Mathena v. Vanderhorst

469 P.3d 1144

Courtney Lynn MATHENA, Appellant,

v.Jason J. VANDERHORST, Appellee.

No. 20190156-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed July 2, 2020

Ryan J. Schriever, Spanish Fork, Attorney for Appellant

A. Joseph Sano and Scarlet R. Smith, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge David N. Mortensen authored this Opinion, in which Judges Michele M. Christiansen Forster and Jill M. Pohlman concurred.

Opinion

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 After four notices were sent to Courtney Lynn Mathena's home over a span of about three-and-a-half months, without her taking any action other than to send her sister to the dismissal hearing to request a continuance, her lawsuit against Jason J. Vanderhorst was dismissed with prejudice. Mathena subsequently moved for relief from the judgment under rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing excusable neglect.¹ However, the district court concluded that her neglect was inexcusable and denied her motion. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In May 2017, Mathena filed a complaint against Vanderhorst, alleging damages related to a car accident. For about a year, the lawsuit proceeded through discovery. However, on May 30, 2018, Mathena's counsel withdrew pursuant to rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and provided Mathena's home address. The next day, Vanderhorst filed a notice to appear or appoint counsel and served a copy of the notice by mail to Mathena's home. See Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c). Mathena did not respond or appear.

¶3 Almost two months later, on July 19, Vanderhorst filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, which he served by mail to Mathena's home. Again, Mathena neither responded nor appeared. Then, almost a month later, on August 16, Vanderhorst filed a request to submit the motion to dismiss for decision and again mailed the request to Mathena's home. Once more, there was no response from Mathena.

¶4 Subsequently, on August 22, the district court issued a notice of hearing on the motion to dismiss to the parties, scheduling the hearing for September 18. The court mailed this notice to Mathena's home as well. Mathena never filed a memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss. She also did not show up to the hearing, but her sister did. Mathena's sister asked the court to reschedule the hearing, but the court did not consider her request because she was not licensed to practice law. See Board of Comm'rs of the Utah State Bar v. Petersen , 937 P.2d 1263, 1268 (Utah 1997) (noting that appearing in court on someone else's behalf is the practice of law). On October 11, the court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. See Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b).

¶5 On November 12, through newly retained counsel, Mathena moved for relief from judgment under rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that her failure to appear and respond to the motion to dismiss was due to excusable neglect. Mathena attached a signed declaration to support her motion, in which she stated, in relevant part:

2. I live with my mother and my mail sometimes gets mixed up with her mail.

3. I recall receiving the Motion to Dismiss and the Notice of the Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, but I do not recall receiving the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel.

4. I received notice of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss two days before the hearing. I do not recall when I received the Motion to Dismiss.

5. I tried to get off work for the court date, but my boss would not grant me time off on such short notice. ....

7. I asked my sister ... if she could go to court for me to let the judge know the reason I was not able to be there so the hearing could be rescheduled.

¶6 The district court denied Mathena's motion. In doing so, the court noted that Mathena "received several notices that her case was in jeopardy of being dismissed and she failed to take reasonable and prudent actions to prevent that outcome." The court then concluded that Mathena's actions did not establish excusable neglect because "she failed to take the reasonable action of contacting the court to reschedule the hearing due to her work conflict, contact an attorney to appear for her or even to appear in person to explain herself."

¶7 Mathena appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶8 There are two issues before this court. First, we review for correctness whether the district court applied the appropriate legal standard in denying Mathena's rule 60(b) motion. See Utah v. Boyden , 2019 UT 11, ¶¶ 21–22, 441 P.3d 737 ("We peel back the abuse of discretion standard and look to make sure that the court applied the correct law." (cleaned up)); Rodriguez v. Kroger Co. , 2018 UT 25, ¶ 11, 422 P.3d 815 (noting that even when a district court's ultimate decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion, "whether the district court applied the appropriate standard ... presents a legal question that we review for correctness").

¶9 Then, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that Mathena's actions did not amount to excusable neglect. See Jones v. Layton/Okland , 2009 UT 39, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 859 ("We review a district court's denial of a rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion.").

