Mason v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

1

KATHERINE M. MASON, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 1:21-cv-616

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

August 8, 2022

OPINION

SALLY J. BERENS U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim under the Child Disability Benefits (CDB) program of Title II of the Social Security Act. The parties have agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings including entry of an order of final judgment.

Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner's decision.

For the following reasons, the Court will vacate the Commissioner's decision and remand the matter for further factual findings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C § 405(g).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting the decision. See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and those findings are conclusive provided substantial evidence supports them. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker may properly rule either way without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiff filed an application for CDB on February 12, 2019, alleging that she had been disabled as of January 1, 2019, due to autism. (PageID.101-02.) Her claim was denied at the initial level on June 10, 2019. (PageID.112.) On February 3, 2020, ALJ JoErin O'Leary held a hearing and received testimony from Plaintiff and Jessica Coles, an impartial vocational expert. (PageID.60-99.) Following the hearing, the ALJ sent medical interrogatories to medical expert Aaron D. Williams, Psy.D. (PageID.375-78.) After Dr. Williams furnished his answers, the ALJ provided them to Plaintiff's counsel. (PageID.302-03.) Plaintiff's counsel indicated he had no objection to the evidence. (PageID.305.) At the ALJ's invitation, counsel provided a written response on April 28, 2020. (PageID.307-08.)

On July 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Act. (PageID.229-31.) Because a supplemental hearing had been scheduled for July 23, 2020, on Plaintiff's claim for CDB benefits, the SSI application was accelerated to the hearing level and joined with the CDB application. On July 23, 2020, the ALJ held a supplemental hearing by telephone, during which Matthew T. Heizler, Ph.D., Plaintiff's academic supervisor from the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, testified. (PageID.42-59.)

On August 5, 2020, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Plaintiff's claim for CDB benefits due to substantial gainful activity but finding that Plaintiff was entitled to SSI benefits because she became disabled on July 6, 2020. (PageID.34-41.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on June 15, 2021. (PageID.22-24.) Therefore, the ALJ's ruling became the Commissioner's final decision. See Cook v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432,434 (6th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff initiated this civil action for judicial review on July 20, 2021.

ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ'S DECISION

The social security regulations set forth a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).^[1] If the Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that, if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.

The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable to perform her previous work and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functional capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof).

Pursuant to the Act, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has promulgated regulations that provide child's insurance benefits if the claimant is at least 18 years old and has a disability that began before age 22. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a)(5). A claimant must establish a medically determinable physical or mental impairment (expected to last at least 12 months or result in death) that rendered her unable to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA). 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). If the claimant was working and had SGA prior to or after reaching age 22, she will not be found eligible for benefits regardless of the medical findings. Dinkel v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 910 F.2d 315, 318 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had attained age 22 as of February 10, 2007, but that she had engaged in SGA in 2006 and 2007, including after she attained age 22, thus rendering her ineligible for CDB. (PageID.37-38.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in SGA since July 6, 2020, her established date of disability for purposes of her SSI claim. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments of autism spectrum disorder and anxiety with compulsive features. (PageID.38.) At step III, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments met listing 12.10 in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.38-40.) Therefore, Plaintiff was disabled beginning on July 6, 2020, for purposes of her claim for SSI benefits. (PageID.41.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises two issues in her appeal: (1) the ALJ committed reversible error by wrongly concluding that Plaintiff had performed substantial gainful activity in the past and by concluding that she was not entitled to CDB benefits; and (2) the appointment of Andrew Saul as a single Commissioner of the Social Security Administration who is removable only for cause and who serves a longer term than that of the President of the United States violates the separation of powers provision and thus causes the decision in this case to be constitutionally defective because the ALJ and the Appeals Council derived their authority from Saul. (ECF No. 14 at PageID.1313.)

I. SGA Determination

The sole issue in this appeal concerning the substance of ALJ's decision is whether her determination that Plaintiff engaged in SGA through her receipt of a stipend for her work as a graduate/teaching assistant while she pursued her master's degree at the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology applies the proper legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence. Because the determination of SGA is a step-one determination, at least for purposes of this appeal, Plaintiff's assertion that the ALJ should have ended her analysis at step three lacks merit.^[2] Plaintiff provides no support for her suggestion that the ALJ's step-three finding that she met a listing essentially allowed the ALJ to skip the step-one analysis. (ECF No. 13 at PageID.428.) This contention directly contradicts the requisite sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a).

The...