Matasavage v. Corby, Civil Action No. 3:CV-98-2105 (M.D. Pa. 10/13/2000)

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ALBERT MATASAVAGE, Plaintiff, v. DAN CORBY, MIKE DOUGHERTY, and PAUL CAVISTON, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:CV-98-2105.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

October 13, 2000.

MEMORANDUM

A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or Any Alternative, Summary Judgment of Defendant, Dan Corby. (Doc. 18.) The Motion will be granted consistent with the reasoning below.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 29, 1997, an individual forcibly pushed Karen Burnside, a church employee, from a chair at the Holy Rosary (the "Church") Rectory in Scranton, Pennsylvania and stole a cash box containing more than $14,000 in "Smart Money" or cash value certificates ("Certificates") which are redeemable at local stores for merchandise. (Pl.'s Comp., Doc. 1 ¶ 5.) Defendant Dan Corby, a police officer with the Scranton Police Department for 29 years, was assigned to investigate the Church robbery. (Mr. Matasavage's Statement of the Undisputed Material Facts in Opp'n to the Def. Dan Corby's Mot. for Summ. J., Dep. of Daniel M. Corby, Doc. 23, Ex. B at 4-5.) Dan Corby was assisted in the Church investigation by Detectives Mike Dougherty and Paul Caviston. (Dep. of Mike Dougherty, Doc. 23 Ex. D at 4-5; Dep. of Paul Caviston, Doc. 23 Ex. C at 5.) Burnside provided Defendant with a detailed description of the individual who had robbed the Church. (Dep. Test. of Karen Burnside, Doc. 23 Ex. F at 8.) Defendant prepared a photo array containing photographs of persons who matched the description of the individual who had robbed the Church. (Doc. 23 Ex. B at 8-9.) Burnside was unable to identify any persons from the photo array presented by Defendant. (Doc. 23 Ex. B at 8-9.)

Monsignor Joseph Kelly, pastor at the Church on December 29, 1997, informed the Scranton Police Department that the Church rectory had been contacted by persons who indicated that Plaintiff Albert Matasavage may have been the individual who robbed the Church. (Dep. of Monsignor Joseph Kelly, Doc. 23 Ex. E at 8-10.) Thereafter, Defendant prepared a second photo array which included Plaintiff's picture and presented the array to Burnside. (Doc. 23 Ex. B at 9.) Burnside identified Plaintiff as the individual who resembled the Church robber and indicated that the person who robbed the Church was clean-shaven whereas Plaintiff's picture in the photo array was not clean-shaven. (Doc. 23 ¶ 12.) Based on Burnside's identification of Plaintiff, Defendant prepared an arrest warrant and Affidavit of Probable Cause for the arrest of Plaintiff. (Doc. 23 ¶ 2 & Aff. of Probable Cause, Doc. 23 Ex. A.) On December 31, 1997, District Justice James Kennedy issued an Arrest Warrant and Defendant then arrested Plaintiff on January 1, 1998. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 12-13; Doc. 23 ¶¶ 4-5.)

Subsequently, a further investigation into the Church robbery revealed that other individuals may have been involved. (Doc. 23 Ex. B at 15.) A search warrant was issued to investigate another individual, Nicholas Fazio, to determine whether he possessed the Certificates. (Doc. 1 ¶ 17; Doc. 23 Ex. C at 8-10.) A search of Mr. Fazio's residence produced evidence which implicated Mr. Fazio. (Doc. 23 Ex. C at 10.) The search occurred one day prior to Plaintiff's Preliminary Hearing. (Doc. 23 Ex. C at 10.) The search of Mr. Fazio's residence produced evidence indicating Plaintiff may not have been involved in the robbery. (Doc. 23 Ex. B at 15-16.) The District Attorney's Office was informed of the new evidence and released Plaintiff the following morning prior to his Preliminary Hearing. (Doc. 23 Ex. C at 10.) The Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office withdrew the Criminal Complaint against Plaintiff on or about February 2, 1998. (Doc. 1 ¶ 18.)

On December 29, 1998, Plaintiff filed a complaint with this court alleging a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and also for malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment and infliction of emotional distress premised upon Pennsylvania law against Defendants Dan Corby, Mike Dougherty and Paul Caviston. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 22 & 28.) Defendants filed their answer on March 5, 1999. (Doc. 4.) On June 30, 1999, Defendants filed motions requesting judgment on the pleadings, or any alternative, summary judgment based on the fact that the evidence and testimony rendered failed to set forth a claim against Defendants upon which relief can be granted to Plaintiff. (Docs. 17 & 18.) On August 11, 2000, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of Michael Dougherty and Paul Caviston and against Plaintiff. (Doc. 28.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence night affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Facts that could alter the outcome are material facts." Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 590 (1994). "Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

Initially, the moving party must show the absence of a genuine issue concerning any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 329, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2556, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party, and the entire record must be examined in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988); Continental Ins. Co. v. Bodie, 682 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1982). Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the nonmoving party "must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. Mere conclusory allegations or denials taken from the pleadings are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment once the roving party has presented evidentiary materials. Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990). Rule 56 requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, where a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. "The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count I: Plaintiff's Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant violated his procedural due process rights and his right to be free from unreasonable seizures pursuant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments through the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. 1 ¶ 24.) Plaintiff contends that there was no probable cause to support the warrant for his arrest. As support, Plaintiff argues that the Probable Cause Affidavit contained material misrepresentations and omissions made by Defendant. Defendant, on the other hand, contends that he did have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. I hold that Defendant did have probable cause to support the Arrest Warrant and will grant summary judgment to Defendant for Count I.

1. Reckless Disregard for the Truth

In order to prevail under § 1983, Plaintiff must show 1) Defendant engaged in conduct under the color of state law; and 2) Defendant's conduct deprived Plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913 (1981). Since Plaintiff contends Defendant did not provide probable cause for the arrest warrant, thereby violating his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the police officer "knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant;" and (2) that "such statements or omissions [were] material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause." Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude Defendant made statements or omissions that he "knew [were] false, or would have known [were] false except for his reckless disregard for the truth." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). In Wilson, the Third Circuit acknowledged that a reckless disregard for the truth means different things when dealing with omissions and assertions, and explained the different methodologies for analyzing each. 121 F.3d at 787. If the court determines there ware material omissions and assertions, the court will correct the warrant by inserting the omissions and excising the offending misstatements and then analyze the "corrected" warrant for probable cause. Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997).

a. Omissions

In the instant matter, the Affidavit of Probable Cause was based upon the identification of Plaintiff by...