McClain v. State

311 Ga. 514

858 S.E.2d 501

MCCLAIN

v.The STATE.

S21A0252

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: May 17, 2021

Joseph C. Timothy Lewis, for appellant.

Natalie S. Paine, District Attorney, Joshua B. Smith, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric C. Peters, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Ellington, Justice.

Letisha McClain appeals from the trial court's denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty pleas to felony murder and three counts of aggravated assault. She claims that the trial court erred in denying her motion because withdrawal of her pleas is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. McClain shows no obvious abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty pleas, and we affirm.

The record shows that a Richmond County grand jury indicted McClain for malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and three counts of aggravated assault in connection with the death of Walter Benning and the injury of three others during a house fire in May 2018. During the course of her May 2019 trial, McClain changed her initial plea of not guilty and entered non-negotiated pleas of guilty to one count of felony murder and three counts of aggravated assault. The count of malice murder and one count of felony murder were nolle prossed. The trial court sentenced McClain to life in prison without parole for felony murder, and 20 years in prison for each count of aggravated assault to be served concurrently with the sentence for felony murder. McClain filed timely motions to withdraw her guilty pleas in June 2019 through trial counsel and new counsel.

At the hearing on the motion to withdraw McClain's guilty pleas, the trial court heard testimony from McClain and her trial counsel. McClain's new counsel represented that the motion was based on the "very limited premise" that McClain "stopped her trial and pleaded guilty because ... she felt that she had a better chance of a life with parole sentence ... if she did plead guilty." The trial court denied the motion in a written order, and McClain filed a timely appeal.

After sentencing, a defendant may withdraw [her] guilty plea only to correct a manifest injustice, which exists if the plea was in fact entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges. When a defendant challenges the validity of [her] guilty plea in this way, the State bears the burden of showing that the defendant entered [her] plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The State may meet its burden by showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant understood the rights being waived and possible consequences of the plea or by pointing to extrinsic evidence affirmatively showing that the plea was voluntary and knowing. In evaluating whether a defendant's plea was valid, the trial court should consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the plea. The court's decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be disturbed absent an obvious abuse of discretion.

Johnson v. State , 303 Ga. 704, 706-707 (2), 814 S.E.2d 688 (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Powell v. State , 309 Ga. 523, 524 (1), 847 S.E.2d 338 (2020) (The test for manifest injustice varies "from case to case, but it has been said that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice if, for instance, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, or the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges." (citation and punctuation omitted)).

McClain contends that withdrawal of her guilty pleas is "necessary to correct the manifest injustice arising from denying [her] the opportunity to obtain the possibility of parole after prison." She asserts that she entered her guilty pleas after her attorney advised her that her trial was "not going well" and that her only chance of avoiding a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole was to plead guilty. McClain argues that she reached for the "lifeline" thrown her way as a result of "instinct," and, therefore, her guilty pleas were not voluntary, knowing, or rational. She argues that she should be allowed to withdraw her instinctive guilty pleas "and finish her day in court" because of the possibility that, if she is found guilty after a trial, "the judge might be moved enough to offer the possibility of parole."

McClain and her trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw her guilty pleas. In pertinent part, trial counsel testified as follows. After the evidence at trial had ...