Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-CV-178

DANIEL MARTINEZ, et al, Plaintiffs, v. NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS, et al, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-CV-178

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

January 5, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defenses of Qualified and Official Immunity (D.E. 48), filed by Nueces County Sheriff's Deputy Ian Rosales and Nueces County Deputy Constables Nate Perez, John Esparza, and Edward F. Day, II (collectively "Defendants"), to which Plaintiffs Daniel Martinez, Rita Martinez, and Jose Martinez (collectively "Plaintiffs") have responded (D.E. 64), and Defendants have replied (D.E. 67). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Background

A. Uncontroverted Facts

On or about June 19, 2011, Plaintiffs were throwing a graduation party at their home at 1404 Canales in Robstown, Texas. When uninvited guest Pedro Villagomez became unruly and started causing trouble, Plaintiffs asked him to leave. Villagomez tried to hit Plaintiff Daniel Martinez ("Daniel"), but Daniel stopped him and knocked himdown. Daniel's son-in-law then began fighting with Villagomez. Eventually, Villagomez left the party and called the police.

Shortly thereafter, Defendants responded to a report of an assault at a party at 1404 Canales. They made contact with Villagomez, who was bleeding from his hand and had visible swelling to his face. He informed Defendants that he had been assaulted at a party down the street and provided a description of his attackers. Defendants went to the house at 1404 Canales and made contact with Plaintiff homeowners.

Eventually, Defendants arrested Daniel and his wife, Plaintiff Rita Martinez ("Rita"), who were both charged with resisting arrest, felony assault on a police officer, and interference with a peace officer. Those charges were later dismissed. Their son, Plaintiff Jose Martinez, AKA Jose Bustos, ("Jose")—a minor at the time—was also arrested and spent between three and five months in jail. What happened between Defendants' arrival at Plaintiffs' home and Plaintiffs' eventual arrests is heavily contested.

B. Plaintiffs' Version of Events

According to the sworn declarations submitted by Plaintiffs (D.E. 64-3, -4, -5), shortly after Villagomez left the party, about 19 or 20 police cars arrived at Plaintiffs' home. When Defendants demanded entry, Plaintiffs refused, and Daniel and Jose stood blocking the doorway. When Daniel and Jose asked Defendants to produce a warrant if they wanted to enter the home, Defendants replied that they were the law and did not need a warrant. Defendants pushed Daniel and Jose into the house and sprayed pepper spray into Jose's eyes, then handcuffed Daniel and pepper sprayed, tased, and beat himwhile he lay handcuffed on the ground. When Jose saw this happening, he tried to block his father from being hit. Then, fearing that Defendants were going to tase his mother, Jose left his father and stood in front of her. When Defendants told Jose they were going to arrest him, he complied with their request and let them handcuff him and lead him out the front door. Defendants then took Jose to the ground, and with at least four officers sitting on top of him, Defendants began jumping on his back and body and slamming their knees into his neck.

Plaintiffs claim they were wrongly arrested and charged, and they have offered their sworn declarations that at no time did any of them strike any Defendant, resist arrest, or do anything other than assert their right to prevent Defendants from entering their home.

C. Defendants' Version of Events

According to the sworn affidavits submitted by Defendants (D.E. 48-10, -11, -12), when Defendants arrived at Plaintiffs' residence, they noticed several individuals matching the description of Villagomez's attackers, including a black male in a white shirt with green writing who was breathing heavily and perspiring profusely, later identified as Pedro Mercedes ("Mercedes"). Defendant Esparza repeatedly ordered Mercedes to approach him, but Mercedes did not obey. Instead, Daniel told Mercedes to run inside the house, which he did, slamming the door in Defendants' faces. Esparza attempted to open the door, but Daniel ran up and physically blocked Defendants' attempt to enter the house. Daniel was told several times to move out of the way, but he refused to obey and continued to block the door. Defendants Perez and Esparza informedDaniel that they were going to place him under arrest and told him several times to give them his hands, but he refused to comply. When Esparza attempted to place Daniel under arrest, Daniel began moving his hands in an aggressive manner, at which time Defendant Rosales pepper sprayed him. Daniel then ran inside the house, and Perez and Esparza followed him inside in order to arrest him and Mercedes.

Upon entering the house, Esparza was tackled by Plaintiff Jose. After another physical struggle, Jose was taken into custody. As Defendants attempted to escort Jose outside, several individuals surrounded and grabbed at them, and Plaintiff Rita struck Rosales several times. There was another altercation with partygoers outside, and Mercedes ran back inside the house. Defendants followed him inside, and Esparza observed Daniel physically resisting Perez's attempts to place him under arrest. During this altercation, Daniel shoved Perez. Perez responded by tasing Daniel, which finally made Daniel comply. Robstown EMS eventually arrived at the scene, where they checked and cleared all three Plaintiffs before Plaintiffs were taken to jail.

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on June 14, 2013, alleging causes of action against Defendants pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for breach of privacy, unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force, and malicious prosecution.¹ Plaintiffs also sue under Texas law for assault and maliciousprosecution. Defendants now move for summary judgment on the defenses of qualified and official immunity.

III. Legal Standard

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must examine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52. In making this determination, the Court must consider the record as a whole by reviewing all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Caboni v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2002). The Court may not weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Id. Furthermore, "affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see also Cormier v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 969 F.2d 1559, 1561 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (refusing to consider affidavits that relied on hearsay statements); Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (stating that courts cannot consider hearsay evidence in affidavits and depositions). Unauthenticated and unverifieddocuments do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence. King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party demonstrates an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). To sustain this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on the mere allegations of the pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "After the nonmovant has been given an opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be granted." Caboni, 278 F.3d at 451. "If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, . . . a verdict should not be directed." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51. The evidence must be evaluated under the summary judgment standard to determine whether the moving party has shown the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248.

B. Qualified Immunity Standard

The doctrine of qualified immunity affords officials protection against individual liability for civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). When a defendant invokes the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). To discharge this burden, the plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test." Atteberry v. Nocana Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2005). First, the plaintiff must establish...