Massey v. Willard

1

JANELLE MASSEY v. JUDGE BENEDICT J. WILLARD, AS EMPLOYMENT SUPERVISOR AND IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, AND CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH

Civil Action No. 22-3924

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

August 7, 2023

SECTION “B” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are defendant Orleans Parish Criminal District Court's 12(b)6 motion to dismiss first supplemental and amending complaint (Rec Doc. 19), and plaintiff's opposition (Rec. Doc. 27). For the following reasons IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Jannelle Massey graduated from Southern University Law Center in 2002, and following the bar exam, was hired by Judge Benedict Willard at the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court (“OPCDC”) as a law clerk. Rec. Doc. 14 at 2. In July of 2011, Massey was diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis (“MS”) and in 2014, “transitioned to using a walker because she was pregnant and concerned about her balance.” Id. at 3. However, her condition progressively worsened, and by 2017 Massey had developed drop foot, causing her difficulty in lifting the front of her foot and leaving her unable to drive. Id. Whereas Massey contends that until 2017 her unofficial duties included “running Judge Willard's personal errands, picking up his children from school, taking Judge Willard's children to eat after school, setting up for campaign parties at Judge Willard's home . . .,” among others, these duties ceased when she could no longer drive. Id. at 4. At that point the minute clerk, Lawrence Dejan, assumed these duties and allegedly “would berate Massey because her ‘crippled ass' could no longer drive.'” See id. at 4-5.

According to Massey, her MS only affected her lower extremities, and throughout her time with the court, her cognitive function along with her abilities to type, write, and communicate were not affected. Id. at 3. However, Massey further alleges that beginning at the time where she was no longer able to drive, she “was harassed by Judge Willard, Dejan, and secretary Judith Thomas ....” Id. at 4. Massey also states that “Judge Willard would tell [her] to ‘get that thing out' of his courtroom,” in reference to her walker. Id. In 2019, after Massey called out sick due to a medication interaction, Judge Willard, through a text message exchange with Massey, expressed that they needed “to discuss the reality of [her] health and wellness along with a discussion of disability.” Id. at 5. Massey expressed her desire to continue working at the OPCDC and the necessity of her medical insurance; however, Judge Willard reiterated that “[d]isability payments and insurance need to be explored.” See id.

Later in the year due to the New Orleans Jazz & Heritage Festival (“Jazz Fest”), Judge Willard decided to close his chambers for various days, including Thursday, April 25, Friday, April 26, Thursday, May 2, and Friday, May 3. See id. at 6. On April 26, 2019, “Massey was emergently hospitalized for sepsis due to a urinary tract infection,” and was not discharged until April 30. See id. She did not return to work for the rest of the week. See id. On Sunday, May 5, 2019, Judge Willard texted Massey “inform[ing] her that she could not return to work without medical clearance,” on a phone call on May 6, 2019, Massey alleges that Judge Willard told her “I can't take this anymore. We can't take it. We have to move on. You either seek disability or find employment elsewhere.” Id. That same day, Judge Willard submitted a letter to Robert Kazik, the Judicial Administrator of Criminal Court, advising him that Massey potentially needed long-term therapy, and with the uncertainty of when she would return, he would need a temporary law clerk. Rec. Doc. 27-1 at 7. On May 8, Massey returned to her office to gather her belongings, and “[s]he tendered a letter indicating that she will seek her rights pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act.”^[1] See Rec. Doc. 14 at 6-7; Rec. Doc. 27-1 at 8, 11. On August 5, 2019 Jude Willard submitted a letter to Kazik stating that “Janelle Massey has been on emergency medical leave since May 2019. It is my understanding that she is in the process of seeking long-term disability. Because 12 weeks have passed since May 1, 2019 it is time to remove her from pay-roll.” Rec. Doc. 14 at 10. However, Massey contends she was never officially on FMLA leave and that she “was forced to file for disability retirement . . .,” which was approved on June 27, 2019. Id.

On November 15, 2019, Massey filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which issued a notice of right to sue on July 19, 2022. See id. at 14-15. Massey filed her original complaint in this Court on October 14, 2022, naming Judge Benedict Willard and the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court as defendants. See Rec. Doc. 1. Then on November 26, 2022, Massey filed her amended complaint alleging that she was discriminated against and terminated on account of her disability, in violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Rec. Doc. 1 at 13. On December 6, 2022, the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court filed the instant motion to dismiss claiming sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Rec. Doc. 19. Massey filed her opposition to the motion to dismiss o December 26, 2022. See Rec. Doc. 27. As relief, she seeks monetary relief for her alleged damages, attorney fees, litigation costs, and equitable relief. See Rec. Doc. 14 at 1516.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard of Review

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's complaint “must contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Varela v. Gonzales, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, a plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 556 U.S. at 556).

When deciding whether a plaintiff has met its burden, a court “accept[s] all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements' cannot establish facial plausibility.” Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs must “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution states that, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend XI. This amendment provides for sovereign immunity, which “is an immunity from suit . . . not just liability.” See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Russell v. Jones, 49 F.4th 507, 512 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). To determine “whether an entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, we ‘must examine the particular entity in question and its powers and characteristics as created by state law ....'” Clark v. Tarrant Cnty, Tex., 787 F.2d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1982)). However, this immunity “does not extend . . . to units of local government.” Bd. Of trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001) (citing Lincoln Cnty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)); see also Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 438 (1985) (“independent local political subdivisions are not entitled to [sovereign] immunity even though they exercise a ‘slice of state power'.”). The Court considers six factors when determining if an entity is an arm of the state and thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity:

1. Whether the state statutes and case law view the agency as an arm of the state;

2. The source of the entity's funding;

3. The entity's degree of local autonomy;

4. Whether the entity is concerned primarily with local as opposed to statewide, problems;

5. Whether the entity has the authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and

6. Whether the entity has the right to hold and use property.

See Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Clark, 787 F.2d at 744). These factors need not all be present, and are not weighed equally. See id. at 681-82. In fact, “it is well established that the second is the most important.” See id. at 682 (citing Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1991)).

The court in LaFrance v. City of New Orleans, performed a thorough analysis of these six Clark factors. See LaFrance v. City of New Orleans, No. 16-CV-14439 (E.D. La. June 19, 2017), ECF No. 29. In addressing the first factor, the court reasoned that the “OPCDC was created by state statute[,] La. Stat. Ann. § 13:1335,” and through the state constitution, was...