Mateen-Bradford v. City of Compton

KAREEMAH MATEEN-BRADFORD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF COMPTON, Defendant and Appellant.

B300491

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division

October 28, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Order Filed Date 10/29/2021

APPEAL from a judgement of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles No. TC026769, William T. Barry, Brian S. Currey, and Maurice A. Leiter, Judges. Reversed.

Office of the City Attorney City of Compton, Damon Brown, Klapach & Klapach, Joseph S. Klapach, Ring Bender, Norman A Dupont, Patrick K. Bobko, and Jay A. Tufano for Defendant and Appellant.

Gladius Law, Alyssa K. Schabloski, The Ehrlich Law Firm Jeffery I. Ehrlich, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on October 28, 2021, be modified as follows:

1. On page 1, in the second line of the first full paragraph "William T. Barry" is changed to "William P. Barry".

There is no change in judgment.

KIM J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant City of Compton (the City) appeals from a judgment, following a jury trial, in favor of plaintiff Kareemah Mateen-Bradford on her FEHA^[1] retaliation claim. The City contends that the trial court erred when it ruled that certain issues had been conclusive adjudicated in an earlier administrative proceeding and instructed the jury accordingly. We agree and therefore reverse the judgment.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Termination and Administrative Appeal^[2]

"Plaintiff joined the City in 1989 and became the director of human resources in 2006. [Fn. omitted.] She made a formal gender discrimination claim on January 5, 2011, and was placed on administrative leave the same day 'for a minimum of two weeks until [her] work [could] be evaluated.'

"The administrative leave lasted nine months. The City advised plaintiff in September 2011 of its intent to terminate her employment effective September 15, 2011. The notice listed the grounds for termination and advised plaintiff of her right to a Skelly hearing.^[3] The Skelly hearing was conducted on September 15, 2011, and plaintiff was terminated effective September 16, 2011.

"Plaintiff appealed her termination pursuant to the City's disciplinary requirements. She also initiated this action on August 16, 2012.

"Plaintiff prevailed in her administrative appeal [(administrative proceeding)]. In September 2014, she was reinstated with full back pay and benefits when the administrative hearing officer, retired Court of Appeal Justice Candace Cooper, determined the City did not have sufficient reasons to fire her." (Bradford, supra, B276236.) In reaching her decision, the hearing officer made numerous findings of fact in support of her ultimate conclusion that the City lacked sufficient cause to terminate plaintiff.^[4]

B. Proceedings Prior to First Trial

Plaintiff's operative complaint in this action asserted six causes of action for FEHA and Labor Code violations. Prior to trial, the City successfully moved for summary adjudication of four of plaintiff's claims, leaving for trial only her FEHA claims for gender discrimination and retaliation for engaging in protected activity.

Following the summary adjudication, both parties briefed the issue of whether the administrative hearing officer's findings should be given preclusive effect at trial. Plaintiff argued that the issues decided in the administrative proceeding were the same as the issues to be litigated in her gender discrimination and retaliation claims. In its brief, the City argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion did not apply to the administrative findings because, among other things: (1) the issue in the administrative proceeding-whether the City had sufficient cause to terminate plaintiff-was not identical to the issues of gender discrimination and retaliation in the FEHA action, and the latter issues were not actually litigated in the prior proceeding; and (2) the party bearing the burden of proof in the administrative proceeding-the City-was different than the party bearing the burden in the FEHA action-plaintiff. The City also argued that collateral estoppel only applied to ultimate facts, not core or evidentiary facts.

On November 20, 2014, the trial court, Judge William T. Barry, held a hearing on the dispute over issue preclusion. On December 23, 2014, the court issued an order that listed 13 separate "issues and facts [that had] been conclusively established between the parties . . . and [could] not be re-litigated in this action."

