Mata v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles

221 Conn.App. 25

299 A.3d 1262

Mario MATA

v.COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES

AC 45598

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 16, 2023

Officially Released August 8, 2023

Devin W. Janosov, with whom was Donald A. Papcsy, Norwalk, for the appellant (plaintiff).

John M. Russo, Jr., assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, Rosemarie Weber, deputy associate attorney general, and Anthony C. Famiglietti, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Elgo, Js.

PRESCOTT, J.

The plaintiff, Mario Mata, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner), dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the commissioner to suspend his motor vehicle operator's license for forty-five days pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b.¹ On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the administrative record contained substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's findings that he (1) operated the motor vehicle and (2) knowingly refused to submit to a Breathalyzer test. We affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiff's appeal. On June 25, 2021, at approximately 1:56 a.m., Officer Steven Luciano was dispatched to 24 Taylor Avenue in Norwalk, the residence of the plaintiff, for a motor vehicle accident.² Luciano arrived on the scene within a few minutes of being dispatched.³ When Luciano arrived, the plaintiff stood next to a Jeep Wrangler that was lodged on top of the stone retaining wall that borders the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff was the registered owner of the Jeep. Officer Tejada, who had arrived at the scene shortly before Luciano, "identified" the plaintiff to Luciano as the operator of the Jeep and told him that he had assisted the plaintiff out of the Jeep. The plaintiff had difficulty standing, his eyes were bloodshot, and he was slurring his words. Before Luciano had the opportunity to ask the plaintiff any questions, the plaintiff stated that he was "borracho," which means "drunk" in Spanish.⁴

Luciano assessed the scene to determine how the accident occurred. Luciano concluded that the plaintiff had been operating the Jeep at a high rate of speed. When the plaintiff attempted to turn into his driveway, he lost control of the Jeep. The Jeep struck a vehicle that was legally parked along the side of the street in front of the plaintiff's residence, causing minor damage to the parked vehicle. The Jeep also hit the stone retaining wall located at the perimeter of the plaintiff's residence, at which point the Jeep became airborne from the impact and landed on the top of the retaining wall. Luciano observed grass and dirt on the sidewalk in front of the retaining wall, which indicated to Luciano that the plaintiff had attempted to drive the Jeep off of the retaining wall. The retaining wall sustained significant damage as a result of the accident.

After assessing the scene, Luciano asked the plaintiff if he would perform standardized field sobriety tests. The plaintiff agreed to do the tests, and Luciano administered three field sobriety tests. The plaintiff failed all three tests. As a result, Luciano arrested the plaintiff for, inter alia, operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a and transported him to police headquarters.⁵

At police headquarters, Luciano advised the plaintiff of his Miranda rights,⁶ completed an A-44 form,⁷ read him an implied consent advisory, and provided him with the opportunity to contact an attorney. Luciano then asked the plaintiff to take a Breathalyzer test. The plaintiff agreed to take the test but stated, in Spanish, that "I'm fucked ... if I do the test, I know I'm fucked."

Luciano proceeded with the Breathalyzer test and instructed the plaintiff, in both English and Spanish, on how to take the test. Luciano instructed the plaintiff "to inhale prior to putting his mouth on the mouthpiece and then to continue to blow [into the mouthpiece] until he was advised to stop, which means until the machine indicates that enough breath was given in order to submit to a proper test." The plaintiff stated that he understood Luciano's instructions but inhaled after putting his mouth on the mouthpiece, resulting in an invalid test. Luciano testified that the plaintiff "would act like he was taking an inhale but really wouldn't do anything, and as soon as [Luciano] put the tube in [the plaintiff's mouth] he would inhale ...." Luciano reinstructed the plaintiff on how to properly take the test two additional times after the first failed attempt. Despite the repeated instructions, the plaintiff repeatedly failed to follow Luciano's directions and would initially inhale rather than exhaling into the mouthpiece. The plaintiff never provided an adequate breath sample. On the basis of the plaintiff's behavior, Luciano determined that he was attempting to manipulate the testing procedures by intentionally inhaling rather than exhaling when given the mouthpiece. Luciano deemed the plaintiff's conduct a refusal to perform the test.

