Maverick Transp., LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Labor

739 F.3d 1149

MAVERICK TRANSPORTATION, LLC, Petitioner

v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD, Respondent.Albert Brian Canter, Intervenor.

No. 12–3004.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 13, 2013.

Filed: Jan. 16, 2014.

Corrected: Jan. 17, 2014.

Alvin Jack Finklea, argued, Indianapolis, IN, for petitioner.

Ronald Joseph Gottlieb, argued, Washington, DC, for respondent.

Before LOKEN, BRIGHT, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

An Administrative Law Judge found Maverick Transportation, LLC (Maverick), liable for taking retaliatory action against Albert Brian Canter in violation of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), 49 U.S.C. § 31105. The Department of Labor Administrative Review Board (ARB) affirmed. Maverick now petitions for review, which we deny.

I

In early October of 2003, Maverick hired Canter as a commercial vehicle driver. On November 21, 2003, while driving a tractor-trailer carrying a load for Maverick, Canter was involved in an accident in Pennsylvania which resulted in the death of a motorist. The Pennsylvania State Police placed the truck Canter had been driving out of service while they investigated the accident. During the post-accident inspection, a state trooper found the truck had defects in violation of a number of federal safety regulations. The defects included brakes out of adjustment, a fluid leak in the power steering box, a chaffing brake hose, and improperly secured dunnage.

The trooper told Canter the truck would be released, provided the brakes were adjusted immediately and Maverick assured him the other violations would be corrected. Canter informed Maverick about the defects and the conditions for the truck's release. Canter corrected the dunnage defect himself and Maverick arranged to have the truck's brakes adjusted the following day. Canter then called Maverick to inform it two defects remained uncorrected. Maverick's fleet manager, Robert Roberson, told Canter the local law enforcement officials had authorized Canter to drive the truck to Canter's home, provided the remaining defects were corrected there.

Canter drove the truck approximately eighty miles to a truck stop near his home. There, on Maverick's instructions, he dropped off the trailer containing the load he had been carrying. Maverick dispatched another driver to pick up Canter's load but did not arrange for the remaining defects in the truck to be corrected at the truck stop. Canter then drove the truck another nine miles to his home.

As a result of the accident, Canter experienced depression. Maverick required Canter to take a month-long medical leave. Maverick did not arrange to have the truck's defects corrected while Canter was on medical leave. On December 29, 2003, Canter was cleared to return to work. He chose to resign instead.

When Canter called to inform Maverick of his resignation, he spoke to Roberson. Roberson asked Canter to drive the truck an additional 200 to 250 miles to Maverick's yard to return it. Canter refused to do so unless Maverick first fixed the remaining defects and agreed to provide him with transportation home. Canter told Roberson the truck had “too many deadline problems,” and the uncorrected defects with the truck were in violation of federal safety regulations. Canter then left the truck with the uncorrected defects at the truck stop where he had left its trailer a month earlier, which he had authority to do, and informed Maverick of its location.

After Canter resigned, Roberson prepared an internal memo to submit to Maverick's Rehiring Committee, in which Roberson indicated Canter had refused to drive the truck because it had “too many deadline problems.” Roberson also talked with Maverick officials about placing an abandonment notation in Canter's Drive–A–Check ¹ (DAC) report. An abandonment notation has a negative effect on a driver's ability to be hired and some employers refuse to hire drivers who have an abandonment notation in their DAC report. The Rehiring Committee ultimately placed an abandonment notation in Canter's DAC report because Canter had refused to drive the truck to Maverick's yard.

Canter secured employment one month after resigning from Maverick and worked for five different trucking companies between 2004 and 2008. After April 2008, Canter began experiencing difficulty finding work. Sometime on or after June 1, 2008, a recruiter told Canter information in his DAC report had prevented Canter from being hired. Canter requested the report and received it thirty days later, sometime in July or August of 2008. This was the first time Canter had seen his DAC report or the abandonment notation.

