Martinez v. State

386 So.3d 394

Lydia MARTINEZ, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee

NO. 2021-KA-00606-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

04/09/2024

LOWNDES COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, HON. LEE SORRELS COLEMAN, JUDGE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: W. DANIEL HINCHCLIFF

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: CASEY BONNER FARMER

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND SMITH, JJ.

SMITH, J, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Lydia Martinez was accused as a principal in the murder of her son-in-law, Manuel Vasquez. Following a jury trial, she was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced to serve a term of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Lydia appeals her conviction alleging a violation of her right to a speedy trial, a violation of her right to trial in a proper venue, and a failure by the trial court to provide a sufficient record for her appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Lydia was initially indicted by a Lowndes County grand jury on one count of accessory after the fact to murder. She was originally indicted for assisting her daughter, Christina Martinez (Christina), in destroying the body of Christina’s husband, Manuel Vasquez, knowing that Christina had murdered Manuel after growing discord and disputes over family issues within the household where they all three lived. The case was continued by agreement of the parties a multitude of times over the next four years. Lydia was then indicted again—this time for the first-degree murder of Manuel. Lydia’s trial on the murder charge was subsequently delayed due to changes in defense counsel and the COVID-19 pandemic. In December 2020, the Lowndes County Circuit Court transferred venue of the murder charge to Oktibbeha County and set the trial for March 2021. During the course of trial, evidence placed before the jury included two separate statements by Lydia confessing to shooting and killing Manuel and disposing of his remains by burning his body in a barrel outside of their house and spreading the remnants in the yard. The jury also heard testimony that in the course of their investigation after Manuel was reported missing by his mother, officers went to conduct questioning at their residence and arrived to find Lydia attempting to commit suicide in her bedroom by drinking antifreeze and slashing her wrists. Her fingerprints were also located on a suicide note next to the bed, and in the note, she confessed to killing Manuel. Finally, expert testimony confirmed that DNA evidence from a bum pile on the property matched the victim. Following a trial in the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court, a jury found Lydia guilty of first-degree murder.

¶3. Thereafter, Lydia filed a post-trial motion for a new trial raising, among other things, a challenge to the lack of a speedy trial. At a hearing on the motion, her counsel argued that she was prejudiced by the delay in bringing her to trial (in both cases of the 2015 indictment for accessory after the fact to murder and the 2019 indictment for first-degree murder) because of failing recollections of witnesses. This was despite the fact that all continuances were requested by or agreed to by Lydia. The trial court denied the motion. Aggrieved, Lydia appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶4. Lydia raises three claims on appeal. She argues that her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated, that her Sixth Amendment right to a trial in the county where the crime was committed was violated, and that the trial court erred by failing to provide a complete record for her appeal.

I. The right to a speedy trial was not violated.

[1, 2] ¶5. The Sixth' Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial …. " U.S. Const. amend. VI. "[T]he United States Supreme Court established a four-part balancing test to decide whether … a criminal defendant has been denied [her] Constitutional right to a speedy trial" in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Hall v. State, 984 So. 2d 278, 282 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). "The Mississippi Supreme Court has adopted the Barker test, which provides that ‘the trial judge is to balance: (i) length of delay, (ii) the reason for the delay, (iii) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (iv) prejudice to the defendant.’ " Lewis v. State, 374 So. 3d 529, 552 (¶90) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Hall, 984 So. 2d at 282 (¶8)), cert. denied, 375 So. 3d 672 (Miss. 2023), pet. for cert., No. 23-7089 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2024). "In weighing the Barker factors, we must consider the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ and ‘no one factor is dispositive.’ " Berryman v. State, 337 So. 3d 1116, 1131 (¶53) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Price v. State, 898 So. 2d 641, 648 (¶11) (Miss. 2005)). "Where the trial court does not articulate findings of fact, this Court ‘acts de novo in performing the Barker analysis.’ " Lewis, 374 So. 3d at 552 (¶91) (quoting DeLoach v. State, 722 So. 2d 512, 516 (¶15) (Miss. 1998)). Thus, because the trial court did not make findings on the record, this Court will review the Barker factors de novo for Lydia’s claim.

