Martinez v. State

649 S.W.3d 782

Danny Daniel MARTINEZ, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

NO. 01-20-00760-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued June 14, 2022

Discretionary Review Refused September 28, 2022

Alexander Bunin, Chief Public Defender, Harris County, Texas, Jani Maselli Wood, Assistant Public Defender, 1201 Franklin St. 13^th Floor, Houston, Texas 77002, for Appellant.

Kim Ogg, District Attorney, Harris County, Texas, Cory Stott, Assistant District Attorney, 500 Jefferson, Ste. 600, Houston, Texas 77002, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Goodman, and Guerra.

Gordon Goodman, Justice Danny Daniel Martinez pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence against him because the arresting officer's dashcam footage contradicts the officer's stated reasons for making the traffic stop and refutes the factual findings necessary to support the trial court's ruling that the officer reasonably suspected Martinez of driving while intoxicated when the officer made the traffic stop.

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The State charged Martinez with misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.04(a). Martinez moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the arresting officer stopped him without reasonable suspicion.

At the suppression hearing, two witnesses testified: D. Smiers and T. Trotti, both of whom are peace officers employed by the Deer Park Police Department.

When Officer Smiers took the stand, he testified that he had been a peace officer for three-and-a-half years. He had spent the entirety of that time working on the patrol division's night shift. As an officer assigned to the night shift, Smiers engages in "a lot of DWI enforcement," for which he is trained.

Smiers testified that he encountered Martinez while on patrol sometime around 1:40 a.m. Smiers suspected Martinez might be intoxicated after he saw Martinez strike the curb and veer outside his lane twice within a short time and distance. Smiers stated that Martinez's erratic driving during the wee hours was an indicator that Martinez might have been drunk.

According to Smiers, the four-lane road they were on was straight and level, without potholes or obstructions. The road was clearly marked, and its surface was dry. Traffic was light for the time of night. Smiers had driven on this road numerous times and was familiar with it.

During Smiers's testimony, the State introduced into evidence the footage from his dashcam. The footage shows Smiers approaching Martinez from behind in his patrol vehicle. But due to the distance between the two vehicles, limited nighttime visibility, glare from the headlights of oncoming traffic, and the quality of the footage, the footage does not definitively show whether Martinez struck the curb at any time before Smiers initiated the stop. The footage arguably seems to show Martinez veer outside his lane at least once beforehand. The footage also shows Martinez repeatedly hitting his brakes before Smiers initiated the stop.

Defense counsel questioned Smiers about the inability to discern from the dashcam footage what Smiers described on the stand. Smiers said he understood the footage might not be clear, attributing this to the footage's quality.

Smiers testified that Martinez's erratic driving was unsafe. Smiers conceded that Martinez did not pose an immediate danger to someone else, as no vehicle was nearby when Martinez veered outside his lane. But Smiers clarified that Martinez could have caused a collision with Smiers's patrol vehicle, depending on the distance between the two vehicles.

After Smiers had stopped Martinez, Smiers observed that Martinez had red glassy eyes, his speech was slurred, and he smelled of alcoholic drink. Martinez admitted to having drunk two alcoholic beverages.

Smiers also stated that, after the stop, he saw scrape marks on Martinez's passenger-side tires, consistent with Martinez having struck the curb.

Officer Trotti testified that he arrived after Smiers had stopped Martinez. Like Smiers, Trotti saw the scrape marks on Martinez's tires.

The trial court denied Martinez's motion to suppress. In doing so, the trial court relied on Smiers's testimony that he had seen Martinez hit the curb twice even though the roadway was free of obstructions that would cause him to do so. The trial court also relied on Smiers's and Trotti's testimony that they observed scrape marks on Martinez's passenger-side tires after the stop.

After the trial court denied the motion to suppress, Martinez entered into a plea bargain with the State and pleaded guilty to the charged offense. The trial court certified his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

DISCUSSION

Martinez contends that Smiers did not reasonably suspect he was driving while intoxicated, thereby rendering the stop unlawful. Martinez maintains that Smiers's dashcam footage contradicts the officer's testimony such that the trial court erred in not disregarding Smiers's testimony and in not granting Martinez's motion to suppress. Martinez also argues that the trial court improperly relied on the evidence of scrape marks on his tires, which Smiers and Trotti saw only after the stop, in determining that Smiers had reasonable suspicion to make the stop.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. State v. Cortez , 543 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). But our review for abuse of discretion must take into account that a trial court's suppression ruling is comprised of two distinct components: historical factual findings, which often turn on credibility evaluations, and legal conclusions, like whether a given set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion. State v. Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We almost totally defer to the trial court's factual findings, as long as the record supports them. Cortez , 543 S.W.3d at 203. Factual matters include credibility evaluations and who did what, when, where, how, or why. Baird v. State , 398 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). But we review de novo questions of law as well as the trial court's application of the law to the facts. Cortez , 543 S.W.3d at 203–04 ; Delafuente v. State , 414 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We review de novo these aspects of the trial court's suppression ruling because a trial court has no discretion to misinterpret the law or misapply the law to a given set of facts. State v. Ballard , 987 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). However, even if the trial court errs in its interpretation or application of the law, we will affirm the trial court's suppression ruling if we conclude that the ruling is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Cortez , 543 S.W.3d at 203.

Applicable Law

The United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment guarantees a citizen's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution guarantees this right as well. These constitutional guarantees cabin the exercise of authority by peace officers over their fellow citizens. See Johnson v. State , 912 S.W.2d 227, 233–34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (plurality op.) (guarantee in Article I, Section 9 generally corresponds to Fourth Amendment).

In reviewing whether police conduct comports with these guarantees, courts classify interactions between the police and the public into three categories:

(1) consensual encounters, which require no objective justification;

(2) investigatory detentions, which require reasonable suspicion; and

(3) arrests, which require probable cause absent an arrest warrant.

See Furr v. State , 499 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

A traffic stop is an investigatory detention. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State , 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) ; Kothe v. State , 152 S.W.3d 54, 63–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Thus, when a peace officer makes a stop without a warrant, he must reasonably suspect the driver of some criminal activity. Delafuente , 414 S.W.3d at 176–77. This may include a traffic offense. Ramirez-Tamayo , 537 S.W.3d at 36. Reasonable suspicion is more than a hunch; it exists only when the officer has specific, articulable facts that, taken together with reasonable inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude the driver is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Delafuente , 414 S.W.3d at 177. This standard is an objective one that turns on the totality of the circumstances. Id. The officer's subjective intent is irrelevant. Ramirez-Tamayo , 537 S.W.3d at 36.

Whether a given set of facts or circumstances, as properly found by the trial court, shows that a peace officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop is a question of law. Wade v. State , 422 S.W.3d 661, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Analysis

Smiers Reasonably Suspected Martinez of DWI before the Stop

When a trial court makes explicit factual findings, whether written out and signed by the judge or dictated on the record, we examine the record in the light most favorable to its ruling and uphold its findings as long as the evidence supports them. Baird , 398 S.W.3d at 226 ; see also Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d at 670 (trial court's factual findings may be made in signed writing or stated from bench and transcribed).

Here, the trial court credited Smiers's testimony that he saw Martinez strike the curb twice. The trial court also credited Smiers's testimony that there was no reason for Martinez to strike the curb. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court concluded that Smiers had a reasonable basis to stop Martinez to investigate whether he was driving in an unsafe manner because he was intoxicated or due to some other cause.

The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony during a suppression hearing. Hereford v. State , 339 S.W.3d...