Mayo v. State

901 S.E.2d 522

MAYO

v.The STATE.

S24A0094

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: May 9, 2024

Superior Court, White County, James E. Cornwell, Judge

John R. Monroe, John Monroe Law, PC, 156 Robert Jones Road, Dawsonville, Georgia 30534, for Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint Christopher Malcolm, Assistant Attorney General, Meghan Hobbs Hill, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Stephany Julissa Luttrell, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, William Jeffrey Langley, District Attorney, Kelly Renae Holloway, A.D.A., Enotah Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, 65 Courthouse Street, Box 6, Blairsville, Georgia 30512, for Appellee.

Colvin, Justice.

Appellant Justin Scott Mayo appeals his convictions for malice murder and other crimes related to the beating death of his girlfriend, Stephanie Smith.¹ Appellant argues that the trial court committed two reversible errors: (1) the trial court presented the jury with a "confusing" verdict form that was inconsistent with the jury charge; and (2) the trial court received and responded to a note from the jury during its deliberations without informing the parties, thereby depriving Appellant of his right to be present throughout the proceedings against him under Article I, Section I, Paragraph XII of the Georgia Constitution and his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.² For the reasons stated below, Appellant’s claims fail.

1. At approximately 2:00 p.m. on November 4, 2017, Appellant entered the White County Sheriff’s Office and told the detention officer at the front desk that he thought his girlfriend, Smith, was dead. Law enforcement officers were dispatched to Appellant and Smith’s shared residence, where they found a trail of bloodstains from Smith’s car in the driveway, along the front porch, to the door, which had been kicked in. Inside, Smith was found deceased, lying nude in her bed, covered by a blanket and a small red towel or washcloth over her eyes. Her body exhibited numerous and extensive injuries, and the bedroom itself was littered with broken and overturned objects. There appeared to be bloodstains on the floor, and there were large amounts of dried blood in the nearby bathroom.

While law enforcement officers were searching Appellant’s home, Appellant remained at the White, County Sheriff’s Office. There, he gave one written statement and two oral statements to law enforcement officers. Appellant’s second oral statement was video-recorded, admitted into evidence at trial, and played for the jury. In Appellant’s second oral statement, which was consistent with his first, Appellant explained that he and Smith had gone out the prior evening with Smith’s friends to two bars in Helen, Georgia. Appellant stated that he "black[ed] out" from alcohol, but that he partially remembered getting into a verbal fight with Smith in Helen because she had been flirting with and "touching" another man at one of the bars. Appellant further stated that he did not remember whether he or Smith drove them home, but that he had some memory of getting into a physical fight with Smith during the drive, kicking in the front door, and continuing the altercation before and after Smith took a bath. Though Appellant’s reported memory of the events was incomplete, he admitted that he was the sole person responsible for Smith’s death.

A subsequent autopsy revealed the extent of Smith’s injuries. According to the testimony of Dr. John Wassum, an assistant medical examiner for the GBI, Smith had dozens of contusions across the front and sides of her body consistent with blunt-force trauma. There were at least ten contusions on her face, covering both cheeks and both eyes, her forehead, chin, jaw line, and ear lobe. Further injuries consistent with blunt-force trauma were found on her abdomen, chest, arms, and hands, as well as on her knees, shins, and both ankles. An internal examination revealed that Smith had two broken ribs and a "large[,] ragged laceration" on her liver, which caused large amounts of internal bleeding. Smith also had a hematoma that was "diffuse across the entire scalp," as well as subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhages in her brain. The fifth cervical vertebra in her neck was broken, which, in Dr. Wassum’s opinion, was likely caused by the blunt-force trauma to her chin. Dr. Wassum determined that Smith’s cause of death was blunt-force trauma to her head, neck, and torso.

At trial, Appellant conceded through counsel that he had killed Smith but argued that the jury should find him guilty only of voluntary manslaughter, rather than of murder.

2. On appeal, Appellant argues that the sequencing of the verdict form — which listed pre-printed options for malice murder, felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault, in that order — was "confusing" because it was inconsistent with the jury instructions in two related, but distinct ways. First, Appellant claims that, though the trial court correctly instructed the jury that it could return a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter for either Count 1 (malice murder) or Count 2 (felony murder), the verdict form listed voluntary manslaughter only after Count 2. In Appellant’s view, the form therefore "implied that voluntary manslaughter was not a valid alternative for malice murder in Count 1." Second, Appellant argues that the verdict form incorrectly implied that the jury was required to determine whether Appellant was guilty of malice murder and felony murder before considering voluntary manslaughter, contrary to the court’s jury charge, which correctly provided that the jury must determine if there were mitigating circumstances that would reduce either Count 1 or Count 2 to voluntary manslaughter before it was authorized to return a verdict on either count. While both issues arise from the trial court’s choice to list options for malice murder, felony murder, and voluntary manslaughter in that order, they present distinct challenges to the verdict form, and, as explained below, only the first of these claims was preserved for ordinary appellate review. We accordingly treat them separately, and, after review, conclude that both fail.

(a) During its charge to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury on Appellant’s presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and reasonable doubt. The court also instructed the jury on malice murder, felony murder, and voluntary manslaughter.

In defining malice murder, the court explained that "[a] person commits murder when that person unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of another human being." The court further instructed the jury that "[l]egal malice is not necessarily ill will or hatred, but it is an unlawful intention to kill without justification, excuse, or mitigation," (Emphasis supplied.) When defining felony murder, the court stated that "[a] person also commits the crime of murder when, in the commission of a felony, that person causes the death of another human being with or without malice." Following the court’s instructions regarding malice murder and felony murder, it stated:

After consideration of all the evidence, before you would be authorized to return a verdict of guilty of malice murder or felony murder, you must first determine whether mitigating circumstances, if any, would cause the offenses to be reduced to voluntary manslaughter.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The court then defined voluntary manslaughter as follows:

A person commits voluntary manslaughter when that person causes the death of another human being under circumstances that would otherwise be murder if that person acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.

After explaining voluntary manslaughter, the trial court stated:

The burden of proof is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense is not so mitigating. If you do not believe beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of murder in Count 1 or felony murder in Count 2, but do believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, then you would be authorized to find, the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter as to that respective count and the form of your verdict in that event would be: ["JWe, the jury, find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter["] as to that count.

(Emphasis supplied.) The court did not instruct the jury on any other circumstances in which it was authorized to return a guilty verdict for voluntary manslaughter.

The trial court prepared a verdict form but did not discuss it with the parties during the charge conference. The form began with Count 1 (malice murder) and provided preprinted options for the jury to mark whether it found Appellant "guilty" or "not guilty." The form then listed the same options for Count 2 (felony murder). Following Count 2, the form stated:

After considering the evidence in this case: ( ) We, the jury, finds [sic] the evidence DOES show sufficient mitigation and that [Appellant] [is] guilty of the offense of VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.

( ) We, the Jury, finds [sic] the evidence DOES NOT show sufficient mitigation and that [Appellant] [is] not guilty of the offense of VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.

(Emphasis in the original.) The form concluded by listing the options of guilty and not guilty for Count 3, aggravated assault.

Immediately following the jury charge, Appellant objected to the verdict form on the ground that it was inconsistent with the jury instructions. Appellant argued then, as he does now, that the verdict form should begin with voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder, so as to make it consistent with the jury charge. The trial court overruled Appell...