Mattei v. Medeiros

320 F.Supp.3d 231

Alexander MATTEI, Petitioner,

v.Sean MEDEIROS, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17–10869–WGY

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Signed June 13, 2018

Alexander Mattei, Norfolk, MA, pro se.

Susanne G. Reardon, Office of the Attorney General, Boston, MA, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

YOUNG, D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Alexander Mattei ("Mattei") is a state prisoner at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Norfolk. Mattei was convicted of assault with intent to rape and assault and battery in the Massachusetts County Superior Court sitting in and for the County of Essex on September 16, 2011. Mattei has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He asserts two claims: (1) his rights to confrontation were violated by restrictions on the cross-examination of a substitute DNA analyst, and (2) the trial judge erred in restricting defense counsel's cross-examination of a police witness. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus ("Pet'r's Pet."), ECF No. 1. The respondent, Sean Medeiros ("Medeiros") opposes the petition, arguing that the Massachusetts Appeals Court decision did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. Resp't's Mem. Opp'n Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus ("Resp't's Opp'n"), ECF No. 13. For the reasons discussed infra, this Court DENIES Mattei's request for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A. Procedural History

On May 20, 2002, Mattei was charged with home invasion, breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, assault with intent to rape, indecent assault and battery, two counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery. Resp't's Further Supplemental Answer ("Supp. Answer") at 179, ECF No. 14. On April 2, 2004, Mattei was convicted of six out of seven of the offenses. Id. at 180. Mattei appealed the convictions, and in 2008, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the convictions. Id. In 2010, the Supreme Judicial Court granted further appellate review. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial on two grounds: (1) that expert testimony ought not have been admitted without accompanying statistical explanations, and (2) that the judge improperly limited defense counsel's cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 862, 920 N.E.2d 845 (2010).

After a second jury trial in 2011, Mattei was convicted of assault with intent to rape and assault and battery, and was acquitted of the remaining charges. Supp. Answer at 181. On appeal from that conviction, Mattei raised three claims: (1) he was deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine a substitute DNA analyst, (2) the trial judge improperly restricted defense counsel's cross-examination of a police witness and refused to give a Bowden ¹ instruction, and (3) the prosecutor made several errors in her closing argument. Commonwealth v. Mattei, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 577, 578, 62 N.E.3d 86 (2016). The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the convictions on October 27, 2016. Id. at 584, 62 N.E.3d 86. The Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate review on March 6, 2017. Commonwealth v. Mattei, 476 Mass. 1112, 80 N.E.3d 980 (2017). On May 15, 2017, Mattei filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. Pet'r's Pet. 1.

II. ANALYSIS

Mattei argues that (1) his confrontation rights were violated when a substitute DNA analyst was not sufficiently cross-examined, and (2) the trial judge erred in restricting defense counsel's cross-examination of a police witness. Pet'r's Pet. 6–8. This Court concludes that neither of these arguments are meritorious and DENIES Mattei's request for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs petitions for habeas corpus seeking relief from convictions in state court. See Hyatt v. Gelb, 142 F.Supp.3d 198, 202 (D. Mass. 2015). A district court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Habeas relief may be granted only if the petitioner is able to show that the state adjudication

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) if "the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). In addition, a state court decision may be an unreasonable application of federal law if it identifies the applicable governing legal rule, "but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case." Id. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

State court decisions are given substantial deference; the incorrectness of a state court decision does not alone warrant relief for a petitioner. Instead, relief may be granted only if the state court decision in question features " ‘some increment of incorrectness beyond error’ that is ‘great enough to make the decision unreasonable in the independent objective judgment of the federal court.’ " Evans v. Thompson, 465 F.Supp.2d 62, 67 (D. Mass 2006) (quoting Norton v. Spencer, 351 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2003) ), aff'd, 518 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008). Put simply, if a state court's decision "was reasonable, it cannot be disturbed" on habeas review. Hardy v. Cross, 565 U.S. 65, 72, 132 S.Ct. 490, 181 L.Ed.2d 468 (2011) (per curiam).

The relevant law necessary for an analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the holdings of Supreme Court cases existing at the time of the state court decision, and does not include the dicta in such cases. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

B. Confrontation Clause

Mattei first argues that his "confrontation rights were abridged" when the Commonwealth called crime lab analyst Brian Cunningham to provide opinion testimony based on original DNA test results from tests completed by the initial DNA analyst, Stacey Edward. Pet'r's Mem. Supp. Pet. Writ. Habeas Corpus ("Pet'r's Mem.") 9, ECF No. 12. Medeiros explains that, according to precedent, "the second analyst's opinion was admissible even if it was based on work conducted by the first analyst." Resp't's Opp'n 8. This Court agrees with Medeiros as well as the Massachusetts Appeals Court's holding; Mattei's rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by the DNA analyst's opinion testimony.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, specifically the Confrontation Clause, provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court noted that this right prohibits testimonial statements by a person who does not testify at trial "unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). A testimonial statement is a statement that the declarant would reasonably expect to be used in a prosecution. See, e.g., id. at 51–52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ; Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (victim statement to 911 operator was not testimonial and not barred by Confrontation Clause, but victim's written affidavit to a police officer was testimonial and therefore barred by Confrontation Clause).

The Supreme Court has expanded Confrontation Clause jurisprudence since Crawford to apply to scientific reports. See Melendez–Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 345, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) ; Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 669, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). In Melendez–Diaz, the Supreme Court held that certificates of analysis from a forensic laboratory that tested a substance found in the defendant's bag were testimonial. Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 345, 129 S.Ct. 2527. The Court compared the certificates to live testimony because they were "quite plainly affidavits," id. at 310, 129 S.Ct. 2527, and did "precisely what a witness does on direct examination," id. at 311, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266 ). Since the certificates of analysis were made to establish or prove "that the substance found in the possession of Melendez–Diaz ... was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine," the Court held they could not be introduced unless the authors of the certificates were subject to cross-examination. Id. at 310–11, 129 S.Ct. 2527. Similarly in Bullcoming, the Supreme Court specifically held that the "testimonial certification" of a blood alcohol analysis report was an out-of-court testimonial statement of the forensic analyst who certified the report. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 657, 131 S.Ct. 2705. While it is true that the test results were generated by a machine, "[the analyst's] certification, however, reported more than a machine-generated number." Id. at 659–60, 131 S.Ct. 2705. Because the certified report was received in evidence through the in-court testimony of a different surrogate analyst, the evidence violated the defendant's rights to confrontation. Id. at 652, 131 S.Ct. 2705. The Court explained in Bullcoming that "surrogate testimony ... could not convey what [the original analyst] knew or observed about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he employed." Id. at 661, ...