Maynard v. State

355 Ga.App. 84

842 S.E.2d 532

MAYNARD

v.The STATE.

A20A0460

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

April 30, 2020

Imani J. Carter, for Appellant.

Kenneth W. Mauldin, District Attorney, Alex Robert Cidado, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.

McFadden, Chief Judge.

In January 2019, Surge Eugene Maynard sent a series of threatening e-mails to the attorney who represented the mother of his child in a child support dispute. He then went to the attorney's house, entered an attached garage, and cursed at the attorney through an internal door as the attorney's family hid and the attorney called 911. For these acts, a jury found Maynard guilty of the misdemeanor offenses of making harassing communications ( OCGA § 16-11-39.1 (a) ), stalking ( OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) ), and criminal trespass ( OCGA § 16-7-21 (b) ). On appeal, Maynard challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, but the trial evidence authorized his convictions for these offenses. He challenges certain evidentiary rulings, but the trial court did not abuse her discretion in those rulings. And he challenges a jury charge that the trial court gave in response to a question from the jury, but the trial court did not abuse her discretion in giving that charge. So we affirm.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence.

There is no merit in Maynard's claim that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. In considering this claim,

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to support the jury's verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. We do not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, but determine only whether the evidence authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

Rowland v. State , 349 Ga. App. 650 (1), 825 S.E.2d 231 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

So viewed, the trial evidence showed that attorney Jon Mills represented the mother of Maynard's child in a child support dispute. In early January 2019, Maynard sent Mills a series of e-mails that Mills construed as threatening to himself and his family. Contained in or attached to the e-mails, among other things, were pictures of Mills's wife and children that Maynard apparently obtained online; allegations that Mills was under the influence of an evil spirit; vehement demands that Mills and his family move away from the area; suggestions that, if Mills did not keep away from Maynard, Mills might "tempt the fate of his existence"; and the following statement: "Remember Jon, you've been suggested to leave and I don't see a for sale sign out side of your house yet. I've included your newly discovered e-mail so you'll get the message. I'll mail it to you or personally post it on your door if I must but you're leaving . Goodbye Jon." (Emphasis in original.)

Mills told Maynard not to send him e-mails, that he viewed them to be harassing, and that if Maynard did not stop Mills would seek a temporary protective order against him. Mills also told Maynard that any further contact should only concern legal matters and should only be made through the United States mail. But Maynard did not stop sending Mills e-mails, and in later e-mails Maynard acknowledged that Mills found the e-mails harassing, making statements such as "Due to expressed concerns of harassment and some being off the clock, the Court adjourned for the weekend and is now hereby Continued"; and "Continuation of last week's correspondence on harassment."

On January 22, 2019, Mills obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order against Maynard. He also had Maynard served with a contempt petition in the ongoing child support dispute.

On the evening of January 27, 2019, Maynard went to Mills's house in Oconee County, entered the attached garage, and knocked repeatedly on the door connecting the garage to the house. Maynard spoke through the door, telling Mills not to be scared, saying he had something for Mills, accusing Mills of taking something away from him, and calling Mills a "motherfucker" and a "coward." Given their previous interactions, Mills thought Maynard was there for "revenge" in connection with the child support case, and he was scared for himself and his family. He told his family to hide, retrieved a personal handgun, called 911, and stepped outside to see what was happening and to try to defuse the situation. Maynard left the garage, put the contempt papers that had been served on him on the windshield of Mills's vehicle, and made a few more comments to Mills before pulling out of the driveway, squealing his vehicle's tires in the process. The next day Maynard e-mailed to Mills a video-recording Maynard made of this encounter.

This evidence authorized the jury to find that Maynard had committed the crime of making harassing communications, which occurs, among other ways, when a person "[c]ontacts another person repeatedly via ... e-mail ... for the purpose of harassing, molesting, threatening, or intimidating such person or the family of such person[.]" OCGA § 16-11-39.1 (a) (1). Maynard repeatedly e-mailed Mills, despite Mills's insistence that he stop and despite acknowledging that Mills found the e-mails harassing. And in those e-mails, Maynard made comments or attached photographs or documents that implied he might harm Mills or his family. This evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction under OCGA § 16-11-39.1 (a) (1). See Kilby v. State , 289 Ga. App. 457, 459 (1), 657 S.E.2d 567 (2008). Contrary to Maynard's argument, the fact that the e-mails were not sent on the specific date set out in the state's accusation for this offense (January 27, 2019) does not change this result, because the accusation did not allege that the date was material. See State v. Layman , 279 Ga. 340, 341, 613 S.E.2d 639 (2005) ("the [s]tate is not restricted at trial to proving that an offense occurred on the date alleged in the indictment when the indictment does not specifically allege that the date of the offense is material").

This evidence also authorized the jury to find that Maynard had committed the crime of stalking, which occurs, among other ways, when a person

contacts another person at or about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person.... [T]he term "harassing and intimidating" means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes emotional distress by placing such person in reasonable fear for such person's safety or the safety of a member of his or her immediate family, by establishing a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior, and which serves no legitimate purpose.

OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1). (The state did not charge Maynard with the offense of aggravated stalking by contacting Mills in violation of the terms of the temporary protective order. See OCGA § 16-5-91 (a).)

The series of e-mails that preceded Maynard's January 27, 2019 appearance at Mills's house established the required pattern of behavior. See Austin v. State , 335 Ga. App. 521, 524 (1), 782 S.E.2d 308 (2016) (pattern of behavior "may include the prior history between the parties"). And although Maynard challenges the sufficiency of the evidence showing that he had the necessary intent to be found guilty of stalking, given the evidence of his "persistent, disturbing actions, and his refusal to leave [Mills] alone, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that [his] acts were intended to harass and intimidate and placed [Mills] in fear for [his and his family's] safety." Hennessey v. State , 282 Ga. App. 857, 860, 640 S.E.2d 362 (2006).

Finally, this evidence authorized the jury to find Maynard had committed the offense of criminal trespass, which occurs, among other ways, when a...