McClay v. Airport Mgmt. Servs., LLC

596 S.W.3d 686

Jodi MCCLAY

v.AIRPORT MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC

No. M2019-00511-SC-R23-CV

Supreme Court of Tennessee, AT NASHVILLE.

September 4, 2019 Session

FILED February 26, 2020

OPINION

Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J.

We accepted certification of the following questions of law from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee regarding the constitutionality of Tennessee’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102 : "(1) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate a plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury, as guaranteed in Article I, section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution ?; (2) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate Tennessee’s constitutional doctrine of separation of powers between the legislative branch and the judicial branch?; (3) Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate the Tennessee Constitution by discriminating disproportionately against women?" Upon review, we answer each of the District Court’s questions in the negative.

Factual and Procedural Background

The certified questions of law at issue in this appeal arise from a personal injury action brought in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee ("District Court"). Plaintiff Jodi McClay filed suit against Defendant Airport Management Services, LLC, seeking damages for injuries she sustained in a store at the Nashville International Airport in August 2016. A jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of $444,500 for future medical expenses and $930,000 for noneconomic damages, including pain and suffering, permanent injury, and loss of enjoyment of life. The District Court entered judgment against Defendant in accordance with the verdict. Defendant then moved to apply the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102, which generally limits noneconomic damages in civil liability actions to $750,000. Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s motion by arguing the statutory cap on noneconomic damages is unconstitutional. The District Court then certified the following questions of law to this Court:

1. Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate a plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury, as guaranteed in Article I, section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution ?

2. Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate Tennessee’s constitutional doctrine of separation of powers between the legislative branch and the judicial branch?

3. Does the noneconomic damages cap in civil cases imposed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102 violate the Tennessee Constitution by discriminating disproportionately against women?

On June 19, 2019, we accepted certification of these three questions of Tennessee law.

In addition to the parties, the State of Tennessee entered an appearance under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 32 to defend the constitutionality of the statute.

Numerous amici curiae also have filed briefs to address the issues before the Court, and we appreciate the perspectives they have provided.

Applicable Legal Standards

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23 provides that this Court "may, at its discretion, answer questions of law certified to it by ... a District Court of the United States in Tennessee" if the questions of state law are "determinative of the cause" and "there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee." Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 23, § 1. "Rather than requiring a federal court to make the law of this State or to abstain from deciding the case until the state courts resolve the point of law, answering certified questions from federal courts promotes judicial efficiency and comity and protects this State’s sovereignty." Yardley v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 470 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Tenn. 2015).

Each of the questions certified by the District Court in this case requires us to determine whether Tennessee’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages violates the Tennessee Constitution. In making that determination, we "start with a strong presumption that acts passed by the legislature are constitutional." Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tenn. 2006). We further " ‘indulge every presumption and resolve every doubt in favor of the statute’s constitutionality.’ " Gallaher v. Elam, 104 S.W.3d 455, 459 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting State v. Taylor , 70 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Tenn. 2002) ). "This presumption applies with even greater force when, as here, the facial constitutional validity of a statute is challenged." State v. Decosimo, 555 S.W.3d 494, 506 (Tenn. 2018).

Analysis

The General Assembly enacted the statutory cap on noneconomic damages as part of the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011. See 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 510, §§ 1, 10. Specifically, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102(a)(2) provides that, in a civil action, awards may include

[c]ompensation for any noneconomic damages suffered by each injured plaintiff not to exceed seven hundred fifty thousand dollars ($750,000) for all injuries and occurrences that were or could have been asserted, regardless of whether the action is based on a single act or omission or a series of acts or omissions that allegedly caused the injuries or death.

The cap is increased to $1,000,000 for certain "catastrophic loss or injury." Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-39-102(c) - (d). The statute also exempts certain kinds of cases from the cap, such as those in which the defendant had a specific intent to inflict serious physical injury, the defendant was intoxicated, or the defendant committed a felony in causing the injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102(h). None of those exemptions is at issue in this case. The statute was enacted to apply prospectively to actions that accrue on or after October 1, 2011. See 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 510, § 24.

Plaintiff, having obtained a judgment of noneconomic damages in excess of the statutory cap, argues that the statutory cap is unconstitutional, and thus unenforceable. More specifically, Plaintiff argues that, under the Tennessee Constitution, the statutory cap violates the right to trial by jury, the doctrine of separation of powers, and discriminates disproportionately against women in violation of equal protection guarantees. We address each of these arguments in turn.¹

A. Whether Tennessee’s Statutory Cap on Noneconomic Damages Violates a Plaintiff’s Right to Trial by Jury.

First, Plaintiff contends that the statutory cap violates the Plaintiff’s right to trial by jury. The right to a jury trial in Tennessee is expressly guaranteed by Article 1, Section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution, which mandates that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate[.]" We have explained that this provision guarantees the right to trial by jury as it existed at common law under the laws and constitution of North Carolina at the time of the adoption of the Tennessee Constitution of 1796. Young v. City of LaFollette, 479 S.W.3d 785, 793 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Helms v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety, 987 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tenn. 1999) ; Patten v. State, 221 Tenn. 337, 426 S.W.2d 503, 506 (1968) ). We further have held that "[t]he right to a jury trial envisions that all contested factual issues will be decided by jurors who are unbiased and impartial." State v. Smith, 418 S.W.3d 38, 45 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Ricketts v. Carter, 918 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tenn. 1996) ; Wolf v. Sundquist, 955 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) ). We also have long-recognized that the ascertainment of damages is a question of fact for the jury. See Spence v. Allstate Ins. Co., 883 S.W.2d 586, 594 (Tenn. 1994) (jury’s determination of damages is a question of fact); Fort v. Orndoff, 54 Tenn. 167, 173 (Tenn. 1872) (the ascertainment of damages was a question of fact "eminently proper to be ascertained by [the] jury"). We assume for purposes of this opinion that noneconomic damages were available at the time of the adoption of the Tennessee Constitution.² Thus, we also assume that a plaintiff has the right to an unbiased and impartial jury to decide, as a question of fact, the amount of any noneconomic damages sustained by the plaintiff. We now turn to what restrictions, if any, the General Assembly may place on the ability of a plaintiff to recover noneconomic damages.

As an initial matter, we recognize that it is within our General Assembly’s authority to legislatively alter the common law. See Mills v. Wong, 155 S.W.3d 916, 923 (Tenn. 2005) ("The Tennessee General Assembly itself has the power to weigh and to balance competing public and private interests in order to place reasonable limitations on rights of action in tort which it also has the power to create or to abolish."); Heirs of Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 71 S.W.3d 705, 712 (Tenn. 2002) (stating that "the General Assembly unquestionably has the constitutional and legislative authority to change the common law of this state"); Wooley v. Parker, 222 Tenn. 104, 432 S.W.2d 882, 884 (1968) (explaining that "the Legislature of the State for obvious reasons sets the public policy of the State by their Acts, and we have held time and time again that the common law is applicable in Tennessee unless the Legislature enacts a statute otherwise"). Indeed, there are numerous examples of the General Assembly altering common law causes of action and available remedies. For example, in Lavin v. Jordon, 16 S.W.3d 362, 363 (Tenn. 2000), we held that the common law tort of negligent control and supervision of a child had been superseded by statute when the damage caused by the child was intentional or malicious. As a result, damages against parents in such actions are now limited by a statutory cap that provides "[t]he recovery shall be limited to the actual damages in an amount not to exceed ten...