Martinez v. Jenneiahn

1

ADRIAN MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEAN JENNEIAHN; LAUREN MACDONALD; PETER VORIS, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-1219

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit

July 12, 2023

(D.C. No. 1:19-CV-03289-RM-NRN) (D. Colo.)

Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and EID, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT^[*]

SCOTT M. MATHESON, JR. CIRCUIT JUDGE

Plaintiff-Appellant Adrian Martinez appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment for Defendant-Appellee police officers on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims that they used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History^[1]

On February 17, 2018, bail bondsmen shot Mr. Martinez with non-lethal bullets, struck him in the head, and tasered and pepper-sprayed him, sending him to the hospital.^[2]The next morning, he left the hospital unannounced, wearing only his underwear and an open gown. Hospital security personnel contacted the Lafayette, Colorado Police Department, which alerted officers that Mr. Martinez had left the hospital and that felony warrants were outstanding for his arrest.

Lafayette police officers arrived at 9:41 a.m. and searched for Mr. Martinez in an apartment complex near the hospital. At 9:50 a.m., two officers briefly spotted Mr. Martinez but did not attempt to talk with him. A witness later reported seeing Mr. Martinez, who looked "confused" and "lost." App., Vol. III at 817. Police dispatch also relayed that a witness saw Mr. Martinez "trying to enter vehicles" in the parking lot, App., Vol. II at 441, and that a "mailman . . . said he witnessed [Mr. Martinez] crawl out of someone's truck and [take] off running," id. at 438. While the Officers were searching for him, Mr. Martinez hid in a small closet (2.6 feet deep and 4 feet wide) on the third floor of one of the apartment buildings. He soon passed out.

At 11:48 a.m., two hours into the search, a canine police dog assisting Officer Sean Jenneiahn signaled toward the closet, indicating that Mr. Martinez was inside. Officers Lauren MacDonald and Peter Voris joined Officer Jenneiahn outside the closet, where they stood for 10 to 12 minutes. The Officers decided to employ a "dynamic entry." App., Vol. III at 660. Officers Voris and Jenneiahn would open the door and release the dog to neutralize Mr. Martinez while other officers would provide cover with a taser, a shotgun, and a firearm.

Officer Voris then opened the closet door. Officer Jenneiahn deployed the dog and told the dog to "get him." Id. at 828, 831. Mr. Martinez, lying face-down, began screaming when the dog bit his left arm. After 15 to 20 seconds, the dog released its bitehold when Officer Jenneiahn pulled the dog away. Mr. Martinez suffered a four-centimeter gash on his arm.

B. Procedural History

Mr. Martinez sued Officers Jenneiahn, MacDonald, and Voris ("Officers") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they (1) used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (2) conspired to use excessive force, and (3) failed to intervene to protect against the use of excessive force. After discovery, the Officers moved for summary judgment, asserting they were entitled to qualified immunity.

The district court granted the Officers' motion. On excessive force, it determined that Mr. Martinez had not shown the Officers violated clearly established law. The court said it followed that the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on all three claims. Mr. Martinez timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Background

1. Standard of Review

"We review grants of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de novo." Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2014). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), "[s]ummary judgment is proper if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Patel v. Hall, 849 F.3d 970, 978 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted).

2. Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that a person acting under color of state law who "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

"Individual defendants named in a § 1983 action may raise a defense of qualified immunity." Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). "Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights." Wilkins v. City of Tulsa, 33 F.4th 1265, 1272 (10th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted). "Put simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (quotations omitted). "This exacting standard 'gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments ....'" City and Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

"When a defendant asserts qualified immunity in a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff must show that (1) a reasonable jury could find facts supporting a violation of a constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation." Wilkins, 33 F.4th at 1272; see also Duda v. Elder, 7 F.4th 899, 909 (10th Cir. 2021). A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-37 (2009); Soza v. Demsich, 13 F.4th 1094, 1099 (10th Cir. 2021).

"A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11 (quotations omitted). "The law is clearly established when a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent is on point or the alleged right is clearly established from case law in other circuits." Irizarry v. Yehia, 38 F.4th 1282, 1293 (10th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted). The relevant "precedent is considered on point if it involves materially similar conduct or applies with obvious clarity to the conduct at issue." Lowe v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). "[A] case directly on point" is not necessary if "existing precedent [has] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam) (quotations omitted). Thus, "[g]eneral statements of the law can clearly establish a right for qualified immunity purposes if they apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question." Halley v. Huckaby, 902 F.3d 1136, 1149 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted).

3. Excessive Force

"When a plaintiff alleges excessive force during an investigation or arrest, the federal right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures." Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014). "Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotations omitted). This balancing "requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including [1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id.

Although "general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning to officers," "Graham does not by itself create clearly established law outside an obvious case." Hemry v. Ross, 62 F.4th 1248, 1258 (10th Cir. 2023) (alterations omitted) (quoting White, 580 U.S. at 80). Instead, to show clearly established law, the burden is on the plaintiff "to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as [the defendants] was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment." White, 580 U.S. at 79.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that "[t]he dispositive question [for qualified immunity] is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established," and "[t]his inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quotations omitted). "It is particularly important that a Fourth Amendment right be clearly established in a specific factual scenario because it can be difficult for an officer to determine how the prohibition against excessive force will apply in novel situations." Arnold v. City of Olathe, 35 F.4th 778, 793 (10th Cir. 2022).

B. Application

We affirm because Mr. Martinez has failed to show that the Officers violated a right that was clearly established.

1. Excessive Force

Mr. Martinez has presented no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case "where an officer acting under similar circumstances as [the defendants] was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment." White, 580 U.S. at 79. Nor has he shown that "the alleged right is clearly established from case law in other circuits." Irizarry, 38 F.4th at 1293 (quotations omitted).^[3]

a. Tenth Circuit cases

i. Perea, Dixon, Weigel, McCoy, McCowan, and Vette-force used on subdued individuals

Mr Martinez relies on cases in which we...