Mason v. Walmart Stores, Inc.

1

CHRISTOPHER MASON, Plaintiff, v. WALMART STORES, INC. and KELLY WALLACE, Defendants.

No. 5:23-CV-226-D

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division

February 8, 2024

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III.UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On April 26,2023, Christopher Mason (“Mason” or “plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VD”), 42 U.S.C. § § 2000e et seq against Walmart Stores, Inc. (“Walmart”) and a negligence claim against Walmart and Kelly Wallace (“Wallace”) (collectively “defendants”) [D.E. 1,2,4]. On July 12,2023 Walmart answered the complaint and moved to dismiss Mason's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [D.E. 13]. On July 24,2023, Mason responded in opposition [D.E. 18]. On August 18,2023, Wallace moved to dismiss Mason's complaint [D.E. 24] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 25]. On August 21, 2023, the court notified Mason of Wallace's motion, the consequences of failing to respond, and the response deadline [D.E. 26]. See Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d309,310 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). On September 11,2023, Mason responded in opposition [D.E. 28]. On October 3,2023, Mason moved for a telephonic hearing on Wallace's motion to dismiss [D.E. 29].

On December 27,2023, Mason filed an amended complaint [D.E. 30]. On January 9,2024, Wallace moved to strike Mason's amended complaint [D.E. 31] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 32]. On January 10,2024, Walmart moved to strike Mason's amended complaint [D.E. 33] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 34]. Mason did not respond to defendants' motions to strike.

On January 17, 2024, Mason moved for “Mediation and/or Arbitration.” [D.E. 37]. On January 19,2024, Wallace responded in opposition to Mason's motion for mediation [D.E. 3 8]. As explained below, the court strikes Mason's amended complaint, grants defendants' motions to dismiss Mason's complaint, denies as moot Mason's motion for a telephonic hearing and motion for mediation, dismisses without prejudice Mason's Title VH claim, and declines to exercise jurisdiction over Mason's negligence claim against Walmart and Wallace.

I.

On January3,2022, Mason became a truck driver for Walmart at its Mebane, North Carolina distribution center (“the distribution center”). See Compl. [D.E. 1] ¶ 7. Walmart required Mason to “use his own personal vehicle” for this work See id. at ¶ 9. Wallace also worked as a Walmart truck driver at the distribution center. See id. at ¶ 10. On August 18, 2022, Mason parked his personal SUV in a marked parking spot at the distribution center. See id. at ¶ 8. Later, Wallace crashed his truck into Mason's parked SUV (“the crash”). See id. at ¶ 10. The crash caused “some front end damage and mechanical issues” to Mason's SUV. Id. Wallace left a note on Mason's SUV admitting fault for the crash. See id. at ¶ 11; [D.E. 19] 3.

The crash caused $5,000 worth of damage to Mason's SUV, and Mason cannot use the SUV anymore “to earn a proper living as [a] [t]ruck [d]river.” Compl. ¶ 12. After the crash, Mason filed a claim with Walmart and asked Walmart to reimburse him for the damage to his SUV. See id. at ¶ 14. Walmart's North Carolina management referred Mason's request to Walmart's “corporate division.” Id. After several weeks, Mason did not hear from Walmart concerning compensation for his SUV and “the other interferences which [Mason] not having his vehicle in prime working condition” caused him. Id. Walmart also did not discipline Wallace, who is white, for the crash. Id. at¶¶ 15-16. Neither Mason's insurance nor Walmart compensated Mason for the damage to his SUV. See Id. at¶¶ 13-15.

Mason contends that Wallace's negligence caused the crash and seeks $20,000 in lost wages from Wallace. See id. at¶¶ 39-45. Mason also contends “Walmart acted in a discriminatory manner towards [Mason], an African American employee, when it failed to resolve or otherwise immediately compensate [Mason] for the damages to [Mason's] vehicle.” Id. at ¶ 35. Mason asserts a Title VH claim against Walmart and a negligence claim against Walmart and Wallace. See Id. at ¶¶ 22-45.

