Maze v. Garber

KENDRA MAZE v. MARK GARBER ET AL

CASE NO. 6:19-CV-00953

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAFAYETTE DIVISION

June 1, 2020

JUDGE SUMMERHAYS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST

MEMORANDUM RULING

The present matter before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Doc. 3] filed by Sheriff Mark Garber. This is a Section 1983 action asserting claims for unlawful arrest, abuse of process, and state law claims against Garber and a Lafayette Parish Deputy Sheriff. Garber contends that the plaintiff, Kendra Maze, has failed to plead facts sufficient to state a Section 1983 claim against him in his official or personal capacity. As explained below, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss IN PART and DENIES the Motion IN PART.

I.BACKGROUND

This Section 1983 action arises out of a domestic dispute between Maze and her male partner. [ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9] Maze alleges that she and her partner got into a heated argument at her home in the early morning hours of August 2, 2018. [Id.] Maze contends that her partner physically threatened her and then left Maze's house. [Id.] Maze bolted the door to her house after her partner left because she feared for her safety. [Id.] Maze's partner then called the police. [Id.] "Officer Miller" of the Lafayette Parish Sheriff's office responded to the call by Maze's partner.¹ [ECF No.1 at ¶ 10] Maze alleges that she refused Miller's request to open the door to her house because "her male partner being there made her feel unsafe and uncomfortable." [Id.] According to Maze, Miller then assisted her partner in forcibly opening the door to her home. [ECF No. 1 at ¶ 11] Maze alleges that Miller allowed her male partner to enter her home and did not remove or separate her from her partner. [Id.] She further alleges that Miller allowed her partner to restrain her after he entered the home. [Id.] Miller then warned Maze that she was disturbing the peace and could be arrested. [ECF No. 1 at ¶ 13] Maze alleges that "without any just cause [she] was then slammed against the wall by [Miller] and was told she was going to jail for the offense which she never committed." [Id.] Maze further alleges that she "tried to resist the actions of [Miller] when she was pushed by [Miller], causing her to fall down a staircase, sustaining serious injuries." [ECF No. 1 at ¶ 14]

Maze then filed the present complaint asserting three counts: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging an unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution; (2) a Section 1983 claim asserting abuse of process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) claims under Louisiana Civil Code arts. 2315, 2322, and 2317.1. Maze asserts the unlawful arrest and state law claims against both Garber and Miller. She asserts her abuse of process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against Miller only. Maze brings her claims against Garber and Miller both in their official and individual capacities. The present Motion to Dismiss addresses only those claims asserted against Garber in his official and individual capacity.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate when a complaint fails to state a legally cognizable clam. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5^th Cir. 2001). In other words, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "admits the facts allegedin the complaint, but challenges plaintiff's rights to relief based upon those facts." Id. at 161-62. When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "[t]he court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5^th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Moreover, "the plaintiff must plead enough facts 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The requirement that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must limit itself to the contents of the complaint, including documents attached to or incorporated by the complaint, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken, including matters of public record. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000); Lovelace v. Software Spectrum Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996); Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007).

III.ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983 Claims.

"Section 1983 provides a remedy against 'any person' who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the Constitution." Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantiverights; it merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere." Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2008). Maze asserts a Section 1983 claim against Garber for unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment. She brings this claim against Garber in his official and individual capacities.

1. Official Capacity Claim

Claims against an official in his or her official capacity are "only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991); Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2005). Here, the entity is Lafayette Parish. Lafayette Parish may not be held liable under Section 1983 on a theory of vicarious liability. Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cty., Texas, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cty., Tex., ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 510 (2017). It may, however, be liable under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., when allegedly unconstitutional conduct "implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

To state a Section 1983 Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that (1) an official policy, (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker, (3) was the moving force for the violation of a constitutional right. Blanchard-Daigle v. Geers, No. 18-51022, 2020 WL 730586, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 12, 2020). Official policies may exist in the form of "written policy statements, ordinances, or regulations, but may also arise in the form of a widespread practice that is socommon and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy." Id. A plaintiff alleging a practice so common and well-settled as to represent municipal policy must show a pattern of conduct that is specific and similar to the constitutional violation alleged by the plaintiff. Hicks-Fields, 860 F.3d at 810. In so doing, a plaintiff "must do more than describe the incident that gave rise to his injury." Ratliff v. Aransas Cty., Texas, 948 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2020).

Here, Maze identifies Garber as the parish's chief law enforcement officer and the final policymaker for law enforcement policy in the parish. [ECF No. 1 at ¶ 4] (alleging that Garber is the parish's "chief law-enforcement officer, policymaker and back/or decision-maker regarding law enforcement training, supervision, rules and procedures.") But she does not identify a specific written policy or widespread practice that Garber instituted, much less allege how that policy or widespread practice was the motivating force for the unlawful arrest alleged in the complaint. Other than identifying Garber's policymaking role, the complaint makes only one other general reference to a "policy" in alleging that Miller "was at all pertinent times acting under color of state law in performance of his duties and under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, policies, customs, and uses of the Lafayette Parish Sheriff." [Id.] (emphasis added). With respect to a relevant practice or custom, paragraph 7 of the complaint merely alleges that both Garber and Miller were "personally acting under the color of state law and back/or in compliance with the official rules, regulations, laws, statutes, customs, usages and/or practices of the State of Louisiana and/or the Parish of Lafayette." [ECF No. 1 at ¶ 7] (emphasis added). Yet, the complaint does not identify the specific "customs, usages and/or practices" that led to Maze's allegedly unlawful arrest.

Maze need not plead the relevant policy or widespread practice in exhaustive detail. Thomas v. City of Galveston, Texas, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 842-46 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (explaining that "only minimal factual allegations should be required at the motion to dismiss stage."). Nor is Maze subject to a heightened pleading standard. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (holding that Monell claims are not subject to a heightened pleading standard). However, the bare requirements of notice pleading under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that "[t]he description...