Mason v. Minn. Dep't of Human Servs.

Ricky Lee Mason, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Minnesota Department of Human Services, et al., Defendants.

Court File No. 16-cv-2340 (JRT/LIB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

April 3, 2017

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. [Docket No. 15]. This case has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1.

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 15], be GRANTED.

I. STATEMENT OF ALLEGED FACTS

Plaintiffs Ricky Lee Mason and Ryan Richard Swenson (collectively "Plaintiffs"), patients civilly committed in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program ("MSOP"), proceeding pro se, initiated the present lawsuit on July 7, 2016, naming as Defendants the Minnesota Department of Human Services; the Minnesota Sex Offender Program; Emily Johnson-Piper; Kevin Moser; the 2015 to present Data Practices Official of the MSOP, as Doe No. 1; the 2015 to present Minnesota Department of Human Services Data Practices Official, as Doe No. 2; and the 2015 to present Health Information Management Services (HIMS) Department, as Doe No. 3 (collectively "Defendants") demanding relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., [Docket No. 1], at 1, 4).¹

The facts in Plaintiffs' Complaint, [Docket No. 1], all surround Plaintiffs' allegation that Defendants released an Incident Report to Plaintiff Swenson which contained the name of other MSOP civil committees including the names of both Plaintiffs. (See, Id. at 5).² Plaintiffs assert that the MSOP is a treatment facility, and therefore, "all of the records maintained on Plaintiffs' [sic] at the MSOP-ML are considered medical records[.]"(Id.).

On January 18, 2016, Plaintiff Swenson requested a copy of the Incident Report³ through the MSOP client request system. (Id.). Plaintiff Swenson received the Incident Report on June 13, 2016. (Id.). Upon review of the Incident Report, Plaintiff Swenson observed Plaintiff Mason's name, a description of Plaintiff Mason's behavior, and "other sensitive information that Plaintiff Swenson was not supposed to be privy to." (Id.).

Upon observation of Plaintiff Mason's name, Plaintiff Swenson spoke with Plaintiff Mason and informed him of the information contained in the Incident Report. (Id.). The record does not explain the exact contents of the Incident Report. (See, Id.).

Plaintiff Mason alleges he has suffered injury to his reputation due to others being able to read about his behavior in the Incident Report. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff Swenson alleges that he hassuffered injury due to being exposed to the private information of another to which he was not privy. (Id.). Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege any specific causes of action. (See, Id.).

II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS. [DOCKET NO. 15].

Defendants move this Court for an Order dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) reasoning that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Complaint, and in the alternative, for an Order dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) reasoning that Plaintiffs have also failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss [Docket No. 15]).

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). "The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and without exception." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff must plead a cause of action arising under federal law or the Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A complaint states a federal cause of action when it appears on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. See gen., Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C&W Enterp., Inc., 487 F.3d 1129, 1131 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

"A court does not obtain subject-matter jurisdiction just because a plaintiff raises a federal question in his or her complaint. If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate." Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (citing Hagans v. Lavin, 415 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1974)). In other words, merely because a plaintiff states in the complaintthat the Court has subject matter jurisdiction does not make it so. It is the burden of the party asserting jurisdiction to prove that jurisdiction exists. VS Ltd. P'ship. v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 112 (8th Cir. 2000).

"A court must dismiss an action over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction." Pomerenke v. Bird, No. 12-cv-1757 (DSD/JJG), 2014 WL 30363, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)). Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move to dismiss a pleading for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Such a motion may challenge at any time the sufficiency of the pleading on its face or may challenge the factual truthfulness of its allegations. See, Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). In a factual challenge, courts may consider matters outside of the pleadings, and no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiffs' factual allegations. Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729-30, n.6.

"A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation omitted). However, "[a]lthough pro se pleading are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law." Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984); see, Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980).

B. Analysis

Defendants filed the present motion to dismiss and their accompanying memorandum on December 30, 2016. (Defs.' Mot. [Docket No. 15)]; Defs.' Mem. [Docket No. 18]). On January 4, 2017, this Court established a briefing schedule directing Plaintiffs to file their response to Defendants' motion to dismiss by no later than January 20, 2017. (Order [Docket No. 21]).Plaintiffs have filed no such response, and they have taken no action in the present case since the filing of Defendants' motion to dismiss.

1. Plaintiffs Fail to Establish Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Maintain Their Section 1983 Claim

Plaintiffs purport to maintain the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "a plaintiff must prove (1) violation of a [federal] constitutional right, (2) committed by a state actor, (3) who acted with the requisite culpability and causation to violate the constitutional right." McDonald v. City of St. Paul, 679 F.3d 698, 704 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Shrum ex rel Kelly v. Kluck, 249 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted)). Although Plaintiffs invoke § 1983, "[t]o state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Alexander v. Hedback, 718 F.3d 762, 765 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Lind v. Midland Funding, LLC, 688 F.3d 402, 405 (8th Cir. 2012)). Section 1983 does not itself grant jurisdiction. Hagans, 415 U.S. at 534.

As noted above in Section I, supra, Plaintiffs' entire Complaint and all the facts pled therein revolve around one single factual scenario: Defendants allegedly produced to Plaintiff Swenson an Incident Report which contained the allegedly private information of Plaintiff Mason. (See, Compl. [Docket No. 1]). Plaintiff pleads no facts supporting any action or omission other than Defendants producing an Incident Report to Plaintiff Swenson. (See, Id.). Other than the title of Plaintiffs' Complaint including a reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to reference any federal statute or federal constitutional law. (See, Id.).

As the label to the factual section of Plaintiffs' Complaint contains a passing reference to a "Breach of Privacy," construing the pleading very liberally, it might be assumed that Plaintiffsattempted to raise a claim alleging that their privacy was violated. (See, Id.). This claim that their privacy was violated, however, sounds in state law⁴ and does not arise under federal law or the United States Constitution.⁵ For instance, Plaintiffs' Complaint may be seen to allege a state law tort claim for public disclosure of private information or that Defendants released the Incident Report in violation of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act. Minn. Stat. § 13.08.

As a matter of law, however, a violation of state law or a state statute cannot create federal question jurisdiction. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.") (emphasis added). In the present case, it is abundantly clear to this Court that Plaintiffs' attempted cause of action sounds solely in state law, not federal law. There is no factual allegation that Defendants have done anything besides produced to Plaintiff Swenson an Incident Report which contained the allegedly private information of Plaintiff Mason in putative violation of a state law.

Therefore, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs' Complaint, construed liberally, contains only state law claims at best that do not give rise to federal question...