II.

Initially, the court addresses defendants' motions to strike Mason's amended complaint. A court may “strike from a pleading... any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(f). Although granting a motion to strike is generally disfavored, the court has such discretion. See Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc, v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316,347 (4th Cir. 2001); F.D.LC. v. Willetts, 882 F.Supp.2d 859, 870 (E.D. N.C. 2012).

Defendants contend Mason's amended complaint is untimely. See [D.E. 32] 2-4; [D.E. 34] 3-5. A plaintiff may amend his complaint once as a matter of course within 21 days after service or, if it is a pleading requiring a response, within 21 days after service of the response or service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, a party may amend his complaint only with the written consent of the opposing party or leave of court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). On July 12,2023, Walmart answered Mason's complaint and moved to dismiss it. See [D.E. 13]. On August 18, 2023, Wallace moved to dismiss Mason's complaint. See [D.E. 24]. Mason had until Friday, September 8,2023, to amend his complaint as a matter of course. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Mason did not file his amended complaint until December 27,2023, over three months late. See [D.E. 30]. Mason did not seek defendants' consent or leave of court. Cf. [D.E. 31,33]. Mason fails to demonstrate “excusable neglect” that justifies his late filing. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1)(B); see Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380,394-95 (1993).

“Pro se litigants are not exempt from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Jones v. Se. Reg'l Med.Ctr., No. 7:18-CV-28,2019 WL 97036, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 2,2019) (unpublished); see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”); Hansan v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch, Bd., 405 Fed.Appx. 793, 794 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished). Accordingly, the court grants defendants' motions to strike Mason's amended complaint. See, e.g., Oliver v. PHH Mortg. Corp., No. 3:20-CV-304,2021 WL 354127, at *1-3 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 2, 2021) (unpublished); Awah v. Midland Credit Mgmt, of Am., No. 10cv885,2011 WL 3821600, at *1-2 (D. Md. Aug. 26,2011) (unpublished).

Alternatively, the court construes Mason's amended complaint as a motion to amend his complaint. Although the court “should freely give leave when justice so requires,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2), the court need not grant leave to amend when “the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the (plaintiff], or the amendment would have been futile.” Laberv. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404,426-27 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quotation omitted); see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,182 (1962); Matrix Cap. Mgmt. Fund, LP v. Bearing Point, Inc., 576F.3d 172,193 (4th Cir. 2009); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d231,242 (4th Cir. 1999); Sarvis v. United States, No. 7:ll-CR-83, 2018 WL 4855206, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 5, 2018) (unpublished); Johnson v. Allen. 416 F.Supp.3d 550,562 (E.D. N.C. 2018), afFd, 784 Fed.Appx. 165 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished). “An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Johnson. 416 F.Supp.3d at 562; see Van Leer v. Deutsche Bank Sec.. Inc.., 479 Fed.Appx. 475,479 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370,376 (4th Cir. 2008).

Mason's amendment seeks to add a hostile work environment claim against Walmart. See [D.E. 30] ¶¶ 41-52. Mason's amendment is futile because Mason fails to state aplausible claim for a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Wright v. Hertford Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:23-CV-30,2024 WL 85926, at *7-9 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 8,2024) (unpublished) (collecting cases); Torres v. Duke Energy Progress, LLC,__F.Supp.3d__, 2023 WL 5420221, at *2-4 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 22,2023) (same); Ali v. Worldwide Language Res., LLC,__F.Supp.3d__, 2023 WL 5120224, at *7-13 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 9, 2023) (same). Accordingly, the court denies Mason's motion to amend his complaint. Mason's original complaint is his operative complaint.

III.

As for defendants' motions to dismiss Mason's complaint, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009); Bell AH. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,554- 63 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187,190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Giarratano v, Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302. Tn considering the motion, the court must construe the facts and reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Massey v. Ojaniit 759 F.3d 343, 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155(2015). A court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions, “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarr...