McClain v. Rochdale Village

RAYMOND MCCLAIN, Plaintiff, v. ROCHDALE VILLAGE, et al., Defendants.

No. 18-CV-03781 (DLI)(CLP)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

July 16, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DORA L. IRIZARRY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

On June 29, 2018, Raymond McClain (“Plaintiff”) timely filed this action after receiving a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against Rochdale Village, Timothy Dickinson, and Gil Francisco (“Defendants”) for inter alia, employment discrimination, hostile work environment, wrongful termination, and unlawful retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. See, Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. Entry No. 1, at ¶¶ 1 10-11.

Defendants moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss or stay the action pending arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, and Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6). See, Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay the Action (“Defs.' Mot.”), Dkt. Entry No. 37. Plaintiff opposed the motion. See, Plf.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. (“Plf.'s Opp'n”), Dkt Entry No. 39. Defendants replied. See, Defs.' Rep. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. (“Defs.' Rep.”), Dkt. Entry No. 40. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is granted, and Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that, in November 2013, he was hired as Rochdale Village's first Black plant technician after achieving the highest score in a qualifying exam administered by Rochdale Village. Compl. at ¶ 13. After Defendants learned that Plaintiff was Black, he was subjected to various forms of discrimination, including being given a different uniform to wear, assignment to menial tasks, and having his desk moved from the management office to a storage area. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. After Plaintiff complained to Rochdale Village's Human Resources department, Defendants retaliated against him by initiating various unjustified disciplinary actions such as for being late to receive work assignments and sleeping on the job. Id. at ¶¶ 16-20. Plaintiff further alleges that Caucasian employees at Rochdale Village were treated more leniently than Plaintiff for more severe infractions and were afforded higher pay and more opportunities to earn overtime pay. Id. at ¶¶ 19-22. On or about January 19, 2017, Plaintiff alleges he was fired in retaliation for reporting the alleged discriminatory acts to the Human Resources department and the EEOC. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 23.

It is undisputed that, during his employment with Rochdale Village, Plaintiff was a part of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local Union No. 94, which was subject to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with Rochdale Village. See, Decl. of Jay Williams in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. (“Williams Decl.”), Dkt. Entry No. 36 at ¶¶ 9-10; Aff. of Tracey L. Brown in Supp. of Plf.'s Opp'n (“Brown Aff.”), Dkt. Entry No. 38 at ¶ 5. The parties have submitted different versions of the CBA for the Court's review. Defendants submitted the CBA in effect from September 1, 2015 through August 31, 2020. See, CBA, Exhibit A to the Williams Decl., Dkt. Entry No. 36-1. Plaintiff submitted the CBA in effect for that same period as well as the version in effect from September 1, 2012 through August 31, 2015. See, CBA, Exhibit 3 to the Brown Aff., Dkt. Entry No. 38-3. Defendants do not dispute the applicability of Plaintiff's version of the CBA. Moreover, the pertinent language at issue in Articles 6 and 7 of the CBA, as explained below, is the same in all versions provided by the parties.

DISCUSSION

I. Arbitrability of Plaintiff's Claims Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement

“The Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA') creates a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability applicable to arbitration agreements affecting interstate commerce.” Ragone v. Atlantic Video, 595 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citation, alteration, and quotation marks omitted). “The overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). The Supreme Court “repeatedly [has] described the [FAA] as embodying a national policy favoring arbitration, and a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements[.]” Id. at 346 (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).

When a party seeks to compel arbitration under the FAA, the Court must engage in a four-step inquiry: “ [f]irst, it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; second, it must determine the scope of that agreement; third, if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the case are arbitrable, it must then determine whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration.” McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1988). “In deciding motions to compel [arbitration], courts apply a ‘standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment.'” Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003)). This standard “requires a court to ‘consider all relevant, admissible evidence submitted by the parties and contained in the pleadings[.]'” Id. (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2002)). “In doing so, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.

The Court finds, and the parties do not dispute, that the CBA is a contract “involving commerce” under the FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The parties agree that they are subject to the terms of the CBA. See, Williams Decl. at ¶ 10; Brown Aff. at ¶ 5. The parties also agree that Articles 6 and 7 of the CBA govern the applicable grievance and arbitration procedures. See, Defs.' Mot. at 2-3; Plf.'s Opp'n at 3. While Plaintiff's opposition cites to Articles 5 and 6 of the CBA, the cited language actually is contained in Articles 6 and 7. See, Plf.'s Opp'n at 3. Therefore, there is no dispute as to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate under the terms of the CBA.

The parties disagree as to the scope of arbitration. Defendants maintain that the arbitration language of the CBA is broad and covers all of Plaintiff's claims, including those for wrongful termination, retaliation, and discrimination. See, Defs.' Mot. at 8. Plaintiff maintains that the CBA contains no provisions regarding such claims or a requirement that such claims be resolved through arbitration. See, Plf.'s Opp'n at 2. However, the Court first must determine whether the parties agreed to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator.

“The law generally treats arbitrability as an issue for judicial determination ‘unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.'” NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. v. UBS Sec., LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1031 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)). Where the “parties explicitly incorporate rules that empower an arbitrator to decide issues of arbitrability, the incorporation serves as clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to delegate such issues to an arbitrator.” Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution, Co., Ltd., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005). Therefore, “the question of who decides arbitrability is itself a question of contract.” Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 524, 527 (2019). “When the parties' contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, the courts must respect the parties' decision as embodied in the contract.” Id. at 528.

“[V]irtually every circuit to have considered the issue has determined that incorporation of the American Arbitration Association's (AAA) arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.” Paduano v. Express Scripts, Inc., 55 F.Supp.3d 400, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases); See, also Gwathmey Siegel Kaufman & Assocs. Architects, LLC v. Rales, 518 Fed.Appx. 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss where the AAA's rules were incorporated into employment agreement); Mobile Real Estate, LLC v. NewPoint Media Grp., LLC, 460 F.Supp.3d 457, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (incorporation of AAA rules is clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to delegate questions of arbitrability).

Article 7 of the CBA provides that:

A. In the event a grievance has not been finally adjusted or resolved in Step 2 of the grievance procedures, a Party may, within the time limits set forth herein, submit the grievance to arbitration pursuant to the rules of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (“FMCS”) or the Labor Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) ....

CBA Article 7(A). The Court is satisfied that Article 7(A) and the additional clauses in Article 7 discussing the AAA sufficiently incorporate the AAA's arbitration rules into the CBA. Id. Article 7(B)-(D) and (G). Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute AAA's incorporation into the CBA or its applicability here.

The CBA states that parties may avail themselves of either the FMCS or AAA. Id. Article 7(A). However, the parties have not submitted any admissible evidence of the rules governing the FMCS. Neither party suggests that the rules of the FMCS would have any bearing on the question...