Mays v. Dir., TDCJ-CID

RANDALL WAYNE MAYS, Petitioner, v. DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:19-CV-426

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

March 20, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Petitioner Randall Wayne Mays, a death row inmate confined within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He was scheduled to be executed on October 16, 2019. On September 18, 2019, he filed the present petition alleging that he is incompetent to be executed under the standards established by the United States Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007). Subsequently, the State trial court withdrew its October 16, 2019, order for execution. He is currently scheduled to be executed on May 13, 2020.

Before the Court is Respondent's motion to dismiss without prejudice Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus (#12). Respondent asserts that Mays' incompetent-to-be-executed claim should be dismissed without prejudice to Mays' raising his claims in a later federal petition after the completion of the State court proceedings on his second Article 46.05 ("Ford") motion. Petitioner filed a response. (#14). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the petition should dismissed without prejudice, as the matter is not ripe for determination. In the alternative, the petition should be dismissed without prejudice, as the matter is not yet exhausted.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 13, 2008, Mays was sentenced to death for the capital murder of a Henderson County Sheriff's Deputy. The conviction was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("TCCA"). Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. Mays v. Texas, 562 U.S. 1274 (2011).

Mays filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the State trial court on May 3, 2010. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing beginning on September 28, 2010. Following the hearing, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on December 3, 2010. On March 16, 2011, the TCCA adopted the findings and conclusions of the trial court and denied relief. Ex parte Mays, No. WR-75105-01, 2011 WL 1196799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. Mays v. Texas, 565 U.S. 963 (2011).

Mays proceeded to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, which was denied. Mays v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No. 6:11-CV-135, 2013 WL 6677373 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2013). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied his application for a certificate of appealability. Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. Mays v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 1082 (2015).

On February 24, 2015, Mays filed a motion in the State trial court challenging his competency to be executed pursuant to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46.05. The trial court denied the motion. The TCCA reversed and remanded the case. Mays v. State, 476 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). The TCCA found that Mays had made a "'substantial showing' that he was incompetent to be executed." Id. at 462. The case was remanded for further consideration inaccordance with Article 46.05. Id. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that relief be denied. On June 5, 2019, the TCCA adopted the trial court's findings and denied relief. Mays v. State, No. AP-77,055, 2019 WL 2361999 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. Mays v. Texas, No. 19-5839, - S. Ct. -, 2019 WL 5875182 (2019).

On June 17, 2019, the State trial court entered a new order setting execution for October 16, 2019. On September 18, 2019, Mays filed his present federal petition alleging that he is incompetent to be executed under the standards established by the United States Supreme Court in Ford, 477 U.S. 399, and Panetti, 551 U.S. 930.

After he filed his federal habeas petition, he filed a second motion challenging his competency under Article 46.05 in the State trial court. Based on that second motion, the State trial court withdrew the October 16, 2019, execution date in order to review Mays' newest motion. The State trial court determined that Mays failed to show a substantial change in circumstances, denied his second motion, and entered a new execution date for May 13, 2020. Mays appealed. That decision is currently on appeal before the TCCA (No. AP-77,093).

II. FACTS OF THE CASE

The Fifth Circuit discussed the facts of the case as follows:

In 2007, police officers responded to a "domestic violence-gunshot" call. All of them were in uniform, wearing badges, and driving marked vehicles. Although Mays was initially calm and courteous, he fled into his house and barricaded himself when the officers began reading him his rights. He later emerged holding a deer rifle. After the officers had failed several times to convince Mays to put down the weapon and give himself up, he opened fire. He shot Deputy Tony Ogburn and Officer Paul Habelt in the head, killing both, and shot Deputy Kevin Harris in the leg.

At the guilt phase of the trial, the defense produced evidence that Mays suffered from paranoia and mental illness but was not insane. The jury found Mays guilty of capital murder. During the sentencing phase, the prosecution provided victim-impact evidence from Harris and from Ogburn's widow and son. The defense submitted mitigating evidence of Mays's violent and abusive childhood and testimony from psychiatrists that he suffered from depression and a "psychotic disorder not otherwise specified," which was possibly linked to permanent brain damage from his chronic methamphetamine use. The jury answered "yes" to the future dangerousness issue and "no" to the question of mitigation; the court sentenced Mays to death.

Mays, 757 F.3d at 212. The Court noted that there was no evidence at trial that he was incompetent. Id. at 216. Moreover, even though there was evidence of mental illness, a "defendant can be both mentally ill and competent to stand trial." Id. Finally, the Court rejected his claim "that the Eighth Amendment prohibits his execution because he is mentally ill." Id. at 219.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. General Standards of Review

The petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Under the AEDPA, a petitioner who is in custody "pursuant to the judgment of a State court" is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "By its terms § 2254 bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in State court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v.Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). The AEDPA imposes a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to the first provision, a "state court decision is 'contrary to' clearly established federal law if (1) the State court 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law' announced in Supreme Court cases, or (2) the State court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court did on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003)), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1141 (2007). "[R]eview under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the State court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011). As such, "evidence later introduced in federal court is irrelevant." Id. at 184. "The same rule necessarily applies to a federal court's review of purely factual determinations under § 2254(d)(2), as all nine Justices acknowledged." Blue v. Thaler, 665 F.3d 647, 656 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 828 (2012).

With respect to section 2254(d)(2), a Texas court's factual findings are presumed to be sound unless a petitioner rebuts the "presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (citing section 2254(e)(1)). The "standard is demanding but not insatiable; . . . [d]eference does not by definition preclude relief." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). More recently, the Supreme Court held that a "state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has explained that the provisions of theAEDPA "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Federal habeas corpus relief is not available just because a State court decision may have been incorrect; instead, a petitioner must show that a State court decision was unreasonable. Id. at 694.

B. The Ford Standard

The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the execution of a...