A. Length of Delay

[3–7] ¶6. "A ‘presumptively prejudicial delay’ acts as a triggering mechanism for the balancing test set out" in Barker. Lewis, 374 So. 3d at 551-52 (¶90) (quoting Ward v. State, 346 So. 3d 868, 871 (¶6) (Miss. 2022)). Mississippi caselaw holds that "[a]n eight-month delay is presumptively prejudicial." Harris v. State, 311 So. 3d 638, 664 (¶78) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). "In calculating the length of delay for a constitutional speedy-trial claim, the clock begins to run once a person has been accused. This can be when there is a formal indictment or information, or when a person has been arrested." Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 285 So. 3d 671, 681 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)). The delay between Lydia’s arrest and her trial was approximately sixty-seven months. Thus, the delay of her trial was presumptively prejudicial, but

[a] presumptively prejudicial delay does not, however, automatically equate to "actual prejudice." "Actual prejudice" is determined later in the Barker analysis. Presumptive prejudice "simply marks the point" where the court must then consider the remaining Barker factors, and the burden is shifted to the State to show good reason for delay.

Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 650 (¶103) (Miss. 2013) (quoting Johnson v. State, 68 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶7) (Miss. 2011)).

B. Reason for Delay

[8–10] ¶7. "Once a delay is found to be presumptively prejudicial, the court must determine whether the delay should be charged to the State or the defendant." Harris, 311 So. 3d at 664-65 (¶79) (quoting Sullivan v. State, 281 So. 3d 1146, 1164 (¶45) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)). "[T]he State must prove either that the defendant prompted the delay or that the State had good cause." Berryman, 337 So. 3d at 1127 (¶36) (quoting De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 606 (Miss. 1997)). "Different reasons for delay are assigned different weights." Id. In Lydia’s case, we will chronologically delineate three distinct time periods and reasons for the delay between her initial arrest and trial.

1. First Delay – Before First Indictment

[11] ¶8. The first period of delay occurred after Lydia was arrested on suspicion of murder and before she was initially indicted by a grand jury. This period of delay was approximately four months, from July to November 2015. In discussing the lapse of time prior to presentment to a grand jury, we have stated,

[I]t requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from "fundamental conceptions of justice" when they defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause tobelieve an accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable cause. It should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Harris, 311 So. 3d at 665 (¶80) (quoting State v. Woodall, 801 So. 2d 678, 682 (¶15) (Miss. 2001)). The lapse of time between an arrest and indictment is considered an "investigatory delay" and weighs only slightly against the State. See Lewis, 374 So. 3d at 553 (¶95). "Investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay undertaken by the government solely to gain tactical advantage over the accused." Harris, 311 So. 3d at 665 (¶80) (quoting Woodall, 801 So. 2d at 682 (¶15)). Thus, this four-month delay weighs only slightly against the State in this case.

2. Second Delay – Before Second Indictment

[12] ¶9. In October 2019, a grand jury returned a second indictment against Lydia for the charge of first-degree murder arising from the same underlying facts of Manuel’s death as the first indictment.¹ During the interim period of over three years between the first and second indictments, she (through counsel) sought or agreed to fourteen orders of continuance for her trial on the accessory charge through November 12, 2019.

[13, 14] ¶10. The record demonstrates that each of the fourteen orders were signed by both the State and Lydia’s defense counsel. "Agreed continuances are weighed against the defense." Courtney v. State, 275 So. 3d 1032, 1042 (¶29) (Miss. 2019). The "[defendant] is bound by [her] lawyer’s decisions as to the timing of trial and the need for a continuance." May v. State, 285 So. 3d 639, 649 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). "In the course of attributing delays caused by defense counsel to the defendant for speedy-trial purposes, when an attorney-client relationship exists, the client may not pick and choose which of his attorney’s actions shall bind him." Id. Thus, because all fourteen orders and forty-two months of delay were agreed to by both parties, they are counted against the defendant for speedy trial...