Matheny v. Clark

1

KELLEY MATHENY and JOHNATHAN MATHENY, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STEVEN J. CLARK and STELLA A. LAVIS, Defendants-Appellants.

No. A-1-CA-39275

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

February 26, 2024

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY Clay Campbell District Court Judge

Kelley Matheny Johnathan Matheny Albuquerque, NM Pro Se Appellees

Steven J. Clark Stella A. Lavis Albuquerque, NM Pro Se Appellants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GERALD E. BACA, JUDGE

{¶1} Defendants Steven J. Clark and Stella A. Lavis, appeal from the district court's memorandum opinion and order affirming the metropolitan court's judgment, finding in favor of Plaintiffs Kelley Matheny and Jonathan Matheny, and awarding Plaintiffs damages, attorney fees and costs in the amount of $5,877.92 based on their complaint alleging violations of the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act (UORRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 47-8-1 through 47-8-52 (1975, as amended through 2007). On appeal, Defendants contend that, pursuant to NMSA 1978 Section 34-8A-6(C) (2019), they were entitled to a trial de novo^[1] in the district court on their appeal from the metropolitan court's judgment finding against them on Plaintiffs' allegations of violations of UORRA and that the district court erred by "simply act[ing] as a typical appellate court" in conducting its appellate review. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} On September 11, 2019, alleging violations of the UORRA stemming from the lack of a functioning toilet or bath/shower in the residence for a period of thirty-one days, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the metropolitan court against Defendants. Following trial on the complaint, the metropolitan court entered a judgment on January 15, 2020, and findings and conclusions on January 23, 2020, finding, inter alia, that Defendants failed to comply with applicable minimum housing codes materially affecting health and safety, awarding damages, costs, and attorney fees to Plaintiffs.

{¶3} As part of their damages, Plaintiffs sought to be reimbursed for hotel expenses they incurred during the thirty-one-day period. The metropolitan court declined to award hotel expenses, and instead awarded Plaintiffs equitable rent abatement as the measure of damages owed by Defendants. Defendants appealed to the district court.

{¶4} Believing at that time the appeal was an "on-the-record appeal," Defendants, on March 10, 2020, filed their statement of appellate issues. On April 9, 2020, Plaintiffs, apparently also believing that the appeal was an "on-the-record appeal," filed their statement of appellate issues and response. The complete record proper was transmitted from the metropolitan court to the district court on appeal. On May 21, 2020, Defendants submitted a request for hearing to the district court requesting a trial de novo "in accordance with [NMSA 1978,] Section 34-8A-6[(C)] [(1979, as amended through 2019)]." The district court did not set the case for trial de novo, instead the district court decided the merits of the appeal by conducting a "[d]e novo review" of the record from the proceedings in the metropolitan court. After its "de novo review" the district court issued a "Memorandum Opinion and Order" (the Order) affirming the judgment of the metropolitan court.

{¶5} In the Order the district court found that "[t]here can be no dispute that a dwelling that does not have indoor toilet or shower facilities is in breach of an owner's obligations under UORRA," see NMSA 1978, § 47-8-20(A)(1) (1999), and that "[t]he question presented by this case is the amount of damages [Plaintiffs] may recover for this breach." Because Plaintiffs did not appeal, the district court did not consider whether damages apart from equitable rent abatement should have been awarded; instead the court limited its "de novo review" to whether it was error to award rent abatement. See NMSA 1978, § 47-8-27.2(D) (1999).

{¶6} Based on its "de novo review," the district court found that the metropolitan court properly exercised its authority to apply equitable rent abatement that exceeds the statutory amount and that the amount awarded was appropriate in this case. Further, the district court found that "assuming [Defendants] made a request for an audio recording of the [metropolitan court] trial and the metropolitan court failed to make an audio recording, this would not be grounds to reverse." Lastly, the district court found sufficient the metropolitan court's basis for awarding attorney fees, which was supported by an attorney fee affidavit with billing records attached, and that the amount of attorney fees awarded was reasonable.

