found that the prosecutor hadn't intentionally caused the mistrial and then denied the motion to dismiss. See Motion to Dismiss Hr'g Tr. [ECF No. 10-2] at 33 (“So, if your motion to dismiss is based on the fact that the prosecutor did something intentionally to gain an advantage, there's nothing before me to suggest that. So, in reference to that, your motion will be denied.”).

On January 7, 2016, after a second trial, a jury found Martinez guilty of both counts. See Verdict [ECF No. 9-1] at 31-32. For these crimes, the state trial court sentenced Martinez to thirty years in prison on Count 1 and a concurrent fifteen-year sentence on Count 2. See Sentencing Orders [ECF No. 9-1] at 44-49. Martinez appealed his conviction and sentence to the Fourth DCA. See Direct Appeal Notice of Appeal [ECF No. 9-1] at 51. Martinez argued on direct appeal that the trial court had committed two errors: (1) that the trial court had improperly denied the motion to dismiss because “[t]he prosecutor's question was intended to elicit testimony which would necessitate the defense request for a mistrial,” Direct Appeal Initial Brief [ECF No. 9-1] at 66; and (2) that the trial court should not have “allowed the prosecution . . . to introduce a gun over defense objection taken from the defendant in Miami Gardens approximately seven months after the shooting” because this firearm wasn't “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense, Id. at 67. On October 19, 2017, the Fourth DCA summarily affirmed the trial court in an unwritten opinion. See Martinez v. State, 232 So.3d 1033, 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

On November 14, 2018, Martinez, through counsel, filed a motion for postconviction relief under FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850. See Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 9-1] at 100-41. In that motion, Martinez argued that: (1) “counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present adequate mitigating evidence at sentencing,” Id. at 116; (2) “counsel was ineffective for moving for a mistrial during the first trial,” Id. at 119; (3) “counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross-examine [the victim] Jonathan Lopez to impeach him with his prior statements,” Id. at 124; (4) “counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross-examine Edwin Rodriguez to impeach his prior statements,” Id. at 128; (5) “counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Schurkman's testimony and to the State's closing arguments, which violated . . . the Confrontation Clause,” Id. at 133; (6) “counsel was ineffective for failing to call a firearms expert to testify regarding the .38 caliber bullet that was recovered,” Id. at 136; and (7) “the cumulative effect of counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant,” Id. at 140. The State filed a Response to the Postconviction Motion, contending that Martinez's claims were “conclusively refuted by the record and the law and must be summarily denied.” State's Postconviction Response [ECF No. 9-3] at 37.

On November 1, 2021, the state postconviction court denied the Postconviction Motion. See Order Denying Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 9-6] at 154-61. Martinez appealed to the Fourth DCA, see Postconviction Notice of Appeal [ECF No. 9-10] at 14, which (on June 2, 2022) summarily affirmed the state postconviction court in an unwritten decision, see Martinez v. State, 339 So.3d 983, 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). The Fourth DCA's mandate issued on July 1, 2022. See Postconviction Mandate [ECF No. 9-10] at 18. Martinez filed this Petition on October 4, 2022. See Petition at 20.^[1] The Law

I. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)

AEDPA instructs district courts to deny any claim that was “adjudicated on the merits” in a state-court proceeding unless that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-98 (2011) (summarizing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e)). To have “adjudicated [the claim] on the merits,” the state court need not have issued any kind of formal opinion or even outlined its reasoning. Id. at 99 (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”). Rather, when a state court doesn't articulate its reasons for the denial, the federal court must “‘look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a rationale” and “then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). “Clearly established Federal law” means “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). To be “contrary to clearly established federal law, the state court must either (1) apply a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law, or (2) reach a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).

For “a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent” to be “‘unreasonable, the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been objectively unreasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (cleaned up). “[I]t is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has...