Martinez v. Rodriguez (In re Martinez)

In re Marriage of MAX EDDY MARTINEZ and MARIA ERIKA RODRIGUEZ.

MAX EDDY MARTINEZ, Petitioner and Appellant, v. MARIA ERIKA RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

B279066

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION SEVEN

September 19, 2018

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SD030729)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Matthew C. St. George, Temporary Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Javier Garibay, for Appellant Max Eddy Martinez.

No appearance by Respondent.

____________________

INTRODUCTION

Max Martinez appeals from a trial court judgment that, among other things, awarded his former wife Maria Rodriguez spousal support and divided the couple's community property. Martinez argues the trial court erred by ordering him to pay Rodriguez monthly spousal support he cannot afford to pay and by making the award retroactive. Martinez also contends substantial evidence does not support the trial court's finding that Rodriguez's health declined since the couple's separation or the court's valuation of certain community assets.

Martinez forfeited his contentions regarding retroactive support payments and Rodriguez's health because he submitted an incomplete record on appeal that precludes meaningful review. Martinez also forfeited his arguments regarding the valuation of certain items of community property because he did not make those arguments in the trial court.

On the merits of his remaining arguments, Martinez has not shown that the trial court ordered him to pay monthly spousal support he cannot afford to pay. He has shown, however, that substantial evidence does not support some of the trial court's valuations of certain community property assets and that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring Martinez to pay Rodriguez for her share of the value of those items. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand with directions for the trial court to recalculate the value of those items of community property to effect an equal division of community property.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Marriage and Divorce

Martinez and Rodriguez married in 2005 but had lived together since the birth of their daughter in November 2000. Before their marriage Martinez and Rodriguez shared incomes and expenses, purchased a family home and other real estate, and acquired a neighborhood market where they both worked. After their separation in April 2012 Rodriguez moved out of the family home, stopped working at the market, and became dependent on public assistance. On April 23, 2012 Martinez filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, and on May 17, 2012 Rodriguez filed a response requesting spousal support.

B. Trial and Decision

A contentious trial began on June 26, 2015 and continued on September 18, 2015, December 4, 2015, and April 22, 2016.¹ Rodriguez was represented by counsel until December 28, 2015,when she began representing herself. Contested issues included legal and physical custody of the couple's two children, visitation, spousal support, and the division of community property. This appeal concerns only the trial court's July 12, 2016 rulings on spousal support and division of community property.

Regarding spousal support, the trial court, considering the circumstances listed in Family Code section 4320,² found the couple lived a "middle-class existence" that allowed them to buy a three-bedroom home, property outside the United States, cemetery plots, two cars, and home furnishings. The court found Martinez "assumed ownership" of the family business and its revenue after the couple's separation and he received revenue from two residential rental units he and Rodriguez had purchased. The court found Rodriguez "worked diligently throughout the relationship," but had become dependent on public assistance since her "exile from the family home and business." The court determined she could work part time, but "[w]hether she is capable of full-time employment depends on her current health, which has declined since the separation." The court concluded Rodriguez should be able to live without public assistance and afford an apartment to share with her son. The court awarded Rodriguez $2,500 in monthly spousal support retroactive to May 17, 2012, when she first requested spousal support.

Regarding the division of property, the court relied primarily on Martinez's April 23, 2012 community and separate property declarations (Judicial Council Forms, form FL-160). The court found the family business was community property butdeclined to determine its value because neither party had provided testimony or evidence on the value of the business. The court also declined to rule on the ownership and appropriate distribution of nine bank accounts and two financial services businesses the parties identified in their respective property declarations because neither party submitted any evidence of the value of those assets.

The court accepted the values of the real property identified in Martinez's form FL-160 and included as community property the family home, real property in El Salvador and Mexico, and cemetery plots in California. The court ruled each party was entitled to $277,000 as his or her share of the real property owned by the community at the time of separation. The form FL-160 valued the furnishings in the family home at $20,600, half of which the court awarded to Rodriguez because Martinez had excluded Rodriguez from the home. The court also found the value of the two cars was $30,000 and ordered Martinez to pay Rodriguez half of that amount.

The court entered a judgment of dissolution on October 4, 2016. Martinez timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Martinez Has Not Shown Any Error in the Trial Court's Spousal Support Award

Martinez argues the trial court erred in failing to consider his expenses in ordering spousal support, making spousal support retroactive to May 2012, and finding Rodriguez's health had declined since the couple separated. None of these arguments merits reversal.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

"Permanent spousal support 'is governed by the statutory scheme set forth in sections 4300 through 4360. Section 4330 authorizes the trial court to order a party to pay spousal support in an amount, and for a period of time, that the court determines is just and reasonable, based on the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into consideration the circumstances set forth in section 4320.' [Citations.] The statutory factors include the supporting spouse's ability to pay; the needs of each spouse based on the marital standard of living; the obligations and assets of each spouse, including separate property; and any other factors pertinent to a just and equitable award." (In re Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442-1443, citing § 4320, subds. (c)-(e), (n); see In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 207.)

"'In making its spousal support order, the trial court possesses broad discretion so as to fairly exercise the weighing process contemplated by section 4320, with the goal of accomplishing substantial justice for the parties in the case before it. "The issue of spousal support, including its purpose, is one which is truly personal to the parties." [Citation.] In awarding spousal support, the court must consider the mandatory guidelines of section 4320.'" (In re Marriage of McLain (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 262, 269; accord, In re Marriage of Nelson (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1559.) "'In balancing the applicable statutory factors, the trial court has discretion to determine the appropriate weight to accord to each. [Citation.] But the "court may not be arbitrary; it must exercise its discretion along legal lines, taking into consideration theapplicable circumstances of the parties set forth in [the statute], especially reasonable needs and their financial abilities." [Citation.] Furthermore, the court does not have discretion to ignore any relevant circumstance enumerated in the statute. To the contrary, the trial judge must both recognize and apply each applicable statutory factor in setting spousal support.'" (In re Marriage of Nelson, at p. 1559; see In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 304.)

"[T]he trial court's decision regarding the amount and duration of spousal support is subject to the abuse of discretion standard." (In re Marriage of Left (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1150.) "We examine the challenged order for legal and factual support. 'As long as the court exercised its discretion along legal lines, its decision will be affirmed on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support it.' [Citations.] 'To the extent that a trial court's exercise of discretion is based on the facts of the case, it will be upheld "as long as its determination is within the range of the evidence presented."'" (In re Marriage of Blazer, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1443.)

2. The Trial Court Did Not Order Martinez To Pay More Spousal Support Than He Could Afford

Martinez argues his income tax returns "clearly demonstrate" he is unable to pay Rodriguez monthly spousal support of $2,500. He contends his income taxes for the four years preceding trial showed he "never averaged more than $3,048.16 in adjusted gross income per month, . . . leaving [him] with slightly over $500 a month to live." Martinez, however, admitted at trial he did not include on his June 25, 2015 incomeand expense declaration approximately $2,000 in monthly earnings from a financial services business, nor does that amount appear on his 2014 income tax return. At trial Martinez conceded his...