Masters v. Murphy

2020 IL App (1st) 190908

176 N.E.3d 911

448 Ill.Dec. 374

Robin MASTERS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Renee MURPHY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-19-0908

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

November 17, 2020

Joel F. Handler, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Cathy McNeil Stein, Mona Lawton, and Jay Rahman, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee.

JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 On October 23, 2018, plaintiff, Robin Masters, filed a complaint against defendant, Renee Murphy, alleging defamation and intentional interference with an existing business relationship¹ based on an alleged false statement Murphy made about Masters in January 2018. The trial court granted Murphy's motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016) ), finding that she was immune under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act or Act) ( 745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2016)). On appeal, Masters argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint because the sections of the Tort Immunity Act relied upon by Murphy in support of dismissal were not applicable. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On October 23, 2018, Masters filed a complaint against Murphy comprising two counts: defamation (count I) and intentional interference with an existing business relationship (count II). In her complaint, Masters alleged that on January 13, 2018, when she and Murphy were both working as probationary correctional officers in the Cook County Department of Corrections (Department), Murphy falsely told Sergeant William Shepsky-Linstead that Masters handed keys to the residential treatment unit to a detainee, Megan Potter. Masters further alleged she was terminated from her employment and "experienced humiliation and damage to her reputation" as a result of Murphy's false statement.

¶ 4 On December 10, 2018, Murphy moved to dismiss Masters's complaint in a combined motion pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code. Therein, Murphy argued that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to section 2-619 ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2016) ) because she had either absolute or qualified immunity under sections 2-204 and 2-210 of the Tort Immunity Act ( 745 ILCS 10/2-204, 2-210 (West 2016)). Murphy also argued that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016) ) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In support of the motion, Murphy submitted an affidavit stating that she observed Masters hand "the keys to the tier, which consisted of three keys and a ‘cut down’ tool, to the Residential Treatment Unit to inmate Megan Potter." According to Murphy's affidavit, these keys were used to open jail doors. Murphy reported the incident to her shift commander and immediate supervisor, Sergeant Shepsky-Linstead. In the motion, Murphy cited to Title 20, section 701.140(h)(4) of the Illinois Administrative Code, which states that "[d]etainees, including trustees, shall not be permitted to handle, use or possess jail keys of any type." 20 Ill. Adm. Code 701.140(h)(4) (2014). Attached to her motion were copies of the Department's "Key and Electronic Access Device Control" policy, which states that "[u]nder no circumstances will security keys be made available to inmates regardless of their status" as well as the Department's policy on report preparation, which Murphy described as requiring reporting incidents including, inter alia , breaches of security.

¶ 5 Masters filed a response to Murphy's motion to dismiss, arguing that there were questions of fact that needed to be resolved and the Tort Immunity Act did not apply. She also argued that Murphy's statement was not privileged. She attached her own affidavit to the response, which contested many of the statements in Murphy's affidavit. Specifically, Masters averred that she did not violate the key policy as set out in the administrative code because she never gave the keys to Potter and, additionally, no incident report was required because she did not engage in any misconduct.

¶ 6 On April 5, 2019, the court granted Murphy's motion to dismiss the complaint. In a four-paragraph written order, the court first noted that the matter was before the court pursuant to Murphy's section 2-619.1 motion to dismiss. The court then set out the legal principles that govern dismissals pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code. In the analysis section of the order, the court addressed the parties' arguments regarding the applicability of the Tort Immunity Act. Finally, in ruling to grant dismissal, the court stated that when Murphy made the alleged false statement she was "acting within the scope of her public employment." As such, the Tort Immunity Act applied. This appeal followed.

¶ 7 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Masters contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint and urges us to reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings. In reviewing Masters's claimed errors, we are guided by the following well-established principles.

