Matias v. Elon Univ.

TEOFILO C. MATIAS, Plaintiff, v. ELON UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

1:17CV398

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

November 26, 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge.

Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant Elon University, his former employer, alleging race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981") and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 19). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a Hispanic male, was hired by Defendant as a Custodian in 1999. (ECF No. 19 ¶ 10; ECF No. 19-1 at 1, 2.) In 2001, Plaintiff was promoted to Sanitation Recycling Worker, in which his responsibilities included pulling trash and recycling from certain buildings and areas. (ECF No. 19-1 at 3-4.) In 2005, Plaintiff was again promoted, this time to Distribution Serviceman. (Id. at 4.) His responsibilities included inspecting fire extinguishers and distributing and delivering custodial supplies. (ECF No. 19-3 at 7-8.) According to Plaintiff, following this promotion, he asked his supervisor, Dave Worden, for a pay raise. (ECF No. 22-9 at 3.) Plaintiff testified that Mr. Worden responded, "You don't know how to do the job. How can I give you a raise? The only thing you know how to do is make tacos." (Id. at 3-4.) During Plaintiff's tenure as Distribution Serviceman, he consistently received good performance reviews, (see ECF No. 19-4), and his supervisors thought that "he did good work" and that he had a "[s]trong work ethic," (ECF No. 19-2 at 1; ECF No. 19-3 at 9). Plaintiff also served in a supervisory role on multiple occasions, including during inclement weather and during a nine-week period when his direct supervisor was out on sick leave. (ECF No. 22-9 at 5, 30.)

In or before August 2014, Plaintiff's direct supervisor, Wayne Brown, who served as Support Services Supervisor, announced his retirement.¹ (See ECF No. 19-2 at 2; ECF No. 22-8 at 2.) Mr. Brown's supervisor, Dave Worden, who was responsible for hiring his successor, testified that he "[got] the word out" about the position to the employees in his department. (ECF No. 19-3 at 4-5, 15.) Mr. Worden interviewed "[r]oughly half a dozen" applicants for the position, although he testified that he was unsure if the position "ever officially opened." (Id. at 13, 15.) On August 11, 2014, Mr. Worden recommended Mark Poole, a white male, for promotion to Support Services Supervisor. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 17; ECF No. 22-8 at 2.)

At some point after Mr. Brown's announcement, when Plaintiff attempted to view the job posting for the Support Services Supervisor position through Defendant's internal Human Resources ("HR") database, he learned that the position was not posted. (ECF No. 19-1 at 7.) In October 2014, Plaintiff asked Mr. Brown about the position and was informed that Mr. Worden had already selected a candidate. (Id. at 8.) In November 2014, Plaintiff asked Mr. Worden about the position, to which Mr. Worden responded that he had already selected Mr. Poole. (Id. at 8-9.) According to Plaintiff, Mr. Worden also made the following remarks: "Why you not happy? You just want some money? You looking to make more money?" and "You guys, Mexicans, you want everything. You just want money." (ECF No. 22-9 at 10, 31.)

Over a year after the promotion decision was made, in February 2016, Plaintiff was accused of sexual harassment by a coworker, Kimberly Ward. (ECF No. 19-8 at 1.) The matter was initially brought to the attention of HR by two supervisors, Donnell Jeffries and Dave Worden. (ECF No. 19-7 at 1.) Ms. Ward complained that Plaintiff had given her gifts and attempted to kiss her on multiple occasions. (ECF No. 19-8 at 2-3.) Carla Ugboro, Associate Director of HR for Employee Relations, conducted an investigation in which she interviewed Plaintiff, Ms. Ward, Mr. Jeffries, Mr. Worden, and six other witnesses. (Id. at 1-8.) During Plaintiff's interview, he claimed that he was "set up" by other coworkers who had grudges against him. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also accused another supervisor, Kevin Bigelow, of engaging in a relationship with a coworker, in violation of company policy. (Id. at 7-8.) As a result of the investigation, Ms. Ugboro recommended Plaintiff's termination "based on his behavior and the environment that he created for [Ms. Ward]." (ECF No. 19-9 at 1.) Plaintiff was terminated on February 12, 2016. (Id.; ECF No. 19-7 at 36.)

Plaintiff subsequently filed a Complaint, alleging failure to promote based on his Hispanic race in violation of § 1981 and discriminatory termination, also based on race, in violation of Title VII and § 1981. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17, 22.) Defendant has moved for summary judgment on both claims, arguing that "there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Plaintiff's claims." (ECF No. 19 at 1.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is "genuine" if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party, and "[a] fact is material if it might affect the outcome" of the litigation. Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The role of the court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but rather "to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must "resolve all factual disputes and any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party. Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996)).

In cases where, as here, the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of "pointing out to the district court . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party carries this burden, then the burdenshifts to the nonmoving party to point out "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The nonmoving party must support its assertions by citing to particular parts of the record, or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The judicial inquiry on summary judgment "thus scrutinizes the plaintiff's case to determine whether the plaintiff has proffered sufficient proof, in the form of admissible evidence, that could carry the burden of proof of his claim at trial." Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Promote Claim

A plaintiff may prove discriminatory failure to promote under § 1981² in one of two ways: (1) by "demonstrating through direct or circumstantial evidence that [unlawful] discrimination motivated the employer's adverse employment decision[;]" or (2) by proceeding under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas.³ Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013); see also Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015). Here, Plaintiff proceeds under both methods. (ECF No. 22 at 11, 13.)

Defendant contends it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's failure to promote claim because Plaintiff can show neither direct evidence of discrimination nor a case fordiscrimination under the McDonnell Douglas analysis. (ECF No. 20 at 10-14; ECF No. 23 at 2-9.) Specifically, Defendant argues that there is no direct evidence of discrimination because any discriminatory remarks allegedly made to Plaintiff by his supervisor, Mr. Worden, fail to "illustrate [the required] nexus between that motive and the adverse employment action." (ECF No. 23 at 3-4 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff can neither prove a prima facie case of unlawful failure to promote nor show that Defendant's nondiscriminatory reason for hiring Mr. Poole was a pretext for discrimination. (ECF No. 20 at 10-14; ECF No. 23 at 5-9.)

Plaintiff, in response, argues that there is evidence of discrimination based on Mr. Worden's discriminatory remarks, which have a nexus with the adverse employment action against Plaintiff. (ECF No. 22 at 11-13.) Plaintiff also argues that, with respect to the McDonnell Douglas analysis, his failure to apply for the Support Services Supervisor position in a timely manner should be excused because "Defendant failed to make all eligible employees aware of the Support Services Supervisor job vacancy." (Id. at 14.) Further, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's nondiscriminatory reason for promoting Mr. Poole instead of Plaintiff is simply pretext for discrimination. (Id. at 15.)

1. Direct Evidence of Discrimination

To prove direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must show "evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on the contested employment decision." Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 520 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statements in question "must have a nexus with the adverse employment action." Id. "While isolated statements can constitute directevidence of discrimination, the statements must be contemporaneous to the adverse employment action." McCray v. Pee Dee Reg'l Transp. Auth., 263 F. App'x 301,...