Martinez v. Nordisk

397 F.Supp.3d 207

William Puig MARTINEZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Novo NORDISK, Defendant.

CASE NO. 17-1012 (GAG)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed August 13, 2019

Monica L. Vega-Quintana, Monica Vega Law Offices PSC, Ruben T. Nigaglioni, Nigaglioni Law Offices PSC, for Plaintiff.

Gregory T. Usera, Usera, Figueroa & Giner, P.S.C., Pedro E. Giner-Dapena, Giner Dapena Law, Melissa C. Rodriguez, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPI, United States District Judge

William Puig Martinez, Hernan Mendez Nazario, his wife Meralys Colón, and their conjugal partnership (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed suit in state court against Novo Nordisk ("Defendant") alleging unlawful discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 and violation of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA") by canceling their benefits (Docket No. 1). Plaintiffs additionally filed claims arising under Puerto Rico's Act No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 146 et seq . ("Act 100"), Act No. 80 of May 30, 1976, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185a et seq . ("Act 80"), and Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31 § 5139.

On January 4, 2017, Defendant removed this case to this Court under federal question jurisdiction. (Docket No. 1). Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 100). After disposing of preliminary matters involving Local Rule 56, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment.

I. Local Rule 56

As a threshold issue the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs' Opposition to the Uncontested Material Facts (Docket No. 110) complies with Local Rule 56. Plaintiffs' opposition statement of uncontested material facts included additional facts in his denials and qualifications of the moving party's facts.

At the summary judgment stage, parties must follow Local Rule 56. Section (c) instructs that "[a] party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts." L. Cv. R. 56(c) (emphasis added). This opposing statement "shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts." Id. Each denial and qualification must be supported by a record citation. Id.

In addition to allowing an opposing party to admit, deny, or qualify the moving party's facts, Local Rule 56(c) allows an opposing party to submit additional facts "in a separate section ." Id. (emphasis added). As the First Circuit has stated, "[t]he plain language of the rule specifically requires that additional facts be put forward in a ‘separate section.’ " Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that district court acted within its discretion when it disregarded additional facts not contained in a separate section). A separate section serves two purposes: "to allow the moving party to reply to those additional facts and to allow the court to easily determine the disputed facts." Malave-Torres v. Cusido, 919 F. Supp. 2d 198, 207 (D.P.R. 2013). For these reasons, "a party may not include numerous additional facts within its opposition to the moving party's statements of uncontested facts." Id. If a party improperly controverts the facts, Local Rule 56 allows the Court to treat the opposing party's facts as uncontroverted. The First Circuit has consistently held that litigants ignore Local Rule 56 at their peril. See Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F. 3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007).

The line between a properly supported qualification or denial and additional facts can be blurry. Because Local Rule 56 requires that a record citation support each qualification or denial, it can seem inevitable to proffer additional facts when doing so. But a better understanding of what constitutes a qualification or denial helps. A qualification is "[a] modification or limitation of terms or language; esp., a restriction of terms that would otherwise be interpreted broadly." Qualification , BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1436 (10th ed. 2014). Simply put, a qualification must clarify a statement of fact that, without clarification, could lead the Court to an incorrect inference. Thus, if a fact states that "Plaintiff works as an attorney all day," a proper qualification would be: "Plaintiff works as an attorney from 9-5" and a citation to the record supporting this fact. This would prevent the Court from inferring that Plaintiff works as an attorney from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m., which can be the standard in the legal world. Adding that Plaintiff works from 9-5 would not be considered an "additional fact" in the context of Local Rule 56. On the other hand, a denial, as common sense suggests, is "[a] statement that something is not true." Denial , id. at 527. So if a fact states that "Plaintiff is an attorney," a proper denial would be: "Denied. Plaintiff is a doctor" and a citation to the record supporting this fact.