On June 29, 2021, the commissioner sent a notice to the plaintiff to inform him of the suspension of his license pursuant to § 14-227b.⁸ On September 14, 2021, an administrative hearing was held before a hearing officer, the commissioner's designee, pursuant to § 14-227b (g) to determine whether the plaintiff's license should be suspended. The administrative hearing concluded on October 5, 2021. During the hearing, the hearing officer admitted into evidence, without objection, the A-44 form.⁹ Attached to the A-44 form were Luciano's incident report and narrative supplements. Luciano stated in the narrative supplement that, "[u]pon approaching the scene I made contact with the operator who was standing next to the vehicle and identified by Officer Tejada as the operator." Luciano was the only witness who testified at the hearing. Luciano testified that Tejada "identified" the plaintiff as the operator and that Tejada, at the very least, was present when the plaintiff got out of the Jeep.

Although the plaintiff did not testify, the plaintiff's counsel introduced into evidence photographs of the scene of the accident and affidavits from Ena Julissa Lopez and Christian Toomey. Neither individual had witnessed the accident, but they averred that the accident occurred as a result of the Jeep being improperly parked at the top of the plaintiff's sloped driveway, rolling down the driveway, and crashing into the retaining wall.¹⁰ The plaintiff's counsel argued that there was a lack of substantial evidence that the plaintiff operated the motor vehicle and refused to take a Breathalyzer test.

The hearing officer, acting on behalf of the commissioner, subsequently made the following determinations pursuant to § 14-227b (g) : "(1) [Luciano] had probable cause to arrest the [plaintiff] for a violation [of § 14-227a ]. ... (2) The [plaintiff] was placed under arrest. ... (3) The [plaintiff] refused to submit to such test or analysis. ... (4) [The plaintiff] was operating the motor vehicle. ..." The hearing officer also made the following subordinate factual findings: "Section F of [Luciano's] A-44 indicates that the breath test was chosen by [Luciano]. Section H indicates that the [plaintiff] refused the breath test through his conduct. The refusal was witnessed and subscribed to in Section H of the A-44 by [another Norwalk police officer]. [Luciano] credibly testified that when the [plaintiff] was asked to participate in breath testing, [he] state[d] in Spanish ... ‘I'm fucked if I do the test.’ Then, despite being shown three different times as to how to perform the test, [he] inhaled first and then was unable to provide a sample. [Luciano] testified that he believed that the [plaintiff] was intentionally manipulating the test. The [plaintiff's] attorney's argument that the [plaintiff] was too drunk to perform the test is not persuasive. There is substantial evidence to infer [that] the [plaintiff] refused the breath test through his conduct. [Luciano] also credibly testified that when he arrived on the accident scene, [Tejada] told him that upon [Tejada's] arrival, he [had] assisted the [plaintiff] out of the vehicle and that the [plaintiff] was the owner of the vehicle. The [plaintiff's] attorney presented affidavits from two people who did not witness the accident. There is substantial evidence to find that the [plaintiff] was the operator of the vehicle." On the basis of these findings, the commissioner ordered that the plaintiff's license be suspended for a period of forty-five days and that an ignition interlock device be installed in the plaintiff's vehicle for two years.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183,¹¹ the plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of the commissioner. The plaintiff claimed that there was not substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing officer's determinations pursuant to § 14-227b that the plaintiff (1) was the operator of the vehicle and (2) refused to take a Breathalyzer test. The court rejected the plaintiff's claims and dismissed the appeal. This appeal followed.

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of review and legal principles. "[J]udicial review of the commissioner's action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act [ General Statutes §§ 4-166 through 4-189 ], and the scope of that review is very restricted. ... [R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. ... Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own...