Mathis v. Dixon

1

RICHARD MATHIS, Petitioner, v. RICKY D. DIXON, Respondent.

No. 4:20cv304/WS/ZCB

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division

April 10, 2024

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Zachary C. Bolitho United States Magistrate Judge

This is a federal habeas corpus case filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Petitioner is Richard Mathis, a prisoner in the Florida Department of Corrections who is serving a life sentence for sex offenses involving a minor. Respondent has answered the petition, and Petitioner has replied.^[1](Doc. 16; Doc. 22). For the reasons below Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.^[2]

I. Factual Background

The evidence at trial established that Petitioner was married to Emma Mathis. Emma Mathis was the aunt of M.S. (Doc. 16-7 at 33). When M.S. was 9 years old, she and her sister often slept over at Petitioner and Emma Mathis's house. (Id. at 33-35). Petitioner and Emma Mathis had two daughters, and all the girls slept together in the kids' bedroom during the slumber parties. (Id. at 35).

Petitioner often came home drunk, and he would pull M.S. out of the kids' bedroom to another room. (Id. at 35-36). Petitioner would instruct M.S. to lie down on the bed, and he would then lubricate her vagina with Vaseline. (Id.). Then Petitioner would get on top of M.S. and insert his penis into her vagina. (Id.). While doing this, Petitioner would place a pillow over her head. (Id.). He also threatened to kill M.S. if she told anyone about the abuse. (Id. at 36-37). The abuse occurred “constantly” from the time M.S. was 9 years old until she was 12 years old. (Id. at 37-39).

M.S told the jury about a specific instance that occurred when she was 12 years old. Petitioner and Emma Mathis had moved into M.S.'s grandmother's house. (Id. at 37-39). One day, M.S. walked to her grandmother's house to find Petitioner there alone. (Id. at 39-40). Petitioner was outside, and M.S. went inside and watched TV in the living room. (Id. at 40). Petitioner then came inside and called M.S. into a bedroom. (Id. at 41). When she entered the bedroom, Petitioner told her to lie down on the bed. (Id.). He then removed M.S.'s clothes, put a pillow over face, and inserted his penis into her vagina. (Id. at 41-42).

After that incident, the abuse stopped for a couple of years before resuming prior to M.S.'s 16th birthday. (Id. at 42-45). At that time, Petitioner drove a school bus that he would park in the back yard. (Id.). M.S. explained that Petitioner took her into the bus and inserted his penis into her vagina. (Id. at 42-45). The abuse stopped again until M.S. was 17 years old. (Id. at 46).

On November 27, 2007, M.S. got drunk at a club and asked Petitioner for a ride home. (Id. at 46-47). Petitioner was also drunk. (Id. at 48). On the way home, Petitioner stopped the truck, walked to the passenger side where M.S. was sitting, grabbed her, and pulled her out of the truck. (Id.). Petitioner had a small gun in his hand. (Id.).

Petitioner pushed M.S. against the side of the passenger seat and had sexual intercourse with her. (Id. at 48-50). M.S. struggled with Petitioner and finally broke free. (Id. at 49). She ran home and reported the incident to law enforcement the next day. (Id. at 50-51).

On January 12, 2008, M.S. learned that she was pregnant. (Id. at 52). She gave birth to a baby on August 26, 2008, at the age of 17. (Id. at 30-31). A DNA test revealed that Petitioner was the baby's father. (Id. at 85-92).

Petitioner was subsequently charged in state court with sexual battery on a child under 12 years of age (Count I), lewd or lascivious battery (Count II), and sexual activity with a 16- or 17-year-old (Count III). He went to trial, and a jury convicted him as charged. Doc. 16-2; Doc. 16-3). The state court sentenced him to life imprisonment on the sexual battery count and fifteen years on each of the other counts, to be served concurrently. (Doc. 16-4).

II. Procedural History

Following his conviction, Petitioner appealed to the Florida First District Court of Appeal (First DCA). (Doc. 16-8). That court affirmed.

(Doc. 16-11). Petitioner then sought state postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Doc. 16-16). The trial court appointed counsel for Petitioner and held an evidentiary hearing on his Rule 3.850 motion. (Doc. 16-17). The trial court ultimately denied the motion, and Petitioner appealed to the First DCA. (Docs. 16-18, 16-19). The First DCA affirmed. (Doc. 16-21).

Petitioner then turned his postconviction efforts to federal court by filing the current habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1).^[3]His petition presents three ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Each will be discussed below, but first the Court will summarize the legal standard for § 2254 petitions.

III. Legal Standard for 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petitions

When considering a state prisoner's § 2254 habeas petition, a federal court is not typically sitting as an appellate court with the mandate of correcting errors that may have occurred in the state court. See Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 377 (2022) (explaining that a federal habeas proceeding is not “a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal”). Instead, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal habeas court applies a “highly deferential standard of review for evaluating state-court rulings [on the merits], which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (citation omitted). Under AEDPA, a federal court may invalidate a state criminal conviction only if the state court decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The state court's factual determinations “shall be presumed to be correct,” and the petitioner “shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

“[T]o be contrary to clearly established federal law, the state court must either (1) apply a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law, or (2) reach a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). An “unreasonable application” of federal law occurs “if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “To meet [the unreasonable application] standard, a prisoner must show far more than that the state court's decision was merely wrong or even clear error.” Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S.Ct. 517, 523 (2020) (cleaned up). Rather, the state court's application of federal law must be “so obviously wrong that its error lies beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. (cleaned up). This standard reflects that the “writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that guards only against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Ramirez, 596 U.S. at 377 (cleaned up).

IV. Discussion

In his § 2254 petition, Petitioner has raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the standard found in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on a Strickland claim, a petitioner must show that (1) counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, and (2) prejudice resulted. Id. at 687. Under the deficiency prong, the inquiry focuses on “whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Id. at 688. Trial counsel is “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. As for the prejudice prong, the inquiry focuses on whether the petitioner has shown there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome would have been different absent counsel's deficient performance. Id. at 694. To make the prejudice showing, the “likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).^[4] Having set forth the applicable standard, the Court will now apply it to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

A. Ground One: “Ineffective assistant [sic] of counsel- failure to file (insufficiency of evidence) during trial and at end of trial.”

Petitioner first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to file a motion for judgment of acquittal that challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. (Doc. 1 at 9). And he claims that such a challenge would have been successful as to the sexual battery charge (Count 1), which he says was based on hearsay and involved no medical evidence.

1. The state court postconviction proceedings

This claim was raised by Petitioner in his state court Rule 3.850 motion. At the state court hearing on his motion, Petitioner's trial counsel, Alex Morris, was called as a witness. (Doc. 16-17 at 6). Attorney Morris testified that he had sixteen years of criminal defense experience when he tried Petitioner's case. (Id. at 23). During those sixteen years, applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard.” Id.

Attorney Morris explained that he...