McCowan v. City of Philadelphia

AUDRA MCCOWAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-3326-KSM

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

March 11, 2022

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.................................................................................................3

A. The Evidentiary Record...................................................................................................3

B. McCowan is Promoted and Transferred to the Intelligence Bureau................................5

1. The Intelligence Bureau................................................................................................6

2. McCowan's Early Experience......................................................................................7

C. McCowan is Excluded from Training, Meetings, and Email Chains..............................9

D. Inappropriate Sexual Comments and Advances from Officer Younger........................11

E. McCowan and Allen Complain About Younger............................................................14

F. Sergeant Conway's Investigation...................................................................................17

G. McCowan Reports Younger's Harassment to Police Commissioner Ross....................18

H. McCowan Asks to be Detailed Out of A&I...................................................................19

I. McCowan Reports to Police Radio................................................................................22

J. McCowan Submits a Hardship Memo and the Union Files a Grievance......................23

1. McCowan's Hardship Memo......................................................................................23

2. Union Grievance.........................................................................................................24

K. McCowan Takes FMLA Leave......................................................................................25

L. Internal Affairs Completes Its Investigation in July 2019 ............................................26

M. McCowan Files this Lawsuit and Resigns from the Department...................................28

N. Systemic Problems at the City and the Department.......................................................28

1. Controller Rhynhart's Audit.......................................................................................28

2. Mayor Kenney's Press Release..................................................................................30

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY..................................................................................................30

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW..................................................................................................32

IV. DISCUSSION.......................................................................................................................33

A. Discrimination Claims....................................................................................................34

1. Counts I, VIII, XI, XVII, XX: Disparate Treatment.................................................34

2. Counts III, X, XVIII, XXI: Retaliation.....................................................................51

3. Counts II, XII, XVII, and XX: Hostile Work Environment......................................58

4. Counts XIX, XXII: Aiding and Abetting..................................................................72

B. Count XIII: First Amendment Retaliation....................................................................77

C. FMLA Claims................................................................................................................79

1. Count VI: FMLA Interference...................................................................................80

2. Count VII: FMLA Retaliation...................................................................................81

D. Remaining State Law Claims.........................................................................................83

1. Count XIV: Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law.........................................................83

2. Count XV: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress...........................................85

3. Count XVI: Assault and Battery................................................................................89

E. Counts XXIII, XXIV: Equitable Claims.......................................................................91

V. CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................92

Plaintiffs Audra McCowan and Jennifer Allen bring claims of discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), assault and battery, violations of the Federal Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), violations of Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, and violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) against the City of Philadelphia and eleven individually named defendants in their official and individual capacities. (See generally Doc. No. 49.) Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims. (See Doc. Nos. 132, 133, 136.)

Although the facts supporting each Plaintiffs claims overlap, their allegations and injuries are sufficiently distinct that we find it prudent to address them in separate, contemporaneously filed, Memoranda. In this Memorandum, we discuss McCowan's claims against the City and ten of the individual defendants.^[1] For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND^[2]

We begin by addressing the parties' arguments about the scope of the evidentiary record before turning to the facts.

A. The Evidentiary Record

In deciding the pending motions, McCowan urges the Court to consider as evidence the averments in her verified second amended complaint, arguing that the complaint may be converted into an affidavit because McCowan verified it under penalty of perjury. (See Draft H'rg. Tr. at 65:12-67:15.) Defendants strongly object, arguing that courts convert verified pleadings into affidavits only in cases involving pro se plaintiffs. (Draft H'rg. Tr. at 12:7-14:18.) We agree with Defendants.

Although courts in this Circuit have converted verified pleadings into affidavits in the past, each of those cases involved a pro se plaintiff. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 320 n.2, 322 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that most of the pro se plaintiffs “version of events is supported solely by his own statements in verified complaints and other court filings. Because those documents were signed under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, we consider them as equivalent to statements in an affidavit”); Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating pro se prisoner plaintiff's verified amended complaint as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment); Boomer v. Lewis, Civil No. 3:06-CV-0850, 2009 WL 2900778, at *2 n.4, *14 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2009) (same). As courts have recognized, this conversion was consistent with the understanding that “pro se complaints are held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Wilson v. Maben, 676 F.Supp. 581, 583 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).

The Court has not found, nor have Plaintiffs identified, any case where a court viewed a verified complaint as an affidavit outside of the pro se context. Cf. Id. (“Based on Haines, the Third Circuit has treated a pro se complaint made under penalty of perjury as an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.”); Hodgin v. Agents of Montgomery Cnty., 619 F.Supp. 1550, 1552 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, I will construe his submissions and the record evidence in his favor liberally. I note that plaintiff's complaint concludes with the statement, ‘I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.' The Third Circuit has treated a pro se complaint containing such a declaration as an affidavit in opposition to summary judgment.” (citations omitted)). Indeed, to do so would seem to run afoul of the Third Circuit's assertion that “[a]t summary judgment, a plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court will not allow Plaintiffs' counsel to avoid his obligations at this stage by relying on a rule that was meant to give pro se plaintiffs the leniency they are to be afforded.

Finally, the Court notes that discovery (and the inherent disputes that come along with it) would be an incredible waste of clients' money, attorneys' time, and judicial resources if a counseled plaintiff could always rely on the allegations in her verified complaint at summary judgment. In this case alone, the parties engaged in years of discovery - which included two depositions of each Plaintiff and an additional fourteen depositions of Defendants and witnesses.^[3] In addition, more than six months passed between when Defendants filed their motions and when Plaintiffs responded.^[4] Despite all that discovery and all that time, Plaintiffs' counsel did little more than cite in passing to his more than 4, 000 pages of exhibits. (See Doc. Nos. 163-65.) As the Court has warned Plaintiffs' counsel over and over again, it is not our job to sift through thousands of pages of evidence.

For those reasons, the Court will not convert McCowan's verified second amended complaint into an affidavit or consider the...