First Circuit case law sheds some light on when parties cross the line between a proper qualification or denial and additional facts. In Acevedo-Padilla v. Novartis Ex Lax, Inc., the district court held that "a party's denial or qualification of a proposed fact must be strictly limited to the issue therein raised. Any additional information shall be included in a separate section in order to ease the Court's task." 740 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (D.P.R. 2010), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 696 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). The First Circuit affirmed this ruling, labeling it "an appropriate exercise of [the district court's] discretion." Acevedo-Parrilla, 696 F.3d at 137 ("[D]istrict court, in an appropriate exercise of its discretion, ruled that it would disregard any additional facts provided by [plaintiff] when denying or qualifying [defendant's] statement of uncontested facts"). So, returning to the previous example of the 9-5 attorney, it could be improper to qualify the fact that Plaintiff works "all day" by adding that one day at work, Plaintiff's boss made a discriminatory remark. This fact would not be "strictly limited to the issue therein raised." Acevedo-Padilla, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 298.

The Court notes that the "strictly limited to the issue therein raised" standard for denials and qualifications, as articulated by my esteemed colleague, the late Senior Judge Salvador E. Casellas, is demanding but necessary. Id. The Court wants to impart justice, and lawyers play an essential role in helping it achieve this goal. Honest argumentation and clear presentation of the issues and facts help the Court tremendously. The opposite burdens the Court just as much.

Natal Perez v. Oriental Bank & Tr., 291 F. Supp. 3d 215, 219-221 (D.P.R. 2018).

Plaintiffs' response to Defendant's statement of uncontested facts has indeed burdened the Court beyond cavil. Many of Plaintiffs' denials and qualifications contained pages of additional facts. For example, Paragraph 44 of Defendant's statement of uncontested facts states: "Johnny Bravo ("Bravo") and Barbara Cardona ("Cardona") were also interviewed for the position in-person by Almérico and Thrasher on or about November 1 and November 2 of 2016." (Docket No. 102 ¶ 44). A proper denial should be limited to those facts. Instead, Plaintiffs' goes on to proffer additional facts not relevant to the uncontested fact:

Johnny Bravo, date of birth December 7, 1964 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 12, Deposition transcript p. 25:1-2) started working with Novo Nordisk on February 9, 2009 (Id. p. 26:1-2) and Barbara Cardona, date of birth, January 7, 1967, started working with Novo Nordisk on April 30, 2007 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 17, Barbara Cardona deposition transcript page 21:15-22) were also interviewed for the position in-person by Almérico and Thrasher on or about November 1 and November 2 of 2016. Rodriguez Decl. Ex. L at 36:2-37:2, Ex. M at 41:25-42:6. Plaintiffs present as an additional uncontested fact that Barbara Cardona, born on January 7, 1967, had seniority over all 3 selected candidates and had an advanced degree whereas none of the 3 selected candidates had advanced degrees. Plaintiffs also present as an additional uncontested fact that Johnny Bravo, date of birth December 7, 1964 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 12, Deposition transcript p. 25:1-2) started working with Novo Nordisk on February 9, 2009 (Id. p. 26:1-2) and had seniority over selected candidate Carmen Irizarry.

(Docket No. 110 ¶ 44).

Furthermore, Plaintiffs' repeated this practice throughout their answer to Defendant's statement of uncontested facts. The Court will consider Plaintiffs' answers to the statement of uncontested facts. Nonetheless, the Court will disregard any self-serving legal argument contained therein, and will focus solely on the facts correctly contested by Plaintiffs' that could raise a genuine issue of material fact.¹

II. Relevant Factual Background

Plaintiff William Puig ("Puig") was born on October 8, 1959. (Docket Nos. 102 ¶ 5; 110 ¶ 5). On April 11, 2007 Novo Nordisk hired Puig for the position of Diabetes Care Specialist III ("DCS"). (Docket Nos. 102 ¶ 6; 110 ¶ 6). Plaintiff Hernan Mendez ("Mendez") was born August 4, 1968. (Docket Nos. 102 ¶ 8; 110 ¶ 8). On April 13, 2007 Novo Nordisk hired Puig for the position of Diabetes Care Specialist III. (Docket Nos. 102 ¶ 9; 110 ¶ 9).

A. Novo Nordisk Global Reorganization

Novo Nordisk is a global healthcare company with over 90 years of experience in diabetes care. The Company manufactures and distributes pharmaceutical treatments for diabetes. (Docket Nos. 102 ¶ 1; 110 ¶ 1).

In 2016, Novo Nordisk undertook a global reorganization and reduction in force which resulted in the termination of approximately 1,000 employees. (Docket Nos. 102 ¶ 13; 110 ¶ 13). This reorganization was intended to address challenges Novo Nordisk determined...