McAdams v. Ladner

608 F.Supp.3d 416

Tommy MCADAMS, Plaintiff

v.Paula LADNER, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-cv-3-TBM-RPM

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Southern Division.

Signed June 23, 2022

Louis H. Watson, Jr., Robert Nicholas Norris, Watson & Norris, PLLC, Flowood, MS, for Plaintiff.

Tim C. Holleman, Boyce Holleman and Associates, P.A., Gulfport, MS, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TAYLOR B. McNEEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Tommy McAdams and Paula Ladner were employed by the Harrison County Tax Assessor's Office. Upon retirement of the former Tax Assessor, Tal Flurry, both McAdams and Ladner decided to run for Tax Assessor. Ladner won the election and terminated McAdams’ employment. According to McAdams, Ladner terminated him because he ran against her for Tax Assessor. McAdams explains that before he announced his candidacy for Tax Assessor, he and Ladner had a conversation about them running for the same office. It was during that conversation Ladner allegedly told McAdams, "if you run against me and I have to spend a lot of money to beat you and I win, I will seriously consider terminating you." McAdams claims that he understood this statement to mean that if he did not cost her a lot of money by running against her for Tax Assessor, then she would not terminate him.

Ladner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [43], arguing that McAdams was not terminated because he ran against Ladner for Tax Assessor, but rather due to his poor work performance. In the alternative, Ladner argues that even if McAdams was terminated because he ran against her for Tax Assessor, McAdams falls into the class of employees subject to political patronage dismissals.

Although McAdams could be subject to political patronage dismissals, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could believe that McAdams was terminated because he ran against her for Tax Assessor. To be sure, a reasonable jury could also find in favor of Ladner. But this is precisely the type of case for a jury to decide. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed fully below, the Court finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment [43] should be denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Tommy McAdams and Paula Ladner worked together for many years at the Harrison County Tax Assessor's Office. McAdams was initially hired as a Field Appraiser and was promoted in 2007 to the position of Real Property Field Director. During this time, Ladner served as Chief Operating Officer to the then Tax Assessor, Tal Flurry.¹ As the Chief Operating Officer, Ladner was one of McAdams’ supervisors. ²

As McAdams’ supervisor, Ladner submits that she was not satisfied with his job performance and even recommended to Tal Flurry that McAdams be terminated.

In 2018, Tal Flurry announced that he would not be seeking reelection as Tax Assessor of Harrison County. Following Tal Flurry's announcement, Ladner expressed her intention to seek election as the new Tax Assessor of Harrison County. Although Ladner was endorsed by the two previous Tax Assessors, McAdams also decided to run for Tax Assessor. McAdams does not dispute that his decision to run was, in part, because he "knew that [he] and [Ladner] had not gotten along during [his] tenure and that if she was elected [he] might lose [his] job." [43-2], pg. 19.

In February 2019, prior to McAdams publicly announcing his candidacy, Ladner approached McAdams to discuss his intent to run for Tax Assessor. According to McAdams, Ladner said, "if you run against me and I have to spend a lot of money to beat you and I win, I will seriously consider terminating you." In November 2019, Ladner was elected Tax Assessor of Harrison County and officially took office on January 6, 2020. On January 3, 2020, prior to assuming her role as Tax Assessor, however, Ladner handed McAdams a termination letter. The letter informed McAdams that his termination would be effective January 6, 2020, due to restructuring within the office. According to Ladner, because of McAdams’ performance issues, she determined that his job could be done by field appraisers and therefore dissolved the position as it was unnecessary to the functioning of the office. [43-3], pp. 17-18. Notwithstanding the reasoning provided in his termination letter, McAdams asserts that he was terminated because he ran against Ladner for Tax Assessor.

McAdams filed suit in this Court on January 4, 2021, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Ladner in her individual capacity.³ In his Complaint [1], McAdams alleges political retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights.⁴

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Summary judgment should be used ‘most sparingly in ... First Amendment case[s] ... involving delicate constitutional rights, complex fact situations, disputed testimony, and questionable credibilities.’ " Benningfield v. City of Houston , 157 F.3d 369, 377 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Porter v. Califano , 592 F.2d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 1979) ). But even in First Amendment cases, summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P . 56(a). If the movant carries this burden, "the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). To rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must show, with "significant probative evidence," that there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc. , 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). "A genuine dispute of material fact means that evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, L.L.C. , 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment is appropriate. Cutting Underwater Techs. USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S. Operating Co. , 671 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986) ).

The Court is not permitted to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Deville v. Marcantel , 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). When deciding whether a genuine fact issue exists, "the court must view the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P. , 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010). However, "[c]onclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Oliver v. Scott , 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

McAdams alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right to political free speech—specifically for running against Ladner for Tax Assessor of Harrison County. Ladner argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on McAdams’ claim for two reasons. First, Ladner argues that McAdams was not terminated because he ran against her for Tax Assessor, but rather due to his poor work performance. Second, Ladner argues that even if McAdams was terminated because he ran against her for Tax Assessor, which Ladner denies, McAdams falls into the class of employees subject to political patronage dismissals.

"The [Supreme] Court has made clear that public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment." Garcetti v. Ceballos , 547 U.S. 410, 417, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006). In De La Garza v. Brumby , then District Judge Gregg Costa explained that the Supreme Court has addressed the First Amendment rights of public employees in two related lines of cases, one involving free speech on matters of public concern and the other involving political patronage. De La Garza v. Brumby , No. 6:11-cv-37-GC, 2013 WL 754260, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2013) (citations omitted). Public concern cases are those in which a public employee is penalized for speech which touches on a matter of public concern, while political patronage cases are those in which a public employee is discharged for political activity or party affiliation. Brinston v. Dunn , 928 F. Supp. 669, 671 (S.D. Miss. 1996). Both implicate the First Amendment rights of public employees.

While this is a political patronage case rather than a public speech case, the Fifth Circuit analyzes cases in which the public employee engages in campaign activity as "public concern" speech cases subject to the Pickering balancing test. Garza v. Escobar , 972 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 2020) ; De La Garza , 2013 WL 754260 at *2 ; Brinston , 928 F. Supp. at 671 ; McBee v. Jim Hogg County , 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984). In Pickering , the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment precludes the discharge of public employees for exercising their First Amendment right to free speech if two criteria are satisfied: (1) the speech relates to a matter of public concern; and (2) the employee's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern outweighs the employer's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. , 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968).

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) he suffered an adverse employment decision; (2) his speech involved a matter of public concern; (3) his interest in the speech outweighed the [employer's] interest in promoting efficiency; and (4) his speech motivated the adverse employment action. Haverda v. Hays Cnty. , 723 F.3d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 2013). Courts analyze First Amendment retaliation claims under the "mixed-motives...