McCool v. Snyder Cnty. & Northumberland Cnty.

JOHN R. McCOOL, Plaintiff v. SNYDER COUNTY AND NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY, Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:CV-11-1038

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: June 27, 2014

(Judge Nealon)

MEMORANDUM

Background

On May 31, 2011, John McCool, an inmate confined in the State Correctional Institution, Coal Township ("SCI-Coal Township"), Pennsylvania, filed the above captioned civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1, complaint). The named Defendants are Snyder County and Northumberland County. Id. He raises claims arising out of alleged violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainer's Act ("IAD") that took place between 1981 and 1989. Id. For relief, he seeks compensatory damages. Id.

Presently pending are Defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint. (Docs. 4, 9). The motions are fully briefed and are ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss will be granted.

Discussion

I. Standard of Review

Motion to Dismiss

Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept as true all [factual] allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)). Although the court is generally limited in its review to the facts contained in the complaint, it "may also consider matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case." Oshiver v. Levin. Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide "the defendant notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of thecomplaint in the face of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must conduct a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, "the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' " Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (1009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated; well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id.; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadvside, 578 F.3d 203. 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the well-pleaded factual allegations have been isolated, the court must determine whether they are sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U .S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level"). A claim "has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

When the complaint fails to present a prima facie case of liability, however, courts should generally grant leave to amend before dismissing a complaint. See Grayson v. Mavview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113,116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). "[I]f a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless suchan amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citation omitted). The federal rules allow for liberal amendments in light of the "principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

II. Statement of Facts

The following statement of facts has been derived from Plaintiff's complaint, supporting exhibits, and matters in which the Court has taken judicial notice. See (Docs. 1, 28).¹

On May 5, 1980, McCool was indicted by an Ontario County grand jury and charged with robbery in the first degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree in violation of the New York Penal Law. McCool v. New York State, 29 F. Supp. 2d 151 (W.D. N.Y. 1998). Following a jury trial,McCool was convicted of robbery in the first degree. Id. On November 12, 1980, McCool was sentenced as a persistent felony offender to an indeterminate term of fifteen (15) years to life for that conviction. Id.

On, or about, February 25, 1981, Plaintiff was transferred to Pennsylvania pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers for trials in Northumberland and Snyder Counties. See (Doc. 28-1 at 4, Prosecutor's Acceptance of Temporary Custody Offered in Connection with another Prosecutor's Request for Disposition of a Detainer).

On June 10, 1981, in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County, Plaintiff was found guilty of kidnapping, felonious restraint, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, indecent assault, robbery, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. (Doc. 28-1 at 7, Prosecutor's Report on Disposition of Charges). He was sentenced to not less than thirty (30) years and not more than sixty (60) years imprisonment, to begin at the expiration of, and run consecutive to, the sentence imposed in Ontario County, Sate of New York. Id. On the same date, in the Court of Common Pleas of Snyder County, Plaintiff was found guilty of rape, kidnapping, and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. (Doc. 28-1 at 9, Prosecutor's Report of Disposition of Charges). He was sentenced to not less than twenty-five (25) years and not more than fifty (50) years imprisonment. Id.

On June 11, 1981, Plaintiff was returned to the State of New York. (Doc. 28 at 79, Return Information). On June 11, and June 16, 1981, Plaintiff's Pennsylvania convictions and sentences were lodged as detainers against him. See (Doc. 28-1 at 10, 12, letters from the Auburn New York Correctional Facility confirming Pennsylvania's detainers).

On March 25, 1983, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated and remanded Plaintiff's Northumberland County conviction and sentence to the Court for the sole purpose of affording McCool a hearing on his allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Doc. 28-1 at 15, Judgment).

Efforts were undertaken by both the Commonwealth and McCool to arrange his return to Pennsylvania, which efforts proved to no avail due to the position of officials at the New York prison where McCool was incarcerated, that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act did not apply.² See (Doc. 28-1 at 42, Commonwealth's Motion to Hold Hearing with or without Presence of Defendant).

Efforts were then made by the Commonwealth to extradite McCool under the Criminal Extradition Act; but, Commonwealth attorneys were advised by officials of the Pennsylvania's Governor's Office that the Extradition Act did not applybecause McCool was not a fugitive as that term is used in the Act, and that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act applied. Id.

On October 4, 1988, the Commonwealth sent a "Form V" request under the IAD for custody of McCool so that he would be available at the hearing he requested on his claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Id. Had McCool agreed to sign the appropriate form, Form II, voluntarily agreeing to his return to Pennsylvania under the IAD, New York State Officials would have given his custody to the Pennsylvania Officials. Id. McCool, however, apparently had had a change of heart since 1985, and refused to sign the form and challenged the Commonwealth's authority to seek or receive his custody for return to Pennsylvania. Id.

On December 11, 1989, New York Governor, Mario Cuomo, honored the requisition of Pennsylvania Governor, Robert Casey, for the surrender of McCool. See (Doc. 28-1 at 51-56, Agreement Between the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Governor of the State of New York).

By Order dated May 29, 1990, the Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas found that McCool was not denied effective assistance of counsel and set his resentencing for May 30, 1990. (Doc. 28-1 at 59, Order).

On June 18, 1990, the New York Department of Corrections acknowledged and lodged Northumberland County's Commitment Detainer against McCool, notifying them that his earliest release date would be January, 1995. (Doc. 28-1 at 60, June 18, 1990 letter).

By Order dated September 21, 1998, the Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas dismissed McCool's Post Conviction Relief Act Petition as untimely. (Doc. 28-2 at 17, Pa. R. Crim. P. 1507 Notice). The Court noted that the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed McCool's 1990 conviction, no appeal was sought in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and McCool failed to allege any exceptions to the one-year statute of limitations. Id.

This Court takes judicial notice that McCool has challenged his underlying convictions, as well as the alleged violations of the IAD, in the following actions: McCool v. Kyler, Civil No. 4:00-1418 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2001) (dismissing, for failing to exhaust, McCool's habeas corpus action, claiming that (1) his conviction was obtained in violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to obtain exculpatory evidence for trial and failed to act in light of the discovery of exculpatory evidence subsequent to trial; (3) he was denied the right to appeal; and (4) Snyder County failed to bring him to trial in a...