Maxwell v. Bailey

1

BOBBIE A. MAXWELL, Plaintiff, v. PAUL BAILEY et al., Defendants.

No. 1:23-cv-439

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

May 23, 2023

OPINION

SALLY J. BERENS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

This is a civil rights action brought by a county inmate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 5). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litigation Reform Act 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997).

Service of the complaint on the named defendant(s) is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the plaintiff-at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't, 212 Fed.Appx. 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case ....” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way that they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).^[1]

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint^[2] indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Bailey and Obrian. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, the following claims against Defendants Johnson and P.A. Mary: (1) Plaintiff's official capacity claims; (2) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims; (3) Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim; and (4) Plaintiff's civil conspiracy claims. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendant Johnson premised upon her refusal to adhere to Plaintiff's medical diet for his diabetic needs, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendant P.A. Mary premised upon her refusal to take action to ensure that Plaintiff received an adequate diet for his diabetic needs, remain in the case. The Court will also deny Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 4).

Discussion

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Berrien County Jail (BCJ) in St. Joseph, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues Sheriff Paul Bailey, Jail Operations Lieutenant J. Obrian, Kitchen Supervisor Barbra Johnson, and P.A. Mary. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2; ECF No. 6, PageID.22.) Public records indicate that Plaintiff was booked into the BCJ on February 17, 2023, and is facing numerous pending criminal charges. See https://www.berriencounty.org/558/Inmate-Search (type “Maxwell” for “Last Name” and “Bobbie” for “First Name,” select Search, then click on “View Details” for inmate Bobbie Archer Maxwell, Jr.) (last visited May 15, 2023).

Plaintiff alleges that when he was booked into the BCJ, he was a “stable Type 2 diabetic [with normal] glucose numbers.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) He avers that from March 20, 2023, until the present, his glucose numbers have been unstable “due to Plaintiff taking 3 high[-]powered diabetic medications.” (Id.) Plaintiff started sending numerous kites to Defendant Johnson, “asking her to honor [Plaintiff's] low sodium, no orange/orange juice diet, and to provide enough food in [his] brown bag to sustain [him through] the 14 [to] 14¼ hour gap” between the last meal of the day and breakfast. (Id.) Plaintiff indicates that he sent these kites because his sugar dropped on more than four occasions, and he experienced hypoglycemia at night. (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that, despite his kites, Defendant Johnson refused to honor his diet and continued to give Plaintiff bologna subs, Fritos corn chips, a box of raisins, and an orange. (Id.) Plaintiff avers that he is allergic to oranges and that he is “stuck eating raisins and bread (sub bun).”

(Id.) Plaintiff “followed the chain of command” and sent three grievances to Defendant Obrian. (Id.) In his grievances, Plaintiff told Defendant Obrian about his kites to Defendant Johnson and how Plaintiff had needed “to push the panic button because [his] sugar had dropped.” (Id.) Plaintiff also spoke to Defendant Obrian about the situation, and Defendant Obrian told Plaintiff that he would speak to Defendant Johnson. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that after he spoke to Defendant Johnson, “all that has happened is that [his] 2 hot meals (breakfast and lunch) are now ‘lighter' in portion size than the general population's.” (Id., PageID.3, 5.) Plaintiff also receives the “alleged diabetic snack,” which, according to Defendant Johnson, consists of one tablespoon of peanut butter and two packs of saltine crackers (four crackers total). (Id., PageID.5.) Plaintiff argues that it is “atrocious” that the snack is supposed to “hold” him from 9:00 p.m. until 7-7:30 a.m., given the “potency of the 3 diabetic medications [Plaintiff] take[s].” (Id.) He asserts that he suffers from nervous tension, weight loss, depression, and anxiety, because of the situation, and that his psychiatric medications have been increased as a result. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he “places his [livelihood] at risk daily to contract communicable diseases by eating other inmates['] scraps they don't want.” (Id.) He suggests that Defendant Johnson has simply “refus[ed] to respect medical's dietary orders” for Plaintiff. (Id.)

In his amendment, Plaintiff contends that on May 9, 2023, he had a “confrontational argument” with Defendant Johnson “about appropriately getting adequate rations of food [and] stopping [Defendant Johnson] from giving [Plaintiff] 1 bologna sub and 1 bag of Fritos (high salt content).” (ECF No. 6, PageID.22.) Plaintiff claims that during this argument, “it came out that [Defendant] Obrian ‘misled' Plaintiff by not telling [Plaintiff] to contact . . . [Defendant] P.A. Mary to amend her order for [a] ‘low sodium' diet to include 1½ portions of food and a snack bag instead of a snack of 1-2 [packs] of crackers and 1 tablespoon of peanut butter.” (Id., PageID.22-23.) Plaintiff alleges that when he spoke to Defendant P.A. Mary “about it in totality, she told [Plaintiff] it's not her decision and told Plaintiff to ‘stick it out, that [he] shouldn't be here much longer.'” (Id., PageID.23.) Plaintiff avers that this “humiliated” him, giving him “grounds to add P.A. Mary as a defendant.” (Id.)

Plaintiff contends that the BCJ is “a revolving door of violations and misconducts done by staff, as so many people ‘come and go' and accept their ‘temporary' neglect.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Bailey “isn't ever made aware because issues don't even reach his desk.” (Id.) He contends that all Defendants are “equally guilty of violating, undermining[,] and disrespecting Plaintiff's human rights as well as [his...