McClinton v. Berry

1

RICARDO MCCLINTON and DORIS JONES, Individually and as Administrators of the Estate of JAMARI MCCLINTON, Plaintiffs, v. Warden WALTER BERRY, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:22-CV-109 (MTT)

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division

September 25, 2024

ORDER

MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE.

The plaintiffs Ricardo McClinton and Doris Jones, individually and as administrators of the estate of Jamari McClinton claim that defendants Walter Berry, Jarvis Primus, James Perry, Eladio Abreu, and Nolita Moss violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to protect Jamari from an inmate assault that resulted in his death. Doc. 31. Recently added defendants James Perry, Eladio Abreu, and Nolita Moss (hereafter, the “new defendants”) move to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against them. Doc. 36. For the following reasons, the new defendants' motion (Doc. 36) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs are the parents of Jamari McClinton, who was stabbed and killed on August 11, 2021, at Baldwin State Prison (“BSP”) shortly after his transfer from Phillips State Prison (“PSP”). Doc. 31 ¶ 5 17, 27. The plaintiffs contend that Jamari died because of the defendants' deliberate indifference to Jamari's safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. ¶ 29.

The new defendants-Perry, Abreu, and Moss-move to dismiss. Doc. 36. At all relevant times, Perry was the warden at PSP and was responsible for its day-to-day operations. Doc. 31 ¶ 8A. Abreu was a classification analyst in the Georgia Department of Corrections' (“GDC”) central office, and he approved Jamari's transfer from PSP to BSP. Id. ¶ 8B. Moss was a shift supervisor at BSP at the time of Jamari's transfer. Id. ¶ 8C. The plaintiffs allege that Moss was “responsible for the security of inmates and staff during her working hours at BSP.” Id.

A. Factual Background

1. Jamari McClinton's death at BSP

While an inmate at PSP in July 2021, Jamari was involved in a fight with another inmate, whom the plaintiffs allege was a prison gang leader. Doc. 31 ¶ 10. After the fight, a “bounty-killing ‘contract'” was allegedly placed on Jamari and disseminated by social media to “gang affiliates throughout the prison system.” Id. The plaintiffs claim they were contacted by gang members as well, who threatened violence against Jamari unless the plaintiffs paid the gang members through Cash App. Id. Because of the fight and the subsequent bounty-killing contract, Perry placed Jamari in protective custody at PSP. Id. ¶ 12, 13. Perry ultimately transferred Jamari to BSP because of safety concerns. Id. ¶ 13. Allegedly alerted to the transfer, a gang leader at PSP posted on social media that Jamari would be transferred and instructed that Jamari “should not be ‘touched' until after he was transferred.” Id. ¶ 15. The PSP gang leader also “alerted gang members in other prisons to be on the lookout for him if they encountered him in the general population.” Id. The plaintiffs claim that they called the GDC when Jamari was transferred to ensure that he remained in protective custody after his transfer to BSP. Id. ¶ 16.

Jamari was transferred to BSP on or about August 6, 2021, but was not placed in protective custody. Id. ¶¶ 17, 22. The plaintiffs allege that on August 9 Jamari was given intake forms and spoke to Primus, a counselor at BSP, about the bounty-killing contract. Id. ¶ 18. Jamari's conversation with Primus was not recorded in Jamari's case notes. Id. ¶ 19. The next day, Jamari told his father that he spoke to a “staff member” at BSP but had not been placed in protective custody. Id. ¶ 24.

On August 11, Jamari was stabbed to death by another inmate in the general population yard at BSP. Id. ¶ 27. The inmate has since been charged with murder and the plaintiffs claim that Jamari's killer has known connections to the alleged gang leader with whom Jamari had an altercation. Id.

2. The plaintiffs' allegations of the new defendants' involvement in Jamari's death

The plaintiffs claim that defendants Perry, Abreu, and Moss each had knowledge of the risk of harm to Jamari and were deliberately indifferent when they failed to protect him. Doc. 31 ¶ 29. First, the plaintiffs allege that Perry placed Jamari in protective custody at PSP because of the bounty-killing contract but transferred Jamari without communicating with BSP to ensure that Jamari would be protected at BSP. Id. ¶ 26A. Second, the plaintiffs allege that Abreu knew that Jamari was transferred to BSP to protect him “from the known risk of murder,” but failed to communicate with BSP staff “to ensure that appropriate measures were taken in response to that known risk.” Id. ¶ 26B. Finally, the plaintiffs claim that Moss spoke with Jamari at least once about his several requests to be placed into protective custody but did not report her conversation so that Jamari's case could be evaluated. Id. ¶ 26C.

B. Procedural History

The plaintiffs filed their original complaint on March 14, 2022. Doc. 1. In that complaint, the plaintiffs sued only the nonmoving defendants, Primus and Berry, in their individual capacity for Jamari's wrongful death. Id. at 1. On April 8, 2024, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend their original complaint, and the plaintiffs added a failure to protect claim against the new defendants. Doc. 31. Because the plaintiffs had, by then, been appointed administrators of Jamari's estate, their amended complaint also added a claim against all the defendants on behalf of Jamari's estate for Jamari's pain and suffering, medical expenses, and funeral expenses. Id. ¶¶ 8D, 32.

The new defendants move to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against them on four grounds. Doc. 36. First, they contend that the plaintiffs' wrongful death claim should be dismissed because it is barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 3. Second, they argue that the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. Third, they argue that because the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. Finally, they claim they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id.

II. STANDARD

A. Statute of Limitations

Dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds is “‘appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred' and ‘only if it appears beyond a doubt that [a plaintiff] can prove no set of facts that toll the statute.'” Sec'y of Lab. v. Labbe, 319 Fed.Appx. 761, 764 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1288 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010) (alteration in original)).

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To avoid dismissal pursuant to Rule12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when “the court [can] draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Factual allegations that are ‘merely consistent with a defendant's liability' fall short of being facially plausible.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

At the motion to dismiss stage, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” FindWhat Inv. Grp. v. FindWhat.com., 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)). But “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Where there are dispositive issues of law, a court may dismiss a claim regardless of the alleged facts. Patel v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 904 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2018).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Plaintiffs' Wrongful Death Claim Against Perry, Abreu, and Moss is Barred by the Statute of Limitations.

The new defendants argue that the plaintiffs' wrongful death claim is barred by the statute of limitations because they did not bring the claim within two years of the accrual of the cause of action and because the statute of limitations has not been tolled.^[1] Doc. 36 at 4-5. The plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations for their wrongful death claim is tolled by both O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-92 (tolling for unrepresented estates) and 9-3-99 (tolling for crime victims), rendering their claim timely. Doc. 37 at 15-16. The Court concludes that the plaintiffs' wrongful death claim is untimely and no Georgia tolling provision applies.

1. The plaintiffs' wrongful death claim against the new defendants is untimely.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person who deprives someone of their constitutional rights “shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Where death results from the alleged constitutional violations, the Court looks to state law, in this case Georgia, to determine who can bring claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983. Carringer v. Rodgers, 331 F.3d 844, 849 (11th Cir. 2003). Under Georgia law, when an individual dies because of a tortious act,...