McCaulley v. Harvard Drug Grp., LLC

992 F.Supp.2d 1192

Sabrina McCAULLEY, Plaintiff,

v.The HARVARD DRUG GROUP, LLC, and Aerotek, Inc., Defendants.

Civil Action No. CV–13–S–1618–NE.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Northeastern Division.

Jan. 17, 2014.

Michael E. Auffenorde, Auffenorde & Auffenorde PC, Huntsville, AL, for Plaintiff.

Jenna M. Bedsole, Brittany R. Stancombe, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz PC, Birmingham, AL, Ryan W. Mitchem, Husch Blackwell LLP, Chattanooga, TN, William E. Corum, Husch Blackwell LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

C. LYNWOOD SMITH, JR, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Sabrina McCaulley, filed a complaint on August 29, 2013, asserting claims against The Harvard Drug Group, LLC (“Harvard”), and Aerotek, Inc. (“Aerotek”), two entities that she claims were formerly her joint employers.¹ Her complaint asserted three claims against both defendants: (1) “Race and Color Discrimination Disparate Treatment” pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“TitleVII”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count One); (2) “Race and Color Discrimination Hostile Work Environment” pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count Two); and (3) “Race and Color Discrimination Wrongful Termination” pursuant to Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count Three).² She also asserts two claims solely against defendant Harvard: i.e., (1) “The Harvard Drug Group, Inc. Retaliation in Violation of Title VII” (Count Four), and (2) “The Harvard Drug Group, L.L.C. Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision and Retention” (Count Five).³ The case currently is before the court on “The Harvard Drug Group L.L.C.'s Partial Motion to Dismiss” Counts One and Five for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.⁴ Upon consideration of the motion, pleadings, and briefs, the court concludes that Harvard's motion should be granted in part, but also denied in part.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for, among other reasons, “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This rule must be read together with Rule 8(a), which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While that pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court explicated this standard in Iqbal, saying that:

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly, 550 U.S., at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion [s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id., at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

To survive a motion to dismiss founded upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), [for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id., at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (brackets omitted).

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. [Iqbal v. Hasty ] 490 F.3d [143], at 157–158 [ (2d Cir.2007) ]. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (emphasis added).

II. RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT⁵

Plaintiff is an African–American female who, on April 26, 2012, was placed by Aerotek to work at Harvard's Decatur, Alabama facility, in the capacity of a chemical repack technician.⁶ Plaintiff alleges that Harvard and Aerotek were her “joint employers.” ⁷ Plaintiff, who was one of only two black employees in her work area, allegedly was treated differently from, and excluded by, the white employees. “The white co-workers would not talk to Plaintiff unless it was to belittle or demean her.” ⁸ When plaintiff began her job, the white employees joked about who would be required to train her, and they eventually asked the other black employee in the work area to train her because no one else wanted to.⁹

Plaintiff's white co-workers showed her a list of about 29 people whose employment had been terminated, and she interpreted that action as a threat that her employment would be terminated as well.¹⁰ Plaintiff's white supervisor, Chasity Davis, told plaintiff that she could “get rid of” plaintiff if she or the other employees did not like her.¹¹ Davis and other white co-workers made sarcastic remarks to plaintiff, and belittled her on a daily basis.¹² A white co-worker told plaintiff that her son had never seen a black person before and, if he did, he would “freak out.” ¹³ When plaintiff walked down the hallway next to a white co-worker, the co-worker hugged his arms close to his body to create as much space as possible between himself and plaintiff.¹⁴ Another white, male co-worker pretended to be a black woman, and the other workers laughed at that man's portrayal.¹⁵ A white co-worker remarked that other employees shouldn't ask anything of a black former co-worker named Shanna, because Shanna would slash their tires, and another white co-worker called a different black former co-worker by the nickname “She-na-na.” ¹⁶

Additionally, when plaintiff asked her white co-workers for assistance, they ignored her, but they readily provided assistance to each other. ¹⁷ White co-workers would sometimes pretend to be members of the Ku Klux Klan when they were dressed in their white, protective lab gear. ¹⁸ A white co-worker became angry and slammed a door when plaintiff refused to allow him to listen to a shared company radio.¹⁹ Finally, on May 31, 2012, plaintiff's white supervisor tampered with one of the products plaintiff was packaging, causing the weight to be “off,” so that plaintiff was forced to re-package it.²⁰ Plaintiff complained about her supervisor's behavior, and her employment was terminated later that same day, allegedly for failing to be receptive to instruction from her supervisor.²¹

III. DISCUSSION

A. Disparate Treatment Claim

Defendant asserts that plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts to support her claim for disparate treatment discrimination (Count One). To establish a prima facie case of race-based disparate treatment, a plaintiff generally must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) the employer replaced her with someone outside her protected class, or otherwise treated similarly situated employees outside her protected class more favorably, and (4) she was qualified to perform the duties of her job. See, e.g., Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir.2002); Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir.2001); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir.1984).²²

“Although a Title VII complaint need not allege facts sufficient to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, it must provide ‘enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ intentional ... discrimination.” Davis v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 (11th Cir.2008) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 997, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), and Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). In addition to containing well-pleaded...