Mattis v. Overmyer, Case No. 1:16-cv-00306 (Erie)

TREVOR MATTIS, Plaintiff v. M. OVERMYER, GUSTAFSON, CUMMINS, BEST, MEALY,HASPER, KENNEDY, SHEESLEY, SGT. ANTHONY, and MCNEELY, Defendants

Case No. 1:16-cv-00306 (Erie)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

June 20, 2019

RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

OPINION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ECF No. 100

ECF No. 104

ECF No. 108

I. Introduction

Presently before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed separately by the Defendants in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. ECF Nos. 101, 104, 108. The Plaintiff filed a collective response in opposition to which the Defendants have replied. See ECF No. 114, ECF No. 121, ECF No. 124, ECF No. 126. For the reasons that follow, this Court will grant the Defendants' motions for summary judgment.¹

II. Factual and Procedural Background

On December 21, 2016, Mattis brought this civil rights action by filing a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as Defendants are the Department of Corrections ("DOC"), DOC Secretary John Wetzel ("Wetzel"), and the following individuals who wereeither staff members or medical personnel at SCI-Forest at all times relevant to the claims in this case: Superintendent M. Overmyer ("Overmyer"); Unit Manager Gustafson (incorrectly identified by Mattis as "Gustafason") ("Gustafson"); Counselor Cummins ("Cummins"); Unit Manager Best ("Best"); Sergeant Mealy ("Mealy"); Dr. Hasper ("Hasper"); Ms. Kennedy ("Kennedy"); Ms. Sheesley ("Sheesley"); K. Smith ("Smith"); Sergeant Anthony ("Anthony"); Sgt. Gilara ("Gilara"); Unit Manager Blicha ("Blicha"); C.O. Small ("Small"); and Nursing Practitioner McNeely ("McNeely").² For ease of reference, all Defendants other than Defendants Hasper and McNeely will be collectively referred to as the "DOC Defendants."

Mattis' Complaint alleged multiple claims against one or more of the Defendants, based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights and/or his rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("Rehab Act"). In addition, he also alleged state tort claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. All Defendants filed motions to dismiss. See ECF No. 31, 47. This Court granted motions to dismiss the majority of Mattis' twenty claims. ECF No. 59. The following claims, however, were permitted to proceed:

1. Mattis' Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Overmyer, Gustafson, Cummins, Simons, Cowen, Sheesley, Best, Mealy, and Anthony, arising from the removal of Mattis' Z-Code;

2. Mattis' Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against Defendants Overmyer, Gustafson, and Cummins, arising from the removal of Mattis' Z-Code; and

3. Mattis' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Defendants Gustafson, Cummins, Best, and Anthony.

4. A negligence claim against Defendants Hasper and McKeel.

ECF No. 60. All of the remaining Defendants have moved for summary judgment.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to render summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). In order to avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. When the party seeking summary judgment satisfies its burden under Rule 56 of identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party is required by Rule 56 to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions,answers to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The party opposing the motion "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, that party must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case which it bears the burden of proving at trial, for "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992). In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. White, 826 F.2d at 59. In doing so, the Court must accept the nonmovant's allegations as true and resolve any conflicts in his favor. Id. (citations omitted).

B. Local Civil Rule 56

Mattis has failed to properly satisfy the requirements of Local Rule 56(C). This rule requires a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to file a responsive concise statement of material fact in which he or she must: respond to each numbered paragraph in the movant's concise statement; admit or deny the facts contained in the movant's concise statement; set forth the basis for denial if any fact within the movant's concise statement is not entirely admitted by the non-moving party, with appropriate citation to the record; and set forth, in separately numbered paragraphs, any other material facts at issue. See LCvR 56(C)(1). Courts in this district require strict compliance with the provisions of Local Rule 56. See, e.g., Coleman v. Tice, 2018 WL 5724125, at *2 n. 3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 5722316 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2018); First Guard Ins. Co. v. Bloom Services, Inc., 2018 WL 949224, at *2-3(W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2018); Hughes v. Allegheny County Airport Auth., 2017 WL 2880875, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2017).

Mattis filed a Response to Concise Statement of Undisputed Facts but the document is unresponsive to the Concise Statements filed the by the Defendants. See ECF No. 115. He neither responds to the Defendants' numbered paragraphs nor admits or denies the facts stated therein. See LCvR 56(C)(1). Thus, he has not complied with the local rule.

A non-moving party "faces severe consequences for not properly responding to a moving party's concise statement." Hughes, 2017 WL 2880875, at *1. Any alleged material facts "set forth in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts . . . which are claimed to be undisputed, will for the purpose of deciding the motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party." LCvR 56(E). Mattis has also failed to comply with the local rules of this Court by referencing exhibits in his Concise Statement which he did not attach and file. Nor did he provide copies of these exhibits to the Defendants. See ECF No. 120, p. 1. Thus, he is citing to material that is not in the summary judgment record.

Mattis cannot evade these litigation responsibilities simply by citing the fact that he is a pro se litigant. These rules apply with equal force to all parties. See Sanders v. Beard, 2010 WL 2853261, *5 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2010) (pro se parties "are not excused from complying with court orders and the local rules of court"); Thomas v. Norris, 2006 WL 2590488, *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2006) (pro se parties must follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). While courts give some leniency to pro se litigants when applying procedural rules, the Court "'is under no duty to provide personal instruction on courtroom procedure or to perform any legal chores for the [pro se litigant] that counsel would normally carry out.'" Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004)). Nor may pro se litigants ignore procedural rules that apply to parties assisted by counsel. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (explaining that "we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel").

Accordingly, where Mattis has failed to specifically respond to a concise statement of material fact offered by the Defendants, that statement of material fact will be deemed admitted. LCvR 56(E). However, the Court will consider any facts properly stated in Mattis' pro se responses that contradict the Defendants' statements of fact, to the extent that they are supported by the record. Boyd v. Citizens Bank of Pa., Inc., 2014 WL 2154902, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2014) (stating that "[t]o the extent Plaintiff's statement of 'fact' specifically controverts Defendant's, the Court will consider these facts in determining...