Martinez v. KIA Motors Am., Inc.

193 Cal.App.4th 187

122 Cal.Rptr.3d 497

11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2888

2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3353

Juanita MARTINEZ, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

No. E049780.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

March 2, 2011.

Review Denied June 8, 2011.

Geller & Stewart, Michael S. Geller and Richard A. Stewart, Moreno Valley, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Greenberg Traurig, Kevin T. Collins and M. Theresa Tolentino Meehan, Sacramento, for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

KING, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff and appellant Juanita Martinez purchased a new 2002 Kia Sedona. She experienced significant problems with the vehicle within the warranty period, and took it to two Kia dealerships for repair. The dealerships denied warranty coverage and told her she would have to pay for the repair. Unable to pay, she left the vehicle at a dealership. It was later repossessed and sold. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against defendant and respondent Kia Motors America, Inc., alleging two violations of the Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ.Code, § 1790 et seq.) ¹ (the Act): breach of express warranty ( § 1793.2) and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability ( § 1792). Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff was not entitled to any of the remedies provided by the Act because she no longer possessed the vehicle. In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled that plaintiff could not seek replacement or reimbursement under the Act because she no longer possessed the vehicle. We disagree.

[1] “The Song–Beverly Act is a remedial statute designed to protect consumers who have purchased products covered by an express warranty. [Citation.] One of the most significant protections afforded by the act is ... that ‘if the manufacturer or its representative in this state does not service or repair the goods to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either replace the goods or reimburse the buyer in an amount equal to the purchase price paid by the buyer....’ [Citation.]” ( Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 798, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 731, fn. omitted.) In providing these remedies, the Legislature has not required that the consumer maintain possession of the goods at all times. All that is necessary is that the consumer afford the manufacturer a reasonable number of attempts to repair the goods to conform to the applicable express warranties. On this basis we reverse the judgment.

II. FACTS

In July 2002, plaintiff purchased a new Kia Sedona. The sale of the vehicle was accompanied by an express written warranty for 60 months or 60,000 miles, issued by defendant. Within the first year, plaintiff began noticing a burning smell emanating from the vehicle. She complained about the smell to the dealer on at least four occasions during the first three years. The dealer did nothing about the problem. No other mechanical problems were experienced throughout the first three years of ownership.

On June 18, 2005, the odometer reading on the car was 38,162 miles. While plaintiff was driving the car on that date, the vehicle started shaking and making strange noises; smoke started coming from the engine compartment. Plaintiff smelled a strong acidic odor, which she believed to be battery acid. The lights and windows began malfunctioning. She pulled to the side of the road. While there, a Good Samaritan, who was a mechanic at a local car care center, visually inspected the engine area and believed the alternator had overcharged the battery. Plaintiff called her son, who purchased and installed a new battery. The vehicle would not start. The car was then towed to a local dealership, Kia of Riverside.

After being denied warranty service at Kia of Riverside, the car was towed to another dealer, Kia of Temecula, for repairs. A “master technician” spent approximately 10 hours inspecting and working on the car and concluded that plaintiff had incorrectly tried to jump-start the vehicle battery by reversing the polarity, thus causing the problems. Warranty coverage was denied. The technician did not test the alternator during the inspection because the dealership did not have the means to do so. Following the Temecula dealership's refusal to repair the car, plaintiff, unable to use the vehicle, left it at the dealership “so they could fix it.”

After plaintiff stopped making payments, the vehicle was repossessed by the lien holder in February 2006. In the meantime, Kia of Temecula had charged plaintiff $901 in storage fees. These were paid by the lien holder. Following repossession and sale, the vehicle was towed to Kia of Glendale, which determined that the car's alternator had been overcharging and causing damage to electrical components. Kia of Glendale made the necessary repairs, which were paid for by defendant pursuant to the warranty.

III. ANALYSIS

As framed by the parties, this appeal is limited to the question of whether a plaintiff must possess or own the vehicle at issue in order to obtain replacement or restitution pursuant to the Act. We hold that under the applicable statutes a plaintiff does not need to possess or own the vehicle to avail himself or herself of the Act's remedies. To judicially impose such a requirement into the Act is contrary to the purpose of the Act and runs afoul of principles relating to statutory construction.

A. Standards of Review and Statutory Construction

“Summary judgment is properly granted if there is no question of fact and the issues raised by the pleadings may be decided as a matter of law.... [¶] On appeal, ‘we review the record de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and oppositions papers ...’ [citation].... Inasmuch as the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment strictly involves questions of law, we must reevaluate the legal significance and effect of the parties' moving and opposing papers.” ( Dominguez v. American Suzuki Motor Corp. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 53, 57, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 354.)

We review questions of statutory construction de novo. ( Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 387, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 212 P.3d 736.) In construing statutes, our goal is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature in order to effectuate the law's purpose. ( Ibid.) “We must look to the statute's words and give them ‘their usual and ordinary meaning.’ [Citation.] ‘The statute's plain meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.’ [Citations.] ‘If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ [Citation.]” ( Id. at pp. 387–388, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 212 P.3d 736.) We may not change the scope of a statute “by reading into it language it does not contain or by reading out of it language it does. We may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention that does not appear in its language.” ( Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253, 85 Cal.Rptr.3d 466, 195 P.3d 1049.)

When more than one statutory construction is arguably possible, our policy is “ ‘to favor the construction that leads to the more reasonable result.’ [Citation.] This policy derives largely from the presumption that the Legislature intends reasonable results consistent with the apparent purpose of the legislation. [Citation.] Thus, our task is to select the construction that comports most closely with the Legislature's apparent intent, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the statutes' general purpose, and to avoid a construction that would lead to unreasonable, impractical, or arbitrary results.” ( Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 388, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 212 P.3d 736.)

B. Statutory Language of the Act Does Not Support Defendant's Construction

The Act provides certain protections and remedies for consumers who purchase consumer goods such as motor vehicles covered by express warranties. ( Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 121, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 295.) Among other requirements, a manufacturer of consumer goods covered by an express warranty and sold in California must generally maintain service and repair facilities within the state. (§ 1793.2, subd. (a).) If the goods do not conform to the applicable express warranties, they must generally be serviced or repaired within 30 days. (§ 1793.2, subd. (b).) In order to trigger the manufacturer's service and repair obligations, the buyer (as is relevant here) “shall deliver nonconforming goods to the manufacturer's service and repair facility within this state ....” (§ 1793.2, subd. (c).)

Section 1794 sets forth the buyer's remedies in the event of a violation of the Act by the manufacturer. Under subdivision (a) of this section, a buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by any failure to comply with any obligation under the Act or an implied or express warranty may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief. Section 1794, subdivision (b) provides: “The measure of the buyer's damages in an action under this section shall include the rights of replacement or reimbursement as set forth in subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2....”

As pertinent here, subdivision (d)(2) of section 1793.2 provides: “If the manufacturer or its representative in this state is unable to service or repair a new motor vehicle ... to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly replace the new motor vehicle in accordance with subparagraph (A) or promptly make restitution to the buyer in accordance with subparagraph (B).” ²

The plain language of these statutes does not support defendant's construction....