¶ 9 Section 2-619.1 of the Code permits a party to combine a section 2-619 motion to dismiss based upon certain defects or defenses with a section 2-615 motion to dismiss based on a plaintiff's substantially insufficient pleadings. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016). A section 2-619 motion to dismiss "admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim but asserts ‘affirmative matter’ outside of the pleading that defeats the claim." Czarobski v. Lata , 227 Ill. 2d 364, 369, 317 Ill.Dec. 656, 882 N.E.2d 536 (2008). A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and challenges whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Tielke v. Auto Owners Insurance Co. , 2019 IL App (1st) 181756, ¶ 22, 434 Ill.Dec. 234, 135 N.E.3d 118. When ruling on a motion to dismiss under either section, "the court should construe the pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Sandholm v. Kuecker , 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 55, 356 Ill.Dec. 733, 962 N.E.2d 418. This court reviews a dismissal pursuant to sections 2-615, 2-619, and 2-619.1 de novo . Gatreaux v. DKW Enterprises, LLC , 2011 IL App (1st) 103482, ¶ 10, 354 Ill.Dec. 892, 958 N.E.2d 1088. We may affirm the court's dismissal based upon any grounds supported by the record ( King v. City of Chicago , 324 Ill. App. 3d 856, 859, 258 Ill.Dec. 62, 755 N.E.2d 143 (2001) ), and because our review is de novo , our disposition is without regard to the trial court's reasoning ( United States Steel Corp. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board , 384 Ill. App. 3d 457, 461, 322 Ill.Dec. 969, 892 N.E.2d 606 (2008) ).

¶ 10 We first note that Masters makes repeated assertions in her briefs that the court improperly resolved factual disputes in ruling in favor of Murphy. Specifically, she notes that the court resolved whether Murphy's accusation regarding the keys was truthful, as well as whether when Murphy made the accusation, she was working within the scope of her duties.

¶ 11 Based on our review of the record, we find no impropriety in the trial court's review of the pleadings before it. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must take as true the allegations in the complaint as well as any reasonable inferences from those facts. See De Jesus v. Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund , 2019 IL App (1st) 190486, ¶ 16, 438 Ill.Dec. 37, 145 N.E.3d 573 ; Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc. , 201 Ill. 2d 81, 86, 265 Ill.Dec. 877, 773 N.E.2d 641 (2002). In this case the trial court, after reviewing the complaint and supporting documents, apparently found that Masters's allegations did not support a claim as a matter of law.

¶ 12 On appeal, as in her motion to dismiss, Murphy asserts several bases upon which the trial court's dismissal may be supported: Murphy's communication to Sergeant Shepsky-Linstead fell within an absolute and qualified privilege, Masters failed to sufficiently allege facts in support of her claim of intentional interference with a prospective business advantage,² and sections 2-204 and 2-210 of the Tort Immunity Act bar Masters's claims. Because we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, we limit our review to the applicability of the Tort Immunity Act, which we find to be dispositive.

¶ 13 The Tort Immunity Act protects local public entities and their public employees from liability arising from the operation of government. 745 ILCS 10/1-101.1(a) (West 2016). The immunity conferred by the Act is an affirmative matter that can be raised under section 2-619. DeSmet v. County of Rock Island , 219 Ill. 2d 497, 504, 302 Ill.Dec. 466, 848 N.E.2d 1030 (2006). It is the entity or employee's burden to assert and prove an immunity under the Act. Wright-Young v. Chicago State University , 2019 IL App (1st) 181073, ¶ 61, 440 Ill.Dec. 386, 153 N.E.3d 185.

¶ 14 Masters contends that sections 2-204 and 2-210 of the Tort Immunity Act are not applicable to her claims and that the court's dismissal on that basis was, therefore, in error. Although the trial court does not specifically mention any particular section of the Act in its ruling, we agree with Masters that section 2-204 has no application in this case. Section 2-204 provides: "[A] public employee, as such and acting within the scope of his employment, is not liable for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person." 745 ILCS 10/2-204 (West 2016). Clear from its language, section 2-204 "provides immunity from vicarious liability claims." Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit District No. 5 Board of Directors , 2012 IL 112479, ¶ 42, 362 Ill.Dec. 484, 973 N.E.2d 880 (plurality opinion). Masters has not pleaded vicarious liability. Thus, that section offers no support to Murphy.

¶ 15 We reach a contrary conclusion...