Maxey v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

ERNEST MAXEY v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

No. 2956

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2018

May 21, 2020

Circuit Court for Prince George's County

Case No. CAL1718728

UNREPORTED

Kehoe, Shaw Geter, Robinson, Jr., Dennis M. (Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Robinson, Jr., J.

* This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

This is an employment-related dispute. Appellant, Ernest Maxey, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County alleging that his former employer, Lockheed Martin Corporation ("Lockheed Martin"), wrongfully discharged him from his employment. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Lockheed Martin. Maxey filed this appeal and raises several arguments, which we have distilled into three questions¹:

1) Did the circuit court err by granting Lockheed Martin's motion for summary judgment?

2) Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's request to file an opposition to Lockheed Martin's motion for summary judgment after the deadline to respond to the motion already passed?

3) Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by not admitting into evidence portions of Appellant's deposition testimony from another proceeding?

For the reasons explained below, we find no error or abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Maxey's employment with Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin is a multi-national defense contractor that employed Maxey to assist the UnitedStates military in war zones in Afghanistan. He worked at Camp Dwyer in Hemland River Valley, Afghanistan. According to Maxey, the details regarding his work are "classified." United States military orders prohibit civilians serving with United States military personnel, like Maxey, from introducing, transferring, possessing or consuming alcohol or marijuana on military bases in Afghanistan. The laws of Afghanistan also prohibit consumption of alcohol and marijuana.

In or around July 2014, Maxey reported to Lockheed Martin and the United States military that some of Lockheed Martin's employees were using alcohol and marijuana on a military site in Afghanistan. The United States military investigated the drug-related activity that Maxey reported. Maxey admitted to consuming alcohol on a military site, but claims that he had stopped in March of 2014. He denied ever using marijuana on any military site. The United States military's investigation resulted in a determination that Maxey had trafficked in and consumed alcohol and marijuana on a military base in violation of United States military orders. At this point on the relevant timeline, the parties' respective versions of events diverge with respect to the circumstances under which Maxey's employment with Lockheed Martin ended.

According to Maxey, Lockheed Martin informed him on August 7, 2014 that it was transferring him from Afghanistan to the United States. Lockheed Martin claims that, on the same date, Maxey verbally resigned from his employment with Lockheed Martin. On August 8, 2014, the United States military issued a debarment letter, which prohibited Maxey from entering any United States military site in Afghanistan. Maxey claims he didnot receive the debarment letter until August 13, 2014. Maxey also claims that, on August 8, 2014, Lockheed Martin left him "stranded" in Dubai, U.A.E. with no means to return to the United States after cancelling his employer-issued credit card, disconnecting his employer-issued cell phone, terminating his employment-related e-mail account, removing him from Lockheed Martin's payroll, and cancelling his employer-provided health insurance. On August 19, 2014, Maxey submitted a written resignation to Lockheed Martin, which Maxey explained as an attempt to preserve his security clearance, although he contends that Lockheed Martin had already discharged him from his employment. What is clear is that Maxey is no longer employed by Lockheed Martin.

DISCUSSION

I. Did The Circuit Court Err By Granting Lockheed Martin's Motion For Summary Judgment?

A. Standard of Review

Motions for summary judgment are governed by Maryland Rule 2-501, which provides that "[a]ny party may file a written motion for summary judgment on all or part of an action on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." When reviewing "the trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, the standard of review is de novo." Beka Indus., Inc. v. Worcester County Bd. of Educ., 419 Md. 194, 227 (2011) (quoting Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149, 163 (2006)). "[W]e independently review the record to determine whether the parties properly generated a dispute of material fact, and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the record in the lightmost favorable to the nonmoving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving party." Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Georg, 456 Md. 616, 651 (2017) (quoting Chateau Foghorn LP v. Hosford, 455 Md. 462, 482 (2017)). "So long as the record reveals no genuine dispute of material fact 'necessary to resolve the controversy as a matter of law . . . the entry of summary judgment is proper.'" Appiah v. Hall, 416 Md. 533, 547 (2010) (quoting O'Connor v. Balt. County, 382 Md. 102, 111 (2004)).

B. Discussion

Maxey's claim against Lockheed Martin is based on Maryland's common law cause of action for wrongful termination.² "The common law rule, applicable in Maryland, is that an employment contract of indefinite duration, that is, at will, can be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party at any time." Yuan v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 452 Md. 436, 450 (2017) (quoting Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35 (1981)). "The doctrine was born during a laissez-faire period in our country's history, when personal freedom to contract or to engage in a business enterprise was considered to be of primary importance." Id. (quoting Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 324 Md.294, 303 (1991)). "However, there are limitations to the at-will employment doctrine." Id.

The Court of Appeals has recognized the competing interests in at-will employment, including the employer's interest in terminating an employee without reason and an employee's and society's interest in ensuring employees are not terminated in violation of public policies. Id. (citing Adler, 291 Md. at 42). Under Maryland law, there is a public policy exception to the at-will employment rule for wrongful termination "when the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy[.]" Id. (quoting Adler, 291 Md. at 47). For an at-will employee to establish wrongful termination "the employee must be discharged, the basis for the employee's discharge must violate some clear mandate of public policy, and there must be a nexus between the employee's conduct and the employer's decision to fire the employee." Id. at 451 (quoting Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 50-51 (2002)).

Lockheed Martin argues at the outset that Maxey cannot pursue a claim for wrongful termination because his employment was based in Afghanistan. Lockheed Martin quotes a portion of Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982) (the "Federal Adler Decision") for the proposition that the cause of action for wrongful termination does not have "extraterritorial effect." The parties' briefs talk past each other on this issue because the parties are relying on prior decisions involving the same parties, but decided by different courts. Lockheed Martin relies on the Federal Adler Decision to support its argument that Maryland's common law claim for wrongful termination doesnot have "extraterritorial effect." Maxey refers to Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31 (1981) (the "Maryland Adler Decision") to argue that the decision Lockheed Martin cites does not stand for the stated proposition. The Maryland Adler Decision was in response to the federal district court's certification of questions to the Court of Appeals. Regardless of this disconnect, Lockheed Martin's argument is not supported by the Federal Adler Decision.

At first glance and viewed in isolation, Lockheed Martin's statement that "[t]he civil law remedy in Maryland for an abusive discharge does not have extraterritorial effect" appears to support its argument that Maryland's common law claim for wrongful termination does not apply to activity in Afghanistan. Placing the partially quoted sentence in proper context demonstrates, however, that the Federal Adler Decision does not support Lockheed Martin's argument. This is the full paragraph that includes the partial quotation upon which Lockheed Martin relies:

Next, there is no merit to defendant's arguments that plaintiff may not rely on federal law as the source of the public policy contravened by plaintiff's discharge. There is no preemption question in a case such as this one. The civil law remedy in Maryland for an abusive discharge does not seek to enforce federal law nor to regulate activities thereunder; it does seek to foster and promote the policy of that law. This does not offend federal sovereignty, nor the Federal Constitution, nor does it have extraterritorial effect. State courts are regularly presented with questions of federal law and federal policy, and state courts are fully capable of deciding questions of this sort.

Adler, 538 F. Supp. at 578. Considering the complete context reflects that the discussion regarding "extraterritorial effect" was included in an explanation that a plaintiff assertinga claim based on the Maryland common law cause of action for wrongful termination may rely on federal law as the...