C. First Trial

On March 28, 2016, the new judge assigned to the action, Judge Brian S. Currey, held a pretrial conference at which he discussed Judge Barry's preclusion order. At the outset of the conference, Judge Currey stated his understanding that a preclusion order had been issued which was "binding on the parties" and, as a result, certain "factual issues [would] be taken away from the jury that otherwise would be decided in a case like this." He then discussed the parties' proposed preinstructions on the preclusion issue and urged them to come to an agreement on an instruction. At the continued conference on April 4, 2016, Judge Currey stated his view that "[t]here [was] plenty of case law that says one superior court judge cannot undo the decision of another, even a predecessor."

Ultimately, the parties came to an agreement on the language of a stipulation and instruction that informed the jury about the matters listed in the preclusion order by essentially quoting verbatim the terms of that order. The trial court read the stipulation to the jury at the close of evidence and later as a jury instruction.

The jury in the first trial returned a verdict in favor of the City, but a different panel of this Division reversed the judgment due to a prejudicial defect in the verdict form.

D. Proceedings Prior to Second Trial

Following remand, the case was assigned to Judge Maurice Lieter for retrial. Prior to the second trial, both parties filed motions in limine related to the findings from the administrative proceeding. In its motion no. 11, the City argued that the findings should be excluded under Evidence Code sections 350 and 352 because the sufficiency of the City's reasons for terminating plaintiff was irrelevant to the issues of gender discrimination and retaliation under FEHA. In her motion no. 12, plaintiff maintained that the findings were binding on the City and the City's reasonable or honest belief in the reasons proffered for the termination was irrelevant and prejudicial.

At the hearing on the motions, Judge Leiter denied both without prejudice. In denying plaintiff's motion, Judge Leiter expressed his understanding that the parties had a stipulation concerning the administrative findings; plaintiff's counsel, however, informed him that there was no stipulation, only her proposed jury instruction. In response, the City's counsel advised the court that the City was willing to consider a stipulation similar to the one used in the first trial.

During argument on the City's motion, Judge Leiter asked if the jury was going to hear the administrative findings and the City's counsel answered, "Yes, and that's the stipulation." Following further colloquy, plaintiff's counsel proposed that the parties reach a stipulation that the administrative findings and decision "come [in to] evidence." Judge Leiter then explained, "I'm going to deny [the City's motion no. 11] without prejudice." He added that he was "hopeful that you'll be able to work together to make sure that the jury gets to hear [the administrative hearing officer's] findings . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . The jury will hear [the hearing officer's] findings."

Notwithstanding Judge Leiter's comments, the parties were unable to reach a stipulation on the introduction and use of the administrative proceeding findings and, instead, they each submitted proposed jury instructions on the issue.

E. Second Trial

At the second trial, Judge Leiter decided to give the City's instruction, with minor edits, to inform the jurors about the administrative proceeding findings and their use of them. The wording of that instruction was substantially similar to the stipulation and instruction read by Judge Currey in the first trial. Specifically, Judge Leiter advised the jury:

"There are a number of things that are not in dispute and that you do not have to decide in this case. As you've already heard, [plaintiff] appealed her termination using the City's administrative appeal process. As a result of that appeal process, it has already been determined that there was insufficient cause to terminate [plaintiff], and she was reinstated in her job with back pay. This determination is binding. It is not only binding on the parties involved, it is also binding on you and in your deliberations.

"The following issues and facts are conclusively established between the parties. You must accept them as true. No further evidence is required to prove them:

"Number One: The failure of [plaintiff] to submit the 2009 Personnel Board [m]inutes to the City Council until October 2010, was not a violation of any rule, policy, or practice, and did not provide sufficient cause for [plaintiff's] termination.

"Number Two: Prior to the October 2010 City Council meeting, there had been no direction by then Compton city manager, Willie Norfleet, for [plaintiff] to submit Personnel Board minutes to the City Council.

"Number Three: [Plaintiff] complied with . . . Norfleet's request that [she] get the 2010 Personnel Board meeting minutes ready and to the City Council.

"Number Four: [Plaintiff's] failure to comply with Norfleet's uncommunicated desire that the 2010 Personnel Board minutes be...