ANALYSIS

I. The District Court Did Not Apply an Incorrect Legal Standard.

¶10 Rule 60(b) is one of several avenues for relief from a district court's rulings under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On a timely motion and "just terms," a court may set aside "a judgment, order, or proceeding" for one of the various enumerated reasons, including "excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). "District courts have broad discretion" in the rule 60(b) arena. Jones v. Layton/Okland , 2009 UT 39, ¶ 17, 214 P.3d 859 (cleaned up). "The equitable nature of the excusable neglect determination requires that a district court be free to consider all facts it deems relevant to its decision and weigh them accordingly." Id. ¶ 18. "To qualify for relief under rule 60(b)(1), a party must show he has used due diligence. Due diligence is established where the failure to act was the result of the neglect one would expect from a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Sewell v. Xpress Lube , 2013 UT 61, ¶ 29, 321 P.3d 1080 (cleaned up). "The ultimate goal of the excusable neglect inquiry" is to determine "whether the moving party has been sufficiently diligent that the consequences of its neglect may be equitably excused." Jones , 2009 UT 39, ¶ 20, 214 P.3d 859.

¶11 Mathena contends that the district court applied the wrong legal standard. Specifically, Mathena takes issue with a quote the court included in its order from Peterson v. Crosier , referenced in a footnote in Jones : "if the record discloses mere carelessness, lack of attention, or indifference to his/her rights on the part of the applicant, he/she cannot expect an opportunity to redeem the past." (Cleaned up.) See id. ¶ 19 n.12 (quoting Peterson v. Crosier , 29 Utah 235, 81 P. 860, 862 (1905) ). Based on the inclusion of this quote, Mathena claims that the district court erroneously interpreted Jones because the Jones court cited Peterson as an example of the cases requiring a showing of circumstances beyond a party's control in considering whether neglect is excusable—a requirement that the supreme court abandoned.

¶12 The district court did not misinterpret Jones . Although the supreme court included Peterson to show that it was moving away from the beyond-control test, see id. ¶ 19 & n.12 ("[A] moving party need not necessarily prove that it has been forced into neglect by circumstances beyond its control."), the supreme court did not depart from the portion of the Peterson quote that the district court included in its order, see id. Indeed, the supreme court expressly reaffirmed "the basic principle upon which [the beyond-control] decisions rested: that excusable neglect requires some evidence of diligence in order to justify relief." Id. ¶¶ 19–20. And Jones made clear that although a party may prove excusable neglect based on circumstances beyond its control, it need not do so for relief. Id. ¶ 19.²

¶13 Here, the proposition the district court quoted related to "carelessness, lack of attention, or indifference" directly falls within the proper discretionary considerations the supreme court reaffirmed and clarified in Jones . Indeed, the bottom line remains that an individual seeking rule 60(b) relief must exhibit sufficient diligence for relief to be granted, which would not include carelessness, lack of attention, or indifference. Id. ¶ 20. Thus, the quote itself is not an incorrect statement of the law.

¶14 Moreover, the substance of the court's order demonstrates that it applied the correct legal standard. The court assessed the relevant facts: Mathena's notice, her opportunities to take action, and her lack of effort to address the situation. And the court never referred to the beyond-control test and never applied the test in its analysis. Therefore, Mathena's argument that the district court erroneously applied Jones is unpersuasive.

¶15 Mathena also posits that "equitable factors require that any amount of diligence is sufficient" if the rule 60(b) motion is timely. (Emphasis added.) But that simply is not the law. See Sewell , 2013 UT 61, ¶ 29, 321 P.3d 1080 (requiring due diligence or proof that "the failure to act was the result of the neglect one would expect from a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances" (cleaned up)); Asset Acceptance LLC v. Stocks , 2016 UT App 84, ¶ 19, 376 P.3d 322. Allowing any amount of diligence to be sufficient as a matter of law would set too low of a standard, render the excusable part of the inquiry nearly meaningless, and subvert the purpose of a rule designed to balance the competing principles of equity and finality. See Jones , 2009 UT 39, ¶ 17, 214 P.3d 859.

¶16 In short, the district court applied the correct legal standard in its determination of whether...