Canter's final trucking job was with DSCO, Inc. (DSCO). He began working for DSCO in July 2008 and resigned in September 2008 when DSCO requested he violate federal hour-of-service regulations. Canter subsequently sought employment with K & B Transportation (K & B). Canter met all of K & B's hiring requirements, but K & B refused to hire him because of the abandonment notation in his DAC report. Canter's inability to find work negatively affected his mental state. He lost his home, became depressed, suffered a loss of appetite, and experienced suicidal thoughts. Canter eventually found work as a produce clerk.

On December 16, 2008, Canter filed a STAA complaint against Maverick with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) alleging retaliation. OSHA's investigation concluded the complaint lacked merit, and Canter sought review by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).

Before the ALJ, Maverick argued Canter had not timely filed his STAA claim, which it also argued failed on the merits. In its recommended decision, the ALJ concluded the claim was timely. Relying on ARB precedent interpreting the STAA limitations period to begin to run when the employee receives definitive notice of an adverse action, the ALJ found Canter had filed his claim within 180 days of receiving definitive notice of the abandonment notation. The ALJ also concluded Maverick had unlawfully retaliated against Canter. The ALJ reasoned Canter's refusal to drive the truck was protected by the STAA because the truck still had defects which violated federal regulations, and of which Maverick was aware. The ALJ reasoned in the alternative Canter had a reasonable fear of danger because of the truck's unsafe condition. The ALJ further found the refusal had motivated Maverick to place the abandonment notation in Canter's DAC report, which the ALJ concluded was an adverse action. Ultimately, the ALJ recommended awarding Canter back pay, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and other relief not currently at issue. Maverick sought review by the ARB.

The ARB concluded the ALJ's findings had all been supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the ALJ's conclusion Canter's claim was timely. The ARB, however, noted sua sponte the ALJ had erred in applying the standard under the STAA as it had existed prior to being amended in 2007, in ruling on Canter's claim. Reviewing Canter's STAA claim de novo under the post–2007 standard, the ARB concluded Canter had prevailed on his retaliation claim.² Finally, the ARB affirmed the damage awards as supported by substantial evidence.

Maverick now petitions for review. In its petition, Maverick argues the ARB erred in (1) concluding Canter's complaint was timely, (2) concluding Canter had proven his retaliation claim, and (3) affirming the damages as awarded by the ALJ.³

II

We review the ARB's decision under the deferential standard articulated in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 49 U.S.C. § 31105(d). Under this standard we must affirm the ARB's conclusions of law unless the same are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). We must also accept the agency's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the [agency's] conclusion.” Steed v. Astrue, 524 F.3d 872, 874 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.2000)). As long as the ARB correctly applied the law and the ALJ's “factual findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole” we will affirm the ARB's decision “even though we might have reached a different decision had the matter been before us de novo.” Wilson Trophy Co. v. N.L.R.B., 989 F.2d 1502, 1507 (8th Cir.1993) (citations omitted).

III

Maverick first contends the ARB's conclusion Canter's claim was timely was contrary to law. Maverick argues the STAA limitations period began to run when it placed the abandonment notation in Canter's DAC report in 2004, and Canter did not file his claim until December 16, 2008. Under the STAA, a driver has 180 days to file a STAA claim from the date an alleged violation occurred. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b)(1). The ARB, however, has interpreted the STAA to incorporate an exception to the general background rule of accrual that a claim accrues at the time of injury. See Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 731 (8th Cir.1990) (describing the general rule). This exception is a version of the discovery accrual rule of federal common law, such that the limitations period begins to run when the employee receives notice of the adverse action taken by the employer. See Eubanks v. A.M. Express, Inc., ARB No. 08–138, 4 (ARB Sept. 24, 2009) (holding the employee had 180 days to file a claim from the date the employee received final, definitive, and unequivocal notice of an adverse employment action). Maverick asserts the ARB's interpretation is invalid.

In reviewing the Department of Labor's interpretation of a statute it administers, we ask two questions. First, we ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res....