Martinez v. United States

GILBERT M. MARTINEZ, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-3264

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

October 26, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Schmehl, J s/s JLS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Gilbert M. Martinez, brings this pro se action against seven defendants and asserts a laundry list of statutory and constitutional violations in relation to Plaintiff's employment. All Defendants who have been served have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, I will grant Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff initiated this action on August 3, 2017, by way of a Complaint against six corporate defendants, the United States of America, the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Honorable Edward G. Smith, claiming that all defendants had conspired to "suppress [his] employment rights." See Docket No. 3. On that same day, Judge Smith was dismissed from this action, Plaintiff's claims against the United States and the FBI were dismissed, and Plaintiff was given thirty days to amend his complaint as to the remaining corporate defendants. I instructed Plaintiff to describe clearly and briefly: 1) the specific statutory basis for federal court jurisdiction over his claims against each defendant; 2) how each defendant was involved in each claim; 3) the specific events and dates thereof that serve as the basis for his claims; 4) the harm he suffered; and 5) the administrative attempts, if any, that he has made to resolve his problems with each defendant. See Docket No. 2.

On August 9, 2017, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint that was virtually identical to his original Complaint. See Docket No. 4. On September 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend in which he sought to file a Second Amended Complaint. This Second Amended Complaint added jurisdictional bases and added a seventh corporate defendant, but was otherwise unchanged from the previous version of his complaint. See Docket No. 7. In his Motion to Amend, Plaintiff acknowledged my direction to him to clearly explain the five things stated above, and stated: "[I] believe one through four were satisfied with the original complaint as filed." With regard to the fifth thing, he stated: "I do not believe the[re] is a administrative process for claims alleging conspiracy to suppress employment rights." See Docket No. 7 at 2.

On May 2, 2018, I granted Plaintiff's September 25, 2017, Motion for Leave to Amend, and directed the Second Amended Complaint to be docketed and considered the operative pleading in this matter. See Docket No. 15. Because Plaintiff continued to name the United States, the FBI, and Judge Smith as defendants, I directed that they be stricken from the pleading. Id. The Clerk of Court subsequently issued summonses to the remaining seven corporate defendants. Motions to dismiss were then filed by Defendants Rahns Trucking, New Enterprise Stone & Lime, and Easton Coach. A review of the dockets shows that the other four defendants have not been properly served.

Plaintiff's 18-page Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter "Complaint") asserts 18 paragraphs of purported facts against Rahns. See Docket No. 16 at ¶¶ 40 - 57. Those paragraphs indicate that Plaintiff was employed with Rahns as a CDL driver for approximately two weeks, from October 3, 2016 to October 18, 2016, during which time he and his company vehicle were involved in two accidents. See id. at ¶¶ 42 - 53. Following the second accident, Plaintiff's employment was terminated. Id. at ¶ 53. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rahns' actions were "willful, deliberate, and discriminative," taken "with the intent to sabotage/hinder plaintiffs work performance." Id. at ¶ 57.

Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint asserts nine paragraphs that could be construed as factual allegations against Easton Coach. See Docket No. 16 ¶¶ 76-84. Those paragraphs indicate that Plaintiff was hired by Easton Coach, and that a third party doctor "deliberately" withheld his medical card and "deliberately" marked off on the medical card that Plaintiff could not drive until he performed a driving skills test. Plaintiff alleges Easton Coach is "complicit' in a conspiracy with the doctor in telling Plaintiff he could not start work for Easton Coach unless he successfully completed the driving skills test. Plaintiff further alleges that Easton Coach forced Plaintiff "into a second skills performance test" with the intent to "take away [P]aintiff s cdl license to prevent [P]laintiff from seeking an [sic] future work." Id.

As to Defendant New Enterprise, Plaintiff alleges that he was hired and began working on July 25, 2017, for New Enterprise as a CDL driver "delivering Ready Mix at their Leesport plant." Id. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff alleges that New Enterprise tampered with the truck assigned to him, forced him to do manual labor not related to his driving job andharassed him in the course of his employment. Id. at ¶¶ 4-13. Plaintiff was terminated by New Enterprise on September 21, 2017. Id. at ¶ 14.

Plaintiff's Complaint consists of three counts that cite to various federal laws and constitutional amendments. Specifically, Plaintiff's Complaint contains counts for: 1) conspiracy to deprive his civil liberties; 2) obstruction of justice and conspiracy to defeat federal suit, which is apparently a contention that the defendants conspired to prevent and/or wrongfully terminate Plaintiff's employment; and 3) denial of his equal rights related to employment. See Docket No. 16.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss requires the court to examine the sufficiency of the complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80, 84 (1957) (abrogated in other respects by Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

The Court of Appeals requires us to apply a three-step analysis under a 12(b)(6) motion: (1) "it must 'tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim;'" (2) "it should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth;'" and, (3) "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675,679); see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d. Cir. 2011); Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d. Cir. 2010).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII and/or ADA Claims

Plaintiff cites Title VII and the ADA in the introduction of the Second Amendment Complaint and the alleged statement of facts in an attempt to assert claims under those Acts. (Docket No. 16 at ¶¶ 1-16.) It is well-established that a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination suit under Title VII and the ADA must first exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing an action in federal court. See Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F. 3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2013); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting exhaustion requirements of Title VII for ADA claims). Consequently, Plaintiff must affirmatively plead that that he has exhausted all applicable administrative remedies prior to filing the instant litigation. See Burgh v. Borough Council of the Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 2001). Otherwise, his complaint, on its face, will be legally insufficient. Id.

Under Title VII and the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 180 days (or 300 days if a state-based claim has also been filed) of the date of the last act of alleged discrimination, wait 180 days for the charge to be processed, and obtain a Right to Sue Notice before commencing a civil action. Id.; see also Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3rd Cir.2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. 2000(e)-5 and 42 U.S.C §12117(a)). The filing of an EEOC charge and issuance of a Right to Sueletter are absolute prerequisites to filing any claim under Title VII and the ADA in federal court.

Here, Plaintiff fails to plead or otherwise state, at all, whether and/or when any charge of discrimination was filed with the EEOC following his termination on September 21, 2017. See Second Amended Complaint. He further fails to plead whether Plaintiff received a Right to Sue Notice, which is an absolute prerequisite to filing suit. Id. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate compliance with the administrative procedures of Title VII as Plaintiff failed to ever file a claim with the EEOC at all, prior to the expiration of the statutory deadline and prior to adding NESL as an additional defendant to this federal action. As an additional consequence, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. See Rife v. Borough of Dauphin, 625 F.Supp. 2d 212, 217 (M.D. Pa. 2008) ("Failure to exhaust their administrative remedies deprives a district court of subject matter jurisdiction.") (citations omitted).

In response, Plaintiff seems to argue that exhaustion of administrative remedies is only required if an individual is alleging racial discrimination, which he is not. See Docket No. 25 at pp. 2-3. However, it is undisputed that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects employees against discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. An employee...