McCray v. New York

CERIOUS D. McCRAY, Plaintiff, v.STATE OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

17-CV-1395 (NSR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

October 31, 2019

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Walkill Correctional Facility, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ On March 18, 2018, the Court dismissed the complaint with leave to replead. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on July 20, 2018, and the Court has reviewed it. The amended complaint is dismissed because it fails to comply with the Court's order to amend, or with federal pleading rules. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the Court will grant him one final opportunity to file a pleading that states a viable claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadingsliberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

But the "special solicitude" in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief "that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

Moreover, the exact degree of solicitude that should be afforded to a pro se litigant in any given case depends upon a variety of factors, including the procedural context and relevant characteristics of the particular litigant. Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2010). A pro se litigant who has previously brought a similar case may be charged with knowledge of particular legal requirements. See Sledge v. Kooi, 564 F.3d 105, 109-110 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussingcircumstances where frequent pro se litigant may be charged with knowledge of particular legal requirements).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's original complaint - which is 771 pages long and names 63 persons and entities as defendants - is difficult to understand, and concerns unrelated sets of events and occurrences. (ECF 7:17-CV-1395, 2.) On March 13, 2018, the Court issued an 18-page order describing the complaint as "largely rambling, incoherent, and rel[ying] heavily on misplaced legal jargon," summarizing Plaintiff's allegations as far as they could be interpreted, and dismissing most of the claims because they were either frivolous, sought relief from immune defendants, or failed to state a claim.² Noting that the complaint was unnecessarily long, lacked detail, and did not clearly allege facts stating a plausible claim, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to replead only those claims relating to alleged mail tampering and retaliation,³ and "strongly encourage[d]" Plaintiff to limit the amended complaint to 50 pages. (ECF 7:17-CV-1395, 15 at 24.)

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on July 20, 2018. (ECF 7:17-CV-1395, 30.) It is 217 pages long, and names scores of defendants, many of whom Plaintiff named in the original pleading and who have already been dismissed out of the case, either on immunity grounds, or because the facts alleged did not suggest that those defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutionalrights. Plaintiff sets forth facts against Defendants who could not have been personally involved in tampering with Plaintiff's legal mail or retaliating against him, and he also asserts a host of new claims that were not set forth in the original pleading.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed for failure to comply with federal pleading rules. "When a complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be short and plain, the court has the power, on its own initiative or in response to a motion by the defendant, to strike any portions that are redundant or immaterial . . . or to dismiss the complaint." Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)); see also Shomo v. State of N.Y., 374 F. App'x 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (holding that where a complaint "contain[ed] a surfeit of detail . . . the district court was within bounds of discretion to strike or dismiss the complaint for noncompliance with Rule 8"); Prezzi v. Schelter, 469 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curium) (affirming dismissal of pro se plaintiff's 88-page, legal size, single spaced complaint that "contained a labyrinthian prolixity of unrelated and vituperative charges that defied comprehension[,] fail[ing] to comply with the requirement of Rule 8"); Lafurno v. Walters, No. 18-CV-1935 (JS) (ARL), 2018 WL 2766144, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2018) (dismissing pro se plaintiff's 61-page complaint that included a 66-page "memorandum of law" and 157-page "affidavit").

The amended complaint does not comply with Rule 8 for the same reasons Plaintiff's original complaint did not comply with Rule 8. It does not contain a short and plain statement showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief; it fails to provide fair notice to the defendants of the nature of his claims so that they may answer and prepare for trial; and it in no way clarifies Plaintiff's mail tampering and retaliation claims. Instead, it presents a barrage of allegationsagainst parole, corrections, and police officials, prosecutors, private attorneys, and others, regarding a slew of seemingly unrelated events.

Moreover, the Court granted plaintiff leave to amend his complaint solely to provide facts relating to the mail tampering and retaliation claims, and to name defendants who could arguably have been personally involved in those events. And, in an attempt to focus Plaintiff on those claims, the Court listed the correctional facilities where Plaintiff was detained at the time those claims arguably arose. Rather than only naming defendants at those facilities, however, Plaintiff names defendants with no conceivable connection to those two claims.

Additional allegations can only be added "with the opposing party's written consent, or the court's leave," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and neither was present here. See, e.g., See McCray v. Cnty. of Dutchess, ECF 7:10-CV-3930, 310 (CS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2017), 17-1781-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2019) (affirming dismissal of amended complaint in part because it went beyond the scope of the permitted amendment). Moreover, the Court is authorized to dismiss claims going beyond the scope of the original lawsuit and the permitted amendment. See, e.g. Palm Beach Strategic Income, LP v. Salzman, 457 F. App'x 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2012) ("District courts in this Circuit have routinely dismissed claims in amended complaints where the court granted leave to amend for a limited purpose and the plaintiff filed an amended complaint exceeding the scope of the permission granted."); Grimes v. Fremont General Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 584, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing cases); Sullivan v. Stein, 487 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D. Conn. 2007) (dismissing claims as "beyond the scope" of the Court's order).

Finally, Plaintiff is an experienced pro se litigator, having filed a number of pro se cases in this Court. See McCray v. Fisher, ECF 1:12-CV-3651, 17 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim); McCray v. Cnty. of Orange, ECF 7:12-CV-3950, 164 (CS) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2016) (entering voluntary stipulation of dismissal), aff'd, 15-4165 (L), 16-0174 (Con) (2d Cir. May 30, 2017); McCray v. New York State, ECF 1:13-CV-4766, 36 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2014), dismissed, 14-4253 (2d Cir. July 16, 2015 (corrected mandate dismissing appeal as lacking an arguable basis either in law or in fact).

In light of Plaintiff's litigation history, he should be able to plead facts, should they exist, stating a § 1983 claim, arising out of the alleged mail tampering and retaliation.⁴ The sheer length of Plaintiff's submissions contribute substantially to the Court's difficulty in deciphering his allegations. For this reason, the Court again strongly encourages Plaintiff to limit his amended pleading to 50 pages.

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket. The amended complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The Court grants Plaintiff one final opportunity to file an amended pleading. Plaintiff must submit the second amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within thirty days of the date of this order, caption the document as a "Second Amended...