May v. Makita U.S.A., Inc.

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THOMAS MAY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff(s), v. MAKITA U.S.A., INC., Defendant.

No. 1:22-CV-79-SNLJ

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Southeastern Division

May 24, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Thomas May is suing defendant Makita U.S.A., Inc. for allegedly failing to put an expiration date label on its product, a type of organic bonded abrasive wheel used to cut metal and concrete. [Doc. 32.] The Court dismissed Counts I III, IV, V, VI, and VII plaintiff's original petition [Doc. 29], but granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (FAC) [Doc. 32], in which he repleads two of his previously-dismissed claims and amends his claim under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act. Defendant moves for dismissal of all plaintiff's claims in the FAC under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) and 12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).^[1]For the reasons discussed below defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff's FAC includes an amended count for a violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practice Act (Count I), and the FAC has repleaded counts for breach of implied warranty (Count II) and violations of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Count III). The facts come from plaintiff's FAC. For the purposes of this motion to dismiss, all of plaintiff's facts are accepted as true. Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2010).

Plaintiff is a citizen of Illinois. FAC at ¶ 26. Defendant is a corporation incorporated in the state of California with its principal place of business in La Mirada, California. Id. at ¶ 32. Defendant makes and sells organic bonded abrasive wheels (“wheel” or “wheels”) used to cut metal and concrete. The wheels get attached to power tools that spin at blistering speeds. Id. at ¶ 38. Thus, if a wheel broke while in use, it could cause serious injuries. Id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff purchased one or more of defendant's wheels within the last five years at a Tractor Supply Company store in Cape Girardeau, Missouri. Id. at ¶ 29. Plaintiff brings a class action claim “arising from the deceptive business practices of Defendant in the advertising, packaging, and labeling of a bonded abrasive wheel product . . . that was manufactured, produced, distributed, and/or sold by Defendant.” Id. at ¶ 1.

Plaintiff thought he was buying a wheel that did not expire because the wheel's packaging did not have a clearly-printed label that warned of the wheel's expiration date. Id. at ¶¶ 1 n.1, 4-6. But in fact, the wheels have an expiration date of three years, and it is an industry standard in the United States to include a three-year expiration date for such wheels. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8-11. After the three-year expiration date, the wheels become too brittle or weak to use safely and reliably. Id. at ¶ 6. Likewise, several other leading organic bonded abrasive wheel manufactures put expiration dates on their wheels. Id. at ¶¶ 11-13. Thus, after three years, the wheels are useless because of an unacceptable risk that they may break while in use, which could cause serious injuries to the user or bystanders. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 71, 90.

Plaintiff's complaint is that defendant failed to properly label its wheels with a clearly-printed expiration date informing buyers of when the wheels should no longer be used. Id. at ¶ 20. Because of the omission of a clearly-printed expiration date, plaintiff and other consumers suffer out-of-pocket damages by either purchasing worthless wheels that already expired or wheels that are worthless (or worth less) because there is no way for a reasonable consumer to tell when the product expires, thus rendering them unsafe to use. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.

Plaintiff claims that defendant, based on well-known and then-existing industry standards, knew that the wheels had an expiration date but failed to disclose these details to customers. Id. at ¶ 47. Because plaintiff thought he was buying one thing (a wheel that never expired) but instead received another (a wheel that expired after three years), plaintiff-and other class members-overpaid for the wheels. Id. at ¶¶ 44-46, 61. Despite defendant's past misrepresentations, plaintiff pleads that he would buy more of its wheels if defendant put a clear expiration date on them. Id. at ¶ 51. Until that time, plaintiff will not buy any more of defendant's wheels because he has no way of knowing when the wheels expire. Id

II. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

A. Defendant's Attack on Plaintiff's Article III Standing

Defendant again seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that plaintiff completely lacks Article III standing to pursue either monetary or injunctive relief. “Article III standing must be decided first by the court and presents a question of justiciability; if it is lacking, a federal court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.” Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab'y, Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 934 (8th Cir. 2012). The Court assumes this is a facial attack on plaintiff's Article III standing, so plaintiff is entitled to the same procedural safeguards as a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2016).

Rule 12(b)(6) requires plaintiffs to allege enough facts that demonstrate a plausible basis for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as true. Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020, 1026 (8th Cir. 2010). But the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)).

A plaintiff's access to federal court depends on having Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992). Article III standing is a federal question and does not depend on whether a party would have standing in a state court. Miller, 688 F.3d at 933. This “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” has three elements: an injury in fact, a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and the likelihood that the injury can be redressed by favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. Defendants argue that plaintiff lacks the injury-in-fact requirement.

An injury in fact requires a showing of a “concrete and particularized” harm that is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339. For an injury to be particularized, it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. Id. at 339 (citing cases). A concrete injury must be de facto, the injury must exist in reality, not the abstract. See Id. at 340. In conducting this analysis, “it is crucial not to conflate Article III's requirement of injury in fact with a plaintiff's potential causes of action, for the concepts are not coextensive.” Carlsen, 833 F.3d at 909 (cleaned up).

B. Plaintiff's Standing for Past Economic Damages

First, defendant argues that plaintiff lacks standing to pursue monetary damages, reiterating its belief that the Eighth Circuit's manifest defect rule applies to bar suits of this type, wherein plaintiff complains of a product defect but does not allege that his product suffered the complained of defect. See Johannessohn v. Polaris Indus. Inc., 9 F.4th 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2021); May v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:22-CV-79-SNLJ, 2023 WL 417487, at *2-3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 26, 2023) (discussing application of manifest defects rule).

As the Court explained in its previous order, [Doc. 29 at 4-6] this is not a defective products case, so the manifest defect rule does not apply. Here, plaintiff's alleged injury stems from his overpaying for a product due to defendant's alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. Thus, his claims are not fundamentally based on a product defect, they are fundamentally based on fraud. “In short, plaintiff pleads economic injury in fact in that 1) defendant intended to misrepresent to buyers that its wheels did not expire by intentionally omitting an expiration date on its wheels; 2) plaintiff relied on that representation in buying defendant's wheels; and 3) that he would not have paid the purchase price-or take the risk of using a wheel without an expiration date-if he knew that the wheels did expire.” [Doc. 29 at 6.] Therefore, plaintiff's alleged overpayment is an Article III injury in fact for his past wheel purchases.

C. Plaintiff's Standing for Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff amended his request for injunctive relief, which defendant seeks to dismiss for lack of standing. To obtain injunctive relief, plaintiffs are required to plead that there is a real and immediate threat that they will suffer a similar injury in the future. See Harmon v. City of Kansas City, 197 F.3d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1999). “Some day intentions,” without any concrete plans or specification of when the “some day” will be, do not satisfy the actual-or-imminent injury requirement. Frost v. Sioux City, 920 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564). Here, plaintiff pleads he would buy more of defendant's wheels if they had a clearly-printed expiration Dated:

Despite being misled by Defendant's deceptive advertising, packaging, and labeling, Plaintiff wishes to

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