{¶7} As to the "de novo review," the district court stated in the Order that (1) the "metropolitan court is no longer a court of record in UORRA cases," citing § 34-8A-6(C), in support of this finding; (2) "though the metropolitan court is no longer a court of record, a record nonetheless exists and is available for [the district c]ourt to examine on appeal," referencing the metropolitan record, "MRP 1-82 and trial exhibits"; (3) the findings and conclusions of the metropolitan court "have assisted [the district c]ourt in its de novo review on appeal"; and (4) although no audio recording of the metropolitan court exists, "[t]he [district c]ourt is able to perform its appellate review function in this case." Defendants appeal from the district court's "Memorandum Opinion and Order."

DISCUSSION

{¶8} In their appeal before this Court, relying on Section 34-8A-6(C), Defendants argue that the district court erred "in treating the appeal from the metropolitan court below as an appeal on the record in accordance with Rule 1-703 [NMRA]" and by failing to provide Defendants with a de novo trial, arguing that the "[d]istrict [c]ourt needed to conduct a hearing on the merits as if no trial had occurred in the metropolitan court." Defendants contend that the version of Section 34-8A-6 that was in effect at the time the case was in metropolitan court provided that the metropolitan court was not a court of record and provided for de novo appeal for "civil actions brought pursuant to the [UORRA]." See § 34-8A-6(C). Defendants ask this Court to reverse the district court and remand for a trial de novo. In response, although Plaintiffs acknowledge Defendants' contention that "[t]he issue in the instant case is whether the [d]istrict [c]ourt . . . erred in failing to provide Defendants . . . with a trial de novo," Plaintiffs contend that (1) the district court "stated that its review of the [j]udgment of the [m]etropolitan [c]ourt was de novo under UORRA"; (2) the district court "independently considered the legal arguments [Defendants] made in their [s]tatement of [a]ppellate [i]ssues and concluded that the [m]etropolitan [c]ourt had not erred"; and (3) the district court "afforded [Defendants] a de novo review," which "requires nothing more than a fresh chance to be heard again," which Defendants were given. Ultimately, Plaintiffs request that this Court deny Defendants' appeal, allow them to provide an additional statement of fees and costs incurred by their counsel, and order the metropolitan court to release the supersedeas bond.

I. Defendants Were Entitled to a Trial De Novo

A. Standard of Review

{¶9} Whether a district court has jurisdiction to engage in on-the-record review of the proceedings before a court of limited jurisdiction, such as the metropolitan court, is a threshold question of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Bevacqua-Young v. Steel, 2017-NMCA-081, ¶ 6, 406 P.3d 547. "[I]t is incumbent upon the appellate court to raise jurisdiction questions sua sponte when the Court notices them." Smith v. City of Santa Fe, 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300. "[J]urisdictional issues should always be resolved even if not preserved below." Id. "[T]he question of whether a trial court has jurisdiction in a particular case is a question of law that we review de novo." Id. Whether a party is entitled to a de novo appeal, or a new trial, in the district court is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Krause, 1998-NMCA-013, ¶ 3, 124 N.M. 415, 951 P.2d 1076. "Interpretation of statutory language is a question of law, which we review de novo." White Sands Constr., Inc. v. City of Las Cruces, 2023-NMCA-056, ¶ 13, 534 P.3d 1015. "When construing statutes our charge is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." Wild Horse Observers Ass'n v. N.M. Livestock Bd., 2022-NMCA-061, ¶ 8, 519 P.3d 74 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "To discern that appellate courts look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. The District Court Erred in Failing to Hold a De Novo Trial

{¶10} In resolving this appeal, we look to the guidance provided by this Court in Bevacqua-Young, 2017-NMCA-081, and, more recently, our Supreme Court in Padilla v. Torres, ___-NMSC-___, ___ P.3d ___ (S-1-SC-35619, Feb. 5, 2024).We discuss each of these cases individually.

{¶11} In Bevacqua-Young, "the magistrate court filed a criminal complaint charging [the d]efendant with criminal contempt, together with an order on direct criminal contempt finding that [the d]efendant committed direct criminal contempt during a video arraignment." 2017-NMCA-081 ¶ 2. The magistrate court entered a judgment and sentence that ordered...