Mattingly v. Marion Superior Court

667 F.Supp.3d 946

Kimberly D. MATTINGLY, Plaintiff, v. MARION SUPERIOR COURT, Amy Jones Hon., in her official capacity,Marc Rothenberg Hon., in his official capacity, Alicia Gooden Hon.,in her official capacity, John Chavis Hon., in his official capacity,Shatrese Flowers Hon., in her official capacity,Indiana Office of Judicial Administration, Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-00369-JPH-MPB

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

Signed March 31, 2023

Courtney E. Endwright, Betz & Blevins, Indianapolis, IN, Sandra L. Blevins, Betz & Associates, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Alexander Robert Carlisle, Gustavo Angel Jimenez, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

James Patrick Hanlon, United States District Judge

Kimberly Mattingly alleges that she was forced to resign her position as a Marion County magistrate judge because of her gender and age in violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Defendants—a state court, several Marion County judges, and a judicial administrative office—have filed a motion to dismiss both claims. The Court does not make any findings or conclusions as to whether there is merit to Ms. Mattingly's claims of discrimination. Rather, in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court concludes that neither statute Ms. Mattingly relies on—Title VII (prohibiting gender discrimination) and the ADEA (prohibiting age discrimination)—permits her to bring such claims. Therefore, as explained in more detail in this Order, Defendants' motion to dismiss, dkt. [25], is GRANTED.

I.Facts and Background

Because Defendants have moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts and recites "the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true." McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).

Ms. Mattingly worked for the Marion Superior Court and the Indiana Office of Judicial Administration as a master commissioner and then as a magistrate judge, primarily overseeing family law cases. Dkt. 1 at 6 (Compl. ¶¶ 35-36, 38). During her twelve years as a magistrate judge, Ms. Mattingly consistently received high performance evaluations and was never disciplined. Id. at 6, 7 (Compl. ¶¶ 37, 42, 44). As part of a Marion Superior Court reorganization in late 2020, Ms. Mattingly learned she was no longer being assigned to a family law court. Id. at 7 (Compl. ¶ 42).

A few months later, Ms. Mattingly met with the Executive Committee¹ and her supervisor, Judge Marc Rothenberg, and was told they would fire her if she did not immediately resign. Id. (Compl. ¶ 43). To support their decision, the Committee pointed to "negative" results from judicial surveys, a complaint from "way back," and Facebook comments made about Ms. Mattingly in response to a 2019 Indiana Bar Association article she wrote. Id. at 7, 8 (Compl. ¶¶ 46, 50). Judge Rothenberg had also listened to twelve hours of hearings that Ms. Mattingly presided over. Id. at 8 (Compl. ¶ 52). Except for the Facebook comments—which led to no disciplinary action—Ms. Mattingly had not been informed of any significant complaints or performance issues, and she had not received a formal performance review in several years. Id. at 7, 8 (Compl. ¶¶ 44, 45, 47, 50).

The Executive Committee replaced Ms. Mattingly with someone fifteen years younger. Id. at 9 (Compl. ¶ 57).

Although Ms. Mattingly resigned, she alleges that she did not have a meaningful choice—when the Executive Committee told her that she would be fired if she did not quit, she was forced to resign. Id. at 7, 9 (Compl. ¶¶ 43, 58). Ms. Mattingly alleges that her forced resignation was the result of discrimination because of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Ms. Mattingly brings her gender discrimination claim against the Marion Superior Court and the Indiana Office of Judicial Administration, id. at 10-11 (Compl. ¶¶ 60-68), and her age discrimination claim against the Marion Superior Court, Judge Rothenberg, and the Executive Committee Judges, id. at 11-12 (Compl. ¶¶ 69-81). Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss both claims. Dkt. 25.

II.Applicable Law

Defendants may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss claims for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A facially plausible claim is one that allows "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court will "accept the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true," but will not defer to "legal conclusions and conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of the claim." McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).

III.Analysis

Defendants raise several arguments in support of their motion to dismiss, including that Ms. Mattingly's claims under the ADEA are barred by state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See dkt. 26 at 2. The Court addresses sovereign immunity first. See id. at 6-9; Boim v. Am. Muslims for Palestine, 9 F.4th 545, 550 (7th Cir. 2021); see also McHugh v. Illinois Dep't of Transportation, 55 F.4th 529, 534 n.2 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that a "federal court cannot enter judgment on the merits when Eleventh Amendment immunity applies").

A. Sovereign Immunity for ADEA Claim

The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from hearing cases brought against state agencies or state officials in their official capacities. See Jones v. Cummings, 998 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 2021). Defendants argue that this immunity bars Ms. Mattingly's ADEA claim since it is brought against Judge Rothenberg and the Executive Committee Judges (collectively "the Judges") in their official capacities and against the court itself. See dkt. 1 at 11-12 (Compl. ¶¶ 69-81); dkt. 26 at 6-9.²

It's undisputed that the Judges are state officials and the Marion Superior Court is a state agency. See dkt. 26 at 7; dkt. 30 at 23; see also Woods v. Michigan City, Ind., 940 F.2d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that "judges of Indiana's . . . superior . . . courts are judicial officers of the State judicial system"); cf. Johnson v. Sup. Ct. of Ill., 165 F.3d 1140, 1141 (7th Cir. 1999). Therefore, they are generally protected from suit by the Eleventh Amendment. See Jones, 998 F.3d at 786.

Under limited circumstances, however, state officials and agencies may be sued in federal court. See Peirick v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletics Dep't, 510 F.3d 681, 695 (7th Cir. 2007). The parties agree that the first two exceptions—waiver and congressional action—do not apply. Dkt. 26 at 7; dkt. 30 at 21-25. The parties instead focus on whether the Ex parte Young doctrine, which allows a plaintiff who is seeking prospective equitable relief to sue state officials for an ongoing violation of federal law, applies in this case. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).

The Ex parte Young doctrine, however, does not allow Ms. Mattingly's claim against the Marion Superior Court because it "has no application in suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred regardless of the relief sought." Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993). So only the claim against the Judges could possibly proceed under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See id. Determining whether that claim is within the scope of Ex parte Young involves a "straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704, 718 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002)). "The inquiry into whether suit lies under Ex parte Young does not include an analysis of the merits of the claim." Verizon Md. Inc., 535 U.S. at 646, 122 S.Ct. 1753.

Defendants argue that Ms. Mattingly's claim does not fit within the Ex parte Young exception because she has not sufficiently alleged (1) an ongoing violation of federal law or (2) that she was constructively discharged. See dkt. 34 at 14-15. Ms. Mattingly responds that her complaint alleges that her resignation was forced and that, by seeking reinstatement as a remedy, she has alleged a claim for prospective equitable relief for ongoing violations of federal law. Dkt. 30 at 23-25.

Here, Ms. Mattingly's complaint alleges that she was forced to resign from her position as a result of age discrimination and she seeks reinstatement. Since alleged wrongful discharge is an ongoing violation, Elliott v. Hinds, 786 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1986), and the relief she seeks is prospective, see Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Valcq, 16 F.4th 508, 521 (7th Cir. 2021), this case fits with in the Ex parte Young exception.

Defendants' argument that Ms. Mattingly's claim does not fit within Ex parte Young because she does not allege "constructive discharge" is unavailing. See dkt. 34 at 14-16. A "coerced resignation," which is what Ms. Mattingly alleges, can count as a wrongful discharge all the same. See Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir. 2010). The cases cited by Defendants do not say that only a "constructive discharge" can qualify as ongoing violation of federal law while a "coerced resignation" cannot. Ms. Mattingly's complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks...