Mathis v. Dauphin Co. Prison, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:CV-12-1317

KARIEM MATHIS, Plaintiff

v.DAUPHIN CO. PRISON, et al., Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:CV-12-1317

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: August 6, 2012

(Judge Caputo)

(Magistrate Judge Blewitt)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

I. BACKGROUND.

On July 9, 2012, Plaintiff Kariem Mathis, currently an inmate at Dauphin County Prison ("DCP") in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, filed, pro se, a civil rights action with this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff's Complaint consists of three a handwritten pages. Plaintiff additionally filed a handwritten Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). To date, Plaintiff's Complaint has not yet been served on Defendants.

Initially, Plaintiff notes that he has filed no other lawsuits in federal court while incarcerated, and that he has exhausted the requisite administrative remedies available at DCP. (Doc. 1, p. 1).¹

II. ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff names the following ten (10) Defendants:

1) Dauphin County Prison;

2) Warden Dominick L. DeRose;

3) Deputy Warden/Treatment Elizabeth A. Nichols;

4) Deputy Warden/Treatment Leonard K. Carroll;

5) [Lieutenant] Smith;

6) [Sergeant] Smith;

7) [Corrections Officer] J. Cryder;

8) [Corrections Officer] M. Frankenstien;

9) [Corrections Officer] Weikel; and

10) [Corrections Officer] Hoose.

(Doc. 1, p. 1).

Plaintiff alleges the following regarding Defendant Corrections Officer Cryder. (Doc. 1, p. 2). On June 18, 2012, between 6:30am and 10:30am, Defendant Cryder, at the request of two inmates, opened their cell and Plaintiff's cell, and permitted the two inmates to enter Plaintiff's cell and "viciously attack" him while he was asleep. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that this incident was captured on video. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges the following regarding Defendant Corrections Officers Hoose and Weikel. (Id.). On June 18, 2012, between 5:30pm and 6:30pm, Defendants Hoose and Weikel instructed two inmates (Darriar Walker and Richard Aycock) that they had five (5) minutes to "fuck [Plaintiff] up" while he was at the gym before the Defendant Officers would "radio[] for all-gaurd [sic]." (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that there exists a video-recording that shows the DefendantOfficers "[standing] by while these inmates viciously attacked [him]." (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges the following regarding Defendants Lieutenant Smith, Sergeant Smith and Corrections Officer Frankenstien. (Id.). On June 18, 2012, following the stated incident in the gym, Plaintiff states that he dragged "to a location in Dauphin County Prison known as "super segregation," and that Defendants Lieutenant Smith, Sergeant Smith and Corrections Officer Frankenstien"took turns assaulting [him] while [he] was fully cuffed until [he] was left unconscience (sic)." (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges the following regarding supervisory Defendants Warden DeRose, Deputy Warden Nichols and Deputy Warden Carroll. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Plaintiff claims: "There have been so many attacks by officers on inmates in this prison [DCP] and they knew of the many attacks or should have known but did nothing to stop it..." (Id.).

As relief, Plaintiff requests that all of the Defendants be terminated as employees at DCP "for abusing their positions and violating [his] civil rights." (Id.). Plaintiff further asks for compensatory damages in the amount of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) per attack, i.e. three million dollars ($3,000,000.00) in total. (Id.). Lastly, Plaintiff requests written apologies from each officer who struck him. (Id.).

In liberally construing Plaintiff's pro se Complaint, as we must, we find that Plaintiff raises Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Defendants Cryder, Hoose, Weikel, DeRose, Nichols, and Carroll and, Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against DefendantsFrankenstien, Lieutenant Smith, and Sergeant Smith.²

Plaintiff's instant Complaint was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his constitutional rights; thus, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and §1343(a).

Because Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2), we are obliged to screen Plaintiff's Complaint. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F. 3d 307, 314 (3d Cir. 2001); Banks v. County of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 589 (W.D. Pa. 2008).

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW.

A. PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,³ (the "PLRA"), obligates the Court to engage in a screening process when a prisoner wishes to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Specifically, § 1915(e)(2), which was created by § 805(a)(5) of the Act, provides:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

The Court uses the same standard to screen a complaint from a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis as it does for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Matthews v. Villella, No. 4:08-CV-0964, 2009 WL 311177, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2009).

B. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

In Reisinger v. Luzerne County, 712 F. Supp. 2d 332, 343-44 (M.D. Pa. 2010), the Court stated:

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently set out the appropriate standard applicable to a motion to dismiss in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions Bell v. Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

"[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true to 'state a claim that relief is plausible on its fact.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The Court emphasized that "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 1950. Moreover, it continued, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. (citation omitted).

McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 530 (3d Cir. 2009). The Circuit Court discussed the effects of Twombly and Iqbal in detail and provided a road map for district courts presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in a case filed just a week before McTernan, Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).

[D]istrict courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded factsas true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. At 1949.] Second, a District Court must then determined whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege a plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips [v. Co. of Allegheny], 515 F.3d [224,] 234-35 [ (3d Cir. 2008) ]. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, "[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not 'show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. At 1949. This "plausibility" determination will be "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

The Circuit Court's guidance makes clear that legal conclusions are not entitled to the sam deference as well-pled facts. In other words, "the court is 'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Services, Inc., 346 Fed.Appx. 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (not precedential).

See Saltzman v. Independence Blue Cross, 634 F. Supp. 2d 538, 544 (E.D. Pa. 2009) ("The Court in Iqbal explained that, although a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in a complain, that requirement does not apply to legal conclusions; therefore, pleadings must include factual allegations to support the legal claims asserted.").

C. SECTION 1983 STANDARD

In a § 1983 civil rights action, the Plaintiff must prove the following two essential elements: (1) that the conduct complained fo was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and, (2) that the conduct complained of deprived the Plaintiff of rights, privileges,or immunities secured by the laws or the Constitution of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993); Beattie v. Dept. of Corrections SCI-Mahanoy, Civil No. 1:CV-08-00622, 2009 WL 533051, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2009). Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights. Rather, it is a means to redress violations of federal law by state actors. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002). See also Holocheck v. Luzerne County Head Start, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498-99 (M.D. Pa. 2005); Phillips v. Miller, Civil No. 3:09-CV-0555, 2010 WL 771793, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2010).

IV. DISCUSSION.

As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated while incarcerated in DCP. (Doc. 1). An inmate may challenge the conditions of his or her imprisonment in a § 1983 civil rights action, as long as success in that challenge would not implicate the legality or length of his or her confinement. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 650 (2004) (per curiam); Leamer v